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The meaning of democracy was contested theoretical and

political terrain in classical Athens.
I

In this dissertation

examine three contending theoretical views of democracy

found in the works of three Greek thinkers

Aeschylus and Plato
democracy.

I

— present

— Thucydides,

at the height of Athenian

show that each view draws upon competing

conceptions of nature, language, truth, and power in order
to claim the contested terrain.
I

argue that the heroic view of democracy, portrayed in

Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, saw politics
as the means by which states achieve immortal glory through

feats of war which simultaneously destroy them.

In this

view political power was delivered by the unified voice--the
single identity--of the Athenian assembly produced by the

power of persuasion.
I

interpret the tragic view, represented by Aeschylus'

Oresteia, to criticize the heroic tradition of politics as

dangerously unbalanced.

The Oresteia offers an alternative

vii

.

view of democracy in which multiple voices divided against

themselves produce not weakness but balance as

a

shield

against the loss of limits implied in the heroic view.

I

argue that the ambiguity of language, and the ambiguous

identity it produces, is affirmed by tragedy to be

a

source

of political strength and not a sign of political

disintegration
The Platonic view articulated in the Republic opposes

both the heroic view of politics and its tragic revision.

I

contend that the Republic, while appearing to oppose
democracy, actually seeks to place it on

a

more secure

foundation grounded in the logical concept of identity and
rational thought applied to the soul.

I

argue that the

Platonic attempt to found political order on the twin
concepts of logical and psychological identity maintained by
rational thought and language actually recapitulates on

a

grand scale the same dangers it identifies in its heroic
opponents.

And

I

suggest in conclusion that our Platonic

legacy may effectively blind us to the dangerously heroic

trajectory of the modern political state.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

The collective nature of political power is
expressed
in various terms such as "assent,"

"obedience."

"consent," or

"Action in concert" 1 is the phrase chosen by

Hannah Arendt to express the same concept and to distinguish
between the nature of political power on one hand, and force
or violence on the other.

As Arendt well recognized,

however, action in concert poses

a

politics is by its very nature

marshalling or pooling of

a

problem of limits.

If

individual power, on what basis or by what means is the

requisite assent, consent, or obedience obtained and what
are its limits?

How,

in other words,

are we to distinguish

between cooperation and complicity?
The experience which shaped Arendt'

s

political

theorizing was of course the degree of cooperation, active
or passive, which contributed to the power of Nazi Germany.

Arendt

'

s

entire work is devoted to the need to distinguish

between this kind of political power and more "legitimate"
instances.

In this respect Arendt

1

s

work is representative

of much of Western political thought, and it follows a

venerable tradition which seeks to found that distinction
upon

a

notion of truth.

In her essay,

"Truth and Politics," Arendt poses the

rhetorical question of whether political power "could or

2

should be checked not only by
rights,

.

.

constitution,

a

bill of

and by a multiplicity of powers, as in the system of

checks and balances,
.

a

.

.

.

[but also]

by something that

has its source outside the political realm, and is as

independent of the wishes and desires of the citizens as is
the will of the worst tyrant." 2

To Arendt,

the answer is

clearly "yes," and in her essay she goes on to argue for

a

version of "factual truth" to fill that authoritative
position.

It is beside the present point if Arendt's effort

ultimately fails to establish factual truth as the
unimpeachable authority needed to ground or legitimize
political action.

For in that essay and in her larger work

Arendt conveys the conceptual architecture behind

a

significant tradition of Western political thought.

Arendt's lifelong search for

a

truth to occupy the position

defined by the intersection of power, authority, and freedom
represents

a

tradition which seeks to admit the necessity of

power in political action while simultaneously seeking

a

basis to limit that power once admitted.
The figure which haunts the shadows of all such efforts
is Friedrich Nietzsche.

If

Nietzsche's work can be said to

culminate in an affirmation of will to power, the persistent
target of this affirmation is the concept of truth in its

various historical articulations beginning with Plato.

Traditional approaches to Nietzsche tend to read his
work as endorsing, even celebrating, the priority of power
3
over and against truth.

The implicit assumption within the

3

traditional critique is that truth and power stand
in
primary opposition to each other and, more specifically,
that truth operates as

a

limit to power.

On this

traditional view, then, Nietzsche's attack on truth is an
attack upon limits to power.

But contrary to the

traditional view, Nietzsche's work can also be read as

critique of

a

modernity.

Far from endorsing the abolition of limits,

then,

a

loss of limits to power which is definitive of

Nietzsche instead may actually sound

a

warning that

the limits have already been abolished, and that the

executioner was Plato.
From Nietzsche's perspective the highest ideals of

modernity have always been some version of the Platonic
ideal of subjecting power to

a

higher standard or even

banishing it from the world altogether.

In Nietzsche's

lexicon, philosophic truth, religious truth, or scientific

truth are all, despite the deep oppositions which divide
them, merely different forms of the Platonist ideal of

erecting

a

final authority over power, an authority in the

form of an ideal standard which could both authorize and
limit power but which would itself require neither

authorization nor limit.

From Nietzsche's perspective,

however, the "highest ideals" in the Platonic sense actually

operate as insidious forms of power, insidious in that they
deny or conceal themselves as power, and so operate as to
evade resistance, opposition, or limitation.

4

It is fundamental to Nietzsche's
position,

as

I

understand it, that unless power is openly
acknowledged and
accepted as a primary component of human life,
human

relations will be governed by

a

rancorous resentment which

destroys the possibility of human friendship and mutual
respect.

Ironically then, from Nietzsche's perspective, the

attempt to banish the element of power from human relations
in favor of "higher" and finer sentiments can lead only to

an unhealthy,

subterranean pursuit of power whose

insatiability consumes all other human possibilities
including those "higher values" in whose name power is
condemned.

It is this self-denial of power which,

Nietzsche's view, renders the figure "man" such

in

a sick and

dangerous animal, sick because he does not recognize his
servitude to invisible power, and dangerous because he seeks
to extend it over all of life.

The Nietzschean position can be summed up briefly in
the claim that Platonic truth institutes

unlimited power.
a

a

modern regime of

Adequate assessment of the charge requires

re-examination of Platonic truth with respect to the

problem of power and its limits.

But any such re-

examination must avoid slipping surreptitiously into
Platonic rejoinder to Nietzsche.

a

mere

It is much too easy in

attempting to assess Nietzschean claims to uncritically and
unref lectively re-impose Platonic standards of truth and to
discover, not surprisingly, that Nietzsche does not conform

b

to them.

This then opens an easy door to dismissing

Nietzsche on various epistemological grounds.
To insist that Nietzsche be held accountable to

Platonic standards of truth is not to refute Nietzsche, it
is to refuse to take him seriously,

and to take Nietzsche

seriously is first of all to entertain the possibility of
other configurations of truth opposed to the Platonic one.

Only then can the more difficult task be undertaken, which
is to assess the Nietzschean claim that Platonic truth poses
a

special danger with respect to power.

Nietzsche's assault on Platonic truth is launched from
behind,

so to speak,

of Greek thought.

I

from the vantage point of earlier modes

follow a similar strategy in examining

the situation of Platonic truth with respect to the possible

limits of power by rejoining Platonic truth to its original

opponents in the form of tragic and heroic literature.

The

initial objective is merely to try to make plausible the

claim that other configurations of truth form

a

part of the

same tradition which produces Plato, and to suggest critical

ways in which those earlier configurations differ from the

Platonic one.

The credibility of the Nietzschean accusation

against Plato can then be better assessed.

Three traditional Greek cosmological orientations to
the problem of power and its limits can be identified:

heroic,

the tragic,

and the Platonic.

formed three separate strands of

a

the

These configurations

single tradition which is

largely definitive of ancient Greek political culture.

But

.

6

as separate strands of a single
tradition,

each orientation

nevertheless locates itself in opposition to one
or both of
the others.
The heroic tradition, usually associated with
the

Homeric poems, yields

a

relatively coherent conception of

natural cosmological order and man's place within it. 4

a

The

two most prominent features of the heroic cosmos are
power

and death,

that is, human mortality.

In the heroic view,

the cosmos is an arena of strife, an agon of forces and

powers in conflict.

5

Within this conception the relation of

truth and power can perhaps best be described as the truth
of power.

Cosmic power was not something which Homeric

heroes took up and possessed; it was rather something which

mortals passed through, something which took them up and
touched them in some fashion or another.
for example,

To an early Greek,

the regularity of the seasons and the

alternation of night and day would not have signified
neutral events obeying mechanical-type laws.

They would be

interpreted as signs of victory and defeat in the regular
ebb and flow of struggles for power among gods and other

active forces.

Interpretation of the cosmos as

a

series of

interminable struggles for power need not imply that the
early Greeks did not notice the regularity of natural
cycles.

It means only that the regularity was interpreted

and understood in terms of

dominance

a

contest or competition for

7

Next to power, the most palpable presence in
the

Homeric world is death.

Significantly, death is the single

most prominent difference between men and gods in
the

Homeric world.

6

Men die and the gods are immortal.

The

ancient Greek gods were more powerful than mortals but they
were not omnipotent; they were fallible and could

occasionally be outwitted, seduced, and even wounded by
mortals.

The gods were decidedly not more "moral" than

mortals in

modern sense.

a

For

a

Greek to rely on the

morality of the gods could prove ruinous.

What mortals

could rely on from the gods was their competition and desire
for honor, or deference,

and in this they differed not at

all from men.

War was a normal occurrence in the Homeric world, and
it was somewhat paradoxically through the medium of war that

heroic man sought to overcome death through the achievement
of honor and glory.

Although death served as an absolute

limit to individual power and presence in the immediate
world,

immortality of

in mortal memory,

and song.

8

a

sort could in principle be achieved

which is to say in the language of legend

The epic language of the Iliad, for example,

does not merely recount the exploits and the valor of
heroes; it commemorates those heroes in

language.

a

monumental

The language of the Iliad is itself

a

greatness which in its timeless retelling confers

monument to
a

semblance of immortality upon the greatest of heroes.

The

choice faced by Achilles in the Iliad, for example, was not

8

whether to live or die, but rather how to die:

early,

in

combat for the greatest glory told forever in song;
or
later, unremembered and unsung.

9

Achilles chooses the

heroic death, and his greatness is remembered in part

because of the greatness of his opponent, Hector.

In many

respects the contest between Achilles and Hector exemplifies
the heroic conception of power, which contains within itself

the notion of opposition.

Where today we might see two

powers in conflict, the Homeric Greek would see conflict as
the very substance and expression of the singularity of

power.

Conflict and the presence of opposition is

a

characteristic of power in the Greek conception.
Although the heroic cosmos is an agon of forces
competing for dominance, the cosmos is not

a

Limits operate through the agency of dike.

chaos of power.
Dike, usually

translated as "justice," is one of many Greek terms which
revolve around
Moira,

fate,

a

conception of natural order in the cosmos.

and physis, nature, are others.

The term

kosmos itself is opposed to chaos and implies order.

For

present purposes it suffices to think of dike as the

regulatory principle of order in the cosmos, "the order of
things," while remembering that the cosmos itself is an

order of power.

Dike is not yet

a

moral notion in the

Homeric cosmos. 10
Like any set of limits, dike both restrains and gives
form to that which it limits.

example,

It is often useful,

for

to distinguish between the river and its banks, but

9

we need not lose sight of the fact that without banks there
is no river.

Similarly, although it may be analytically

useful, even necessary, to distinguish between power and the

dike which limits it, it would nevertheless be thoroughly

misleading to think of dike as having
from the power which it limits.
one, not two,

a

separate identity

Power and opposition are

in the heroic cosmos.

This is perhaps the

simplest, yet most difficult "truth" for moderns to

comprehend.

Its simplicity lies in its restrained,

geometric balance.

Its difficulty lies in its challenge to

our deepest convictions about the nature of identity.

To a

modern mind, identity means non-contradiction, but the

marriage of opposites which seems to characterize early
Greek thought seems to deny what for us is an intuitively
logical and necessary truth.

As

I

will argue later,

however, this "intuition" of ours is an inheritance from
Plato.

It was neither intuitive nor necessary to much of

pre-Socratic thought.
The distinguishing feature of the heroic cosmos is the

characteristic relationship between power and dike.
heroic cosmos, power conforms to
resembling an upright wheel.

a

In the

cyclical nature, physis,

The movement of celestial

zenith, and
objects, rising from the horizon to an akme, or

then declining below the horizon again, supplies
the natural rotation, or physis, of power.

a

model for

The natural

strength at
cycle of life, from weakness at birth through
is also seen to
maturity, followed by decline and death,

.

10

follow this cyclical trajectory.

To the mind of an early

Greek, this paradigmatic movement represents

a

fundamental

truth of the cosmos; and the physis of power--which grows

from weakness to strength, possibly ascending to greatness

before entering its inevitable decline

— offers

no exception.

Given the agonistic conception of the cosmos which dominates
early Greek thought, any account of this cyclical movement
at the heart of the cosmos must be offered in terms of

power.

If day is followed by night and Spring follows

Winter, for example, it is because Day becomes weak and is

defeated by Night, and Spring achieves victory over Winter.
Each achieves dominance in turn, only to face eventual

defeat by its proper opponent.

Power is seen to be self-

limiting in this cosmology because it tends to naturally
increase (hubris) until it destroys itself, and it destroys
itself because it naturally generates its own opposition

which then passes through

a

similar cycle. A natural

tendency toward hubris 11 is followed by dike, not as two
separate, oscillating powers, but as the physis of power

itself

Homeric man is compelled by the world he lives in to

pursue honor and avoid dishonor.
an alignment with power.

Either course necessitates

Neutrality, in the sense of

a

position outside alignments of power, is not an available
option in the heroic world.

Like most early Greek values,

to the
the Greek idea of freedom is intimately related

centrality of power in the Greek experience.

In the heroic

11

world "power" is almost synonymous with rule over others.
Thus only two real possibilities present themselves to the

early Greeks:

rule or be ruled.

In its heroic

manifestation "freedom" means freedom from rule by others.

Consequently dominance and freedom come to mean much the
same thing. 12

Equality of power was not yet

be maintained, but only

a

a

principle to

precarious condition resulting

from an indecisive competition for power and honor.
The all-consuming pursuit of honor seeks to overcome
the limit of mortality, but because power rises and falls

with the turning of the cosmos, those to whom dike once

grants the greatest honor and glory may also be those to

whom she delivers the greatest suffering and undoing.

greater the rise, the greater the fall.

The

Although the

inexorable action of dike would seem to mitigate against the

pursuit of greatness, it could also fuel the desire to die
in a heroic blaze of glory.

In such a way a mortal might

cheat fate, live forever in memory, and earn

a

semblance of

honor customarily reserved only for the immortal gods.

Although the heroic view is most often, and
appropriately, associated with the epic poetry of Homer,
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, which bears

many affinities to Homer's Iliad,

12

is particularly well-

situated to illustrate the theoretical utility of the heroic

orientation to power and its limits.

By the time Thucydides

the Iliad
writes his History, perhaps four centuries after

silently shaped
was written down, the view of nature which

12

the earlier text is no longer uncontested.

Time, events,

and other texts have intervened to provide space for

competing views to clash.

The distance from Homer to

Thucydides, however, far from dimming the heroic view,

sharpens it in some respects and renders it more available
to Thucydides as a theoretical account of the war he

describes between Athens and Sparta.
The Peloponnesian war, which ended in Athenian defeat,

lasted for twenty-seven years from 431 B.C. to 404 B.C.
end of the war marked the end of

a

The

remarkable trajectory of

Athenian power following the combined Greek victory over
Persian naval forces at the Battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. 14
At Salamis the Persians were defeated by a confederation of

Greek forces including among the strongest both Athens and
Sparta.

It was the Persian threat which initially served to

unite, at least loosely and temporarily, what had been

fiercely competitive and relatively autonomous Greek states.

Although the Greek confederation was at least in principle
an alliance between equals, Athenian daring and leadership

was conceded by others and claimed by Athens to have

contributed disproportionately to the victory.

During the

war with Persia, Athens had boldly overthrown its traditions
to become a naval power.

Following the audacious Greek

victory at Salamis, Athens continued to develop its navy and
15
emerged as the dominant power in greater Greece.

Twenty-eight years before Salamis, Athens had become

a

and
democracy under the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 B.C.,

13

Athenians were fond of crediting their greatness
to their
form of government.
If we accept this self -assessment
and
,

designate 508 B.C. as the infancy of Athenian greatness,
then the period which encompasses the institution of

Athenian democracy to the death of Socrates just over
century later, in 399 B.C., represents

a

a

period of

extraordinary accomplishment amid intense intellectual
strife.

This was the period of "Greek enlightenment" when

traditional understandings of the fundamental bases of law,
justice,

and political rule, for example, came under intense

scrutiny and debate.

It was also during this period that

the production and performance of Greek tragedy reached its

height before passing into history shortly after the end of
the Peloponnesian War.

The lifespan of Greek tragic drama closely paralleled
the steep trajectory of Athenian power and greatness.

It

emerged along with Greek democracy and did not long outlive
it.

A signal characteristic of Greek tragedy is the

dramatic presentation of contested meanings within the folds
of action.

But the "tensions and ambiguities in Greek

tragedy" 16 do more than to dramatically reproduce and

reflect the social strains of shifting meanings within

changing world. 17

Greek tragedy occupies

a

a

definite

political position and embraces an affirmative political
theory at odds with the heroic orientation shaping
Thucydides' text.

14

Thucydides* History and Greek tragic drama can be

juxtaposed to portray contending theoretical orientations to
the nature of power and its limits.

In part the debate

revolves around the nature of language itself and its role
in political life,

and this contest may account in part for

the prominent place of the famous speeches in Thucydides'
text.

The theoretical confrontation which emerges from

a

juxtaposition of Thucydides' History and Greek tragic drama
serves to illuminate both the heroic and tragic orientations
to the limits of power.

The confrontation also helps to

situate, both historically and intellectually, the

Socratic/Platonic philosophic reaction to both the poetic
tradition and the political dislocations engendered by the
war.

As it happens then, Thucydides'

text presents a

convenient aperture through which we might view, directly or
indirectly, all three strands of the tradition
explore:

the heroic,

the tragic,

I

want to

and the Platonic.

.

15
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The facile translation of dike by "justice" tends to
obscure the essentially unsettled and contestable meaning of
the term throughout Greek history as well as today.
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CHAPTER

2

THUCYDIDES AND THE LANGUAGE OF POWER

Thucydides and Homer
In Thucydides'

History the heroic cycle of power is

traced by the dramatic rise and fall of Athenian power in
the context of the Peloponnesian War, where the war is

representative of the cosmic agon, and the combatants are
city-states rather than heroic individuals.

The History

begins with an account of the antecedents of Athenian power
in "early times" and culminates in the political dis-

integration of Athens following the disastrous Sicilian
Expedition, in which the Athenians
were beaten at all points and altogether; all that they
suffered was great; they were destroyed, as the saying
is, with a total destruction, their fleet, their army

everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned
home

1
.

Between its emergence and its demise, Athenian imperial
power surpassed all previous bounds among Greeks, and
The magnitude of the

appeared to deny any future limits.

Athenian defeat in Sicily provides

a

dramatic counterpoint

the
to the Battle of Salamis in the Persian War in which

forces
invading Persian fleet was destroyed by smaller Greek

and Athenian ingenuity.

Although Thucydides does not make

the comparison explicit,

the ironic reversal could hardly

reader, and the
fail to be noted by any contemporary Greek

.
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contrast follows

a

basic structural principle of Thucydides'

text
In his introduction to the Crawley translation
of

Thucydides History, T.
as "antithetical,"

E.

Wick describes Thucydides' style

that is,

"characterized by sentences in

which words, clauses, and ideas are coordinated to give
balance, parallelism, and comparison and contrast." 2

As

Wick also observes, the antithetical designation can readily
be applied not only to Thucydides' own narrative sentence

structure and that of the reconstructed speeches of various
parties to the war, it can be applied as well to the

organization and arrangement of the whole work.

Initially,

the text appears to be a running account of the events of
the war as they occurred,

and Thucydides' method of

chronicling the war according to consecutive summers and
winters contributes to the initial impression.
of the text soon emerges,

however.

The geometry

The speeches, often

presented in balanced pairs, are frequently echoed and
rejoined in complex juxtapositions later in the text.
Beyond the speeches, the text abounds with contrasts and
comparisons, oppositions and reversals.

Sea-power is

contrasted with land-power, Athenian character is contrasted
with Spartan character, and oligarchy is contrasted to

democracy.

Justice is pitted against both force and

expediency.

paralleled by
war.

A description of Athens afflicted by plague is
a

description of Corcyra afflicted by civil

These contrasting images are then reversed, turned

°

'
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inside out, and paradoxically rejoined with yet other

oppositions within the text moving in similar orbits.

The

structure is not merely antithetical; it is thoroughly
agonistic.

Even Thucydides' apparently natural method of

recounting events chronologically by summers and winters can
be seen to conform to the principle of paired oppositions

which governs the structure of the text.
Hunter R. Rawlings III, in The Structure of Thucydides
History, further claims that "Thucydides wrote the history
of a great war that was itself composed of two wars of

almost identical length." 3

According to Rawlings,

Thucydides' original insight that the Peloponnesian War was
a

single war of twenty-seven years' duration 4 is further

complicated by Thucydides' belief, reflected in the
structure of the text, that the war was "not only twentyseven years long, but it consisted of two periods of
intense, continuous fighting each lasting ten years.
the equivalent of two epic wars." 5

It was

Rawlings then argues

meticulously that the speeches and events of the "two wars"
present mirror opposites to each other.
That Thucydides' text is carefully structured, and

structured antithetically, has been extensively noted by
other scholars. 7

Considerably less attention has been given

to the significance of that structure.

Rawlings contends

that the structure is intended to demonstrate and verify the

truth of Thucydides' assertion that the past will resemble
the future,

8

not as repetition but as ironic contradiction.

20

Francis Cornford, in his Thucydides Mythistoricus

,

is among

those drawn to the tempting conclusion that Thucydides'
text
is not history at all in the modern sense but
rather a form

of tragic drama.

10

Reacting to the "ambivalences" and oppositions within
the text, James Boyd White claims in When Words Lose Their

Meaning,

that "irresolution on matters of greatest

importance is
whole." 11

a

structural characteristic of the text as

a

White's intention is not to fault Thucydides'

ability or style, even though he finds that "the events of
the History are

.

.

.

constructed in incompatible ways as

well as subjected to incompatible modes of explanation."

Indeed he emphasizes that "the opposition is deliberate
.

.

[and]

.

gives the text its central life and meaning." 12

White's interpretation is both sophisticated and generous.
He argues that Thucydides has created a text which "mirrors
the world" itself, one in which "the modes of presentation

and understanding Thucydides employs are the ways in which
we still try to make sense of our own world.

ni

He

maintains further that Thucydides goes "beyond the
conditions of his own life as he represents them and raises
a

hope that things could somewhere, sometime be different"

from

a

world which falls apart.

White's invocation of

a

14

world shared at some level by

both Thucydides and the modern reader fails to consider that
Thucydides' world may be even more alien to us than White
allows.

White's insistent characterization of the

21

paradoxical oppositions which structure Thucydides
a

text as

'

"lack of resolution" prevents him from entertaining
the

possibility of

a

world in which the longing for resolution

is not an operative or predominant standard.

White's text

is one of the more prominent attempts to interpret

Thucydides* text as anti-war.

But the alternative

possibility, that the text is

a

glorification of war in the

Homeric tradition, has at least an equal claim to viability.
Rather than rejecting the world of war, the text may seek to

defend and immortalize it just as Homer immortalized the

Trojan War in the Iliad.
White would consider the criticism to be misguided

since he interprets Homer's Iliad to be anti-war as well. 15

Commenting on the oppositions which permeate the heroic
culture, and which are represented in the quarrel between

Achilles and Agamemnon, White finds it "remarkable that the

culture provides the intellectual and rhetorical material by
which an opposition such as this can be defined

.

.

.

but

apparently no material by which it can be authoritatively
addressed and resolved.

.

.

.

The central issue is always

this:

Who shall dominate, and who shall submit."

added].

16

[Emphasis

The agonistic order of the heroic cosmos is

recaptured in part in the antagonism between Achilles and
Agamemnon, and White confronts this world with wonderment.
His governing standard of "resolution"

— resolution

of

ambiguity and conf lict--prevents him from seeing the culture
he observes as whole and coherent in its own way.

From the

.
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perspective of "resolution," the culture must be viewed as
deficient, incomplete, and inadequate.

White notes that, although Homer necessarily works

within "a language that seems to have been made for the

celebration of the heroic culture he criticizes," 17 the
structure of the poem manages to order materials into

a

"pattern of experience that teaches the reader something

different from anything the material itself seems to say." 18

According to White, the critical space opened up by the
structure of the poem "operates as an appeal to normalcy, to
a

world without war, where night is safe and beautiful." 19

The status of this "normalcy" is in question, however.

White makes no claim that war itself was anything but normal
in Greek culture from Homer to Thucydides

appear,

then,

20

It would

that the normalcy of a world without war

alludes to the "impossible hope" repeatedly invoked by White
and attributed to both Homer and Thucydides.

21

This longing

for reconciliation and resolution, which finds no actual

expression in the language of either Homer or Thucydides,
and which exists, according to White, only in the unspoken

community of author and reader,

22

apparently finds its

23
reality in the universal longings of humanity.

There is, then, something resembling

a

Hegelian dynamic

shaping White's interpretations of both Homer and
Thucydides.

It seems

uncharitable to be critical of this

beautiful vision or to deny

which inspires it.

a

moment of "truth" to the hope

Nevertheless, it bears noting that

23

White's "impossible hope" may represent an innocence

achieved through the privileged elevation of one set of
longings over still yet others present in the human breast.

Modern thought will puzzle at

a

suggestion that hope for an

end to strife and conflict should not be privileged over

contrary longings.

But another Greek tradition,

found in

Greek tragedy, will treat the proposed hierarchy as itself

dangerously unbalanced.

And Nietzsche will, much later,

remind us that such innocence may itself become the

unwitting instrument of those "other" longings.
Thucydides
Homer.

'

text exists in an ambiguous relationship to

On the one hand Thucydides appears to disparage

Homer and "the poets," associating them with exaggeration
and romance.

94

On the other hand, Thucydides tends to echo

Homer even as he discounts him.

The key to this paradox is

contained in the Greek tradition of the agon, or contest.
Thucydides is engaged in

competition with Homer in which

a

he seeks to best Homer at his own game.

Thucydides relates the history of

a war.

Like Homer,

More to the point,

Thucydides informs us repeatedly that his war, the
60
Peloponnesian War, is the greatest war in history.

would certainly have been
standards.

a

This

bold claim by contemporary Greek

The Trojan war occupied the central position in

Greek history, and all wars in Greece tended to be measured
against the Trojan War.

26

Thucydides, however, provides

numerous grounds for the claim that his war is greater than
Homer's war.

The Trojan War lasted for ten years by Homer's

24

account, but the Peloponnes ian War lasted for twenty-seven
years.

Furthermore, since the Peloponnesian War was

single war composed of two ten-year wars separated by

a

a

seven-year interval of nominal peace, 27 it was, he could
argue,

the equivalent of two epic wars,

as great as Homer's war.

28

and more than twice

Thucydides could also claim that

the scale of the fighting involved in the Peloponnesian War

was far greater than that of the Trojan War.
to the Peloponnesian War, he tells us,

For contrary

the Trojan War never

employed the whole concentrated force of the victors.
On the contrary,
.

.

.

they seem to have turned to cultivation

and to piracy from want of supplies.

This is what

really enabled the Trojans to keep the field for ten
years against them. ... If they had
persevered
in the war without scattering for piracy and
.

.

.

agriculture, they would easily have defeated the Trojans
in the field

.

.

.

[and]

the capture of Troy would have

cost them less time and less trouble.

y

Thucydides similarly dismisses the Persian War as an
engagement which "found

a

speedy decision in two actions by

sea and two by land," in contrast to the Peloponnesian War

which was "prolonged to an immense length," and caused an

unprecedented scale of desolation, suffering, and
bloodshed.

30

Lastly, Thucydides can, and does, claim

superiority to both Homer and Herodotus in terms of
accuracy, thereby elevating himself by implication to the

unrivaled status of the greatest historian of all time,
suitably fit to be the chronicler of the greatest war in

.
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history.

As a parting blow to Homer, Thucydides notes as

additional signs of greatness the unparalleled number and
extent of earthquakes, eclipses, droughts, famines, and

plague associated with the Peloponnesian War. 32
Even as Thucydides discounts Homer on one level, he is

simultaneously engaged on another level in demonstrating
Homeric truth exemplified in the Peloponnesian War on
greater scale than ever before:

a

a

power follows its own laws,

and power uses men, not the reverse.

On one level,

Thucydides might be read as the first modern historian,
chronicling
manner.

a

On

war in an almost scientifically detached
a

deeper level, the structural patterns of the

History suggest that Thucydides may be defending an older,
more conservative view of law, nature, and "the order of
things" generally, against more modern contentions of his

day
The Truth of Power and Language

There can be little doubt that in his account of the
war, Thucydides seeks to convey a great and timeless

truth.

34

Thucydides himself informs us that

The absence of romance in my history will, I fear,
detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged
useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge
of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the
future, which in the course of human things must

resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content.
essay which
In fine, I have written my work, not as an

.
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is to win the applause of the moment,

possession for all time.

but as a

35

We may judge from this passage that Thucydides finds

revealed in :he war

a

pattern to human events which recurs

over time, and it is this pattern which interests him even
more than the particular events of the war.

The course of

the war is treated by Thucydides as metaphorical of a

greater truth.

The point is reinforced by Thucydides'

assertion that his work eschews mere passing entertainment
to aim at a possession for all time;
in Thucydides

1

that is,

it presents,

view, a timeless truth.

Some scholars have focused on the apparent utilitarian

value of knowledge claimed by Thucydides in the passage

According to one view, Thucydides advances an early

above.

rationalist view of history incorporating

a

belief that

rational understanding of the past will be useful in

altering or controlling future events.

Thucydides,

however, makes no such claim here or anywhere else in the
He suggests that history recurs in cyclical patterns,

text.

and that

a

knowledge of those patterns will be useful in

interpreting or recognizing the future.

There is never any

claim that human intelligence can do more than observe the
larger patterns of power within which human events are

implicated

Jl

The growth of power generally, not merely Athenian
power,

of
is the subject of the first twenty-four chapters

Thucydides' History, usually referred to as the

27

"Archaeology."

The theme of "greatness" permeates this

section of the text.

In the opening sentences Thucydides

tells us that he undertook to write the history of the

Peloponnesian war because he believed it "would be

a

great

war;" indeed it would be "the greatest movement yet known in

history;" and further, that there was nothing on such

a

"great scale, either in war or in other matters" which

preceded it. 38

Greatness is contrasted generally to

weakness throughout the Archaeology, and it is treated

synonymously with

a

range of activities including the

building of large cities, collective action, naval power,
and of course, war.
then,

The nominal subject of the History,

is the course of a particular war, but the larger

subject concerns

a

recurring pattern of history involving

great and powerful deeds:

deeds which command renown and

are therefore worthy of retelling; and

a

pattern of power so

inscribed in nature as to earn the epithet of "truth."

Addressing the question of the origins, roots, or
causes of the war, Thucydides distinguishes between two

categories of causes

— those

which were spoken and those

which were unspoken--and he concludes that the true cause,
which was "invisible to speech," was the growing power of
Athens.

This distinction between spoken and unspoken causes

parallels Thucydides' division of the text into speeches and
narrative.

The passage which introduces the subject of the

causes of the war deserves close examination since it has
the
long been recognized as one of the most important in

:

,
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text.

As translated by w.

Robert Connor it reads as

follows
The Athenians and Peloponnesians began the war when they
repudiated the Thirty Years Truce which they had made

after the capture of Euboea [in 446 B.C.].
I have set
down first the causes of complaint and the grievances
behind the repudiation so that no one ever has to
investigate from what origin such a great war broke out
among the Greeks.
The truest reason, although the least

evident in the discussion, was, in my opinion, that the
Athenians by growing great caused fear in the [Spartans]
and drove them into war.^

Hunter Rawlings III translates the same passage, retaining
the Greek terms in critical places, as follows:
As to why they broke the peace,

and the diaphorai

,

so that no one will ever seek the

background out of which so great
Greeks.

wrote first the aitiai

I

a war arose among the

But as for the truest prophasis, though the

least apparent in talk,

I

believe that the Athenians,

becoming powerful and causing fear in the [Spartans]
forced them into war. 40
And lastly, the Crawley translation:
To the question why they broke the treaty, I answer by
placing first an account of their grounds of complaint
and points of difference [aitiai and diaphorai] that no

one may ever have to ask the immediate cause which
plunged the Hellenes into a war of such magnitude. The
real cause alethestate prophasis] I consider to be the
one which was formally most kept out of sight
The growth of the power of
[aphanestate de logoi]
[

.

Athens,

and the alarm which this inspired in [Sparta],

made war inevitable.
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Both the Connor and the Rawlings translations make
clear
that the "true cause" of the war was unspoken, in
contrast
to the accusations articulated by the parties to the
war.

The Crawley translation, in rendering aphanestate de logoi
as "out of sight" rather than "beyond language" or some such

equivalent, deflects attention from the Thucydidean

distinction between things which appear in language and
things which do not.

The Crawley translation does have the

merit, however, of clearly highlighting the issue of

background causes, or why the war broke out.
The controversy which surrounds this passage concerns
the perplexing notion of "cause" employed by Thucydides.

Frances Cornford argues persuasively that Thucydides had no

concept available to him resembling our modern,

deterministic sense of cause. ^
is best avoided,

He concludes that the word

advice which is largely respected by Connor

Sound as it may be, Cornford 's analysis does

and Rawlings.

not satisfactorily address the importance of Thucydides'

distinction between things which did and did not appear in
speech; and it is well for us to recall that precisely what

did not appear in speech was the truth.

Cornford'

s

analysis focuses on the fact that the Greek

term prophasis, which Thucydides employs in some sense of
"root cause," can also mean "pretext."

Cornford then

translates the critical phrase alethestate prophasis,

aphanestate de logoi, as "the most genuine pretext, though
it appeared least in what was said."

He concludes that

30

"Thucydides draws no clear distinction between an
aitiai and
a prophasis.
No respectable writer who had such a

distinction in his thoughts could speak of

a

'most genuine

pretext, which appeared least in what was said' --which
in
fact was least of all a pretext." 43

Cornford identifies the

paradoxical, oxymoronic aspect of the construction and

concludes that Thucydides could not mean what he appears to
say.

But oxymoronic constructions, we know from Greek

tragedy, were

a

hallmark of the Greek language.

It is

strange that Cornford, who argues forcefully that
Thucydides' History is actually
of Aeschylus,

a

tragic drama on the model

should reject as meaningless

construction which is itself

a

a

linguistic

characteristic feature of the

language of Greek tragedy.
The fact that Thucydides' His tory consists in large

part of reconstructed speeches of parties to the war

strongly suggests that we should take Thucydides at his
word, and treat the puzzling distinction between truths

which appeared in speech and those which did not, as

deliberate and significant.

What does it mean to say that

the truth did not appear in language?

Does it mean that it

was mere happenstance that no one mentioned it?

deception involved?

Was there

Was the truth deliberately omitted from

language, suggesting that it could have been spoken but was
not?

Or was the truth of such a nature that it could not

appear in words, and was therefore invisible to language?

31

James Boyd White adopts the first view when he says
that "prophasis" simply refers to "what the Spartans
would

have said had they spoken to the question.

In this sense it

is distinguished from the causes that were spoken.

.

.

.' ,44

According to White, Thucydides "spends little time on what
he calls its

cause,

[the war's]

for that is easily stated:

Athens* growth.
a

'truest explanation' or deepest
it is Sparta's fear of

His primary concern is with its

different sense:

'causes'

in

the grounds or claims that the two sides

had against each other," that is, the spoken charges and

accusations.^

But White's treatment of the problem begs

the question of why Thucydides would bother to make such

a

distinction in the first place, and go so far as to
structure the text around it.

White overlooks the

possibility that, far from spending little time on the war's
truest explanation, which was hidden from speech, Thucydides

actually devotes his entire text to exploring the unspoken

cause— power--and

its relation to language.

Thucydides' text has been interpreted by others as

attempting to convey
Often, however,

a

universal truth or law of nature.

°

these interpretations seize upon Thucydides'

allusions to "human nature," and place that notion at the
center of analysis.
in the text,

but,

The approach is not without foundation

in my opinion,

it does not go far enough.

Limiting the interpretive focus to the concept of "human
nature" rather than "nature" writ large, tends to prejudge
the question and overlook the strong possibility that

32

Thucydides' text resists to some degree the notion
of

a

human nature autonomous from the forces of necessity
[ananke]

operating in the whole of nature itself. 47

Focusing on the element of compulsion cited by

Thucydides in the Athenian growth of power and the Spartan
response, Werner Jaeger suggests that Thucydides points in
the direction of an overarching law of nature.

According to

Jaeger, Thucydides considered that "Athenian progress to

power was necessary and inevitable," and he saw that "Sparta
was compelled by fear of Athens to declare war." 48

Jaeger

concludes that Thucydides' recurrent references to
compulsion, or necessity, indicate that the effort to

delineate the causes of the war does not seek to fix

responsibility or blame, but looks more toward the immanent
laws of power itself.

In this context it is significant

that Thucydides emphasizes in the Archaeology that both

Athens and Sparta were at the height of their power when the
war broke out,

y

and conforms to

suggesting that power is bipolar in nature
a

early weakness to

pattern of development ascending from
a

great clash at its peak.

The pattern of

the Peloponnesian War, exemplifying the cycle of power, then

suggests that the peak is followed by decline and

disintegration before the pattern repeats itself anew.

It

has often been remarked that Thucydides, like Homer in his

treatment of the Trojans, does not detract from the

greatness of the Spartans, even though Thucydides himself is
an Athenian.

The explanation is found in the

33

Homeric/Thucydidean view of power as agonistic in its very
structure.
Power includes the element of opposition which
it generates within itself as it grows.

Thucydides' treatment of the true cause of the war

suggests

a

relationship between power, truth, and language

such that power and truth belong together in some fashion on
one side of an antithetical relation to speech.

related possibilities present themselves.
power does not appear in language.
appear in language?

2)

a

of power.

The truth of

But then what does

The truth of power and the truth of

language are not the same.
there is

1)

Three

This alternative suggests that

truth of language which is at odds with the truth
3)

The truth of power appears in language but

does not appear in words or speech.

This third formulation

distinguishes between the content of language and its use,
and it is this formulation which is most consistent with

Thucydides' portrayal of language in the text.

regularly portrays language used instrumentally

Thucydides
,

and the

reader must carefully distinguish between what is said in
speech and what is sought by speech.

This line of reasoning

raises perplexing questions, to be sure, but it also

provides

a

useful key to interpreting Thucydides' text.

The

speeches are included in the text as much for what is unsaid
as for what is said,

and the reader must therefore be alert

to ironic juxtapositions of speeches,

actions, and events.

Another clue to the function of the speeches in the text
lies in Thucydides' methodological statement that while he

34

has adhered as closely as possible to the
general sense of
what was said, it was also his habit to "make
the speakers
say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the
various

occasions."™

Like other ambiguities and obscurities in

Thucydides, this methodological statement has been the
subject of some debate.

Certainly, however, it seems to

admit the possibility that Thucydides' History portrays an

active power of Necessity at work in the speeches as well as
the events.

The Speeches and the War

Immediately following his statement of the true but

unspoken cause of the war
Athens

— Thucydides

— the

growth of the power of

allows that nevertheless, "it is well to

give the grounds alleged by either side which led to
the breaking out of war." 51

Epidamnus follows.

.

.

.

An account of the affair of

By prefacing his account in such a

manner, Thucydides makes clear that the events of the affair
to be described belong to the aitiai and diaphorai

to the truest prophasis of the war.

Later,

,

and not

following his

account of the affair of Epidamnus and the numerous debates
and allegations which it inspired, Thucydides provides a

lengthy retrospective account, known as the "penta-

contaetia," of the circumstances under which Athenian power
grew following the Persian War.

52

Although the penta-

contaetia has often been treated as

a

digression, W. Robert

"
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Connor recognizes it as an elaboration of the truest cause
of the war:

the growth of Athenian power.

Epidamnus,

a

53

city on what is now the Adriatic coast,

was a colony of Corcyra, one of the wealthiest cities in

Greece and

a

notable sea-power.

Corcyra in turn had been

founded as a colony of the city of Corinth.
custom,

As a matter of

the original founders of Epidamnus were leading

citizens of Corinth, thus preserving formal affiliation to
the original parent city.

Following

a

period of

debilitating internal strife in which an exiled faction of
nobles allied themselves with non-Greek foreigners to attack
the city,

Epidamnus sought the assistance of Corcyra to end

the war.

Corcyra, however, refused any aid to its colony.

The Epidamnians then turned for assistance to Corinth after

receiving favorable guidance from the God at Delphi.

On

behalf of their appeal to Corinth, the Epidamnians could
cite the customary bonds of affiliation as well as the

divine blessings of Delphi.

The Corinthians consented to

protect the Epidamnians, according to Thucydides, because
"they felt it to be

succinctly,

a

kind of duty.

.

.

.

Besides," he adds

"they hated the Corcyraeans" for their failure

to properly honor Corinth as their own parent city.

Thucydides inserts

a

54

brief description of the relative power

and wealth of Corcyra before concluding that "All these

grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid to
Epidamnus

.

,
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In the space of a few short sentences Thucydides has

managed to quietly introduce the elements of

a

major

confrontation which will be amplified throughout the text.
On one hand,

there are claims of justice; on the other hand

there are subterranean interests of power and advantage.

In

this instance calculations of justice (duty and friendship)

and interest could be made to coincide by Corinth.

Thucydides deftly complicates things by noting

a

But

short time

later without further comment that "the Epidamnian exiles
had come to Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulchres of their

ancestors, had appealed to their kindred to restore them." 55
In other words,

Thucydides shows us two warring factions of

Epidamnians appealing in similar terms of kinship

obligations to enemies who are themselves related.

Clearly,

beneath the surface of this matter-of -f actly chronicled
event of the war, there are inaudible conflicts already

taking place.

Upon learning of Corinthian assistance to Epidamnus

Corcyra besieged her colony, and Corinth then declared war
on Corcyra.

In the end, both Epidamnus and the Corinthian

fleet fell to Corcyra.

Following its defeat, Corinth,

a

Spartan ally, concentrated all of its efforts on building up
a

powerful naval force against Corcyra.

Alarmed by the

prospect of Corinthian power, Corcyra, previously unaligned
with either the Athenians or the Spartans, sought to enter
into alliance with Athens.

An assembly was convened at

.

.
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Athens to decide the question, with both Corcyraean and

Corinthian advocates present.
The ensuing debate, generally referred to as the

"Corcyraean Debate," contains the first set of formal
speeches presented by Thucydides

The Corcyraeans spoke

.

first to the question of why Athens should accept them into

alliance.

The Corinthians, in

a

point-by-point rebuttal,

sought to convince the Athenians to reject the Corcyraean
suit

The Corcyraean speech is notable for its heavy reliance

upon considerations of power and expedience to convince the

Athenians to accept them.

The Corcyraeans begin by

renouncing their past policy of non-alliance as both weak
and inexpedient.

being

a

Next,

following

a

perfunctory claim to

victim of injustice, Corcyra enumerates the many

advantages which will accrue to Athens upon acquiring the
most powerful navy in Hellas, second only to Athens' own.
Thirdly, Corcyra prompts Athens how to reply to anticipated

Corinthian claims to have law and justice on its side.

And

lastly, Corcyra returns again to rehearse at length the

strategic considerations flowing from the size of the

Corcyraean navy, and the folly of an Athenian rejection of
alliance
For your first endeavor should be to prevent, if
possible, the existence of any naval power except your

failing this, to secure the friendship of the
And if any of you believe
strongest that does exist.
that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon

own;

.
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this belief,

lest it should lead to a breach of the
treaty, you must remember that on the one hand, whatever
your fears, your strength will be formidable to your
antagonists; on the other, whatever the confidence you

derive from refusing to receive us, your weakness will
have no terrors for a strong enemy. 56
Aside from two rather peremptory and defensive earlier

references to injustice, the entire Corcyraean speech is

couched in terms of calculations of power and advantage.
The brief mention of "justice" merely serves to highlight
the emphasis upon power.

In contrast,

is devoid of strategic calculations,

the Corinthian speech

and is framed entirely

as an appeal to considerations of justice.

The Corinthian

speech is sprinkled with references to justice and
injustice, honor and shame, honesty and moderation, law and

morality, doing right and being wronged, the commission of
crimes, and mutual gratitude among friends.

Against

calculations of power and advantage, the Corinthians argue
that "Abstinence from all injustice

...

is a greater tower

of strength than anything that can be gained by the

sacrifice of permanent tranquility for an apparent temporary
en

advantage

" Dl

At the conclusion of this lengthy debate, Thucydides
"In

reports that two assemblies were held by the Athenians.
the first,

there was

a

manifest disposition to listen to the

representations of Corinth; in the second, public feeling
on,
had changed, and an alliance with Corcyra was decided
68
with certain reservations."

It was to be a defensive,

not

39

an offensive alliance, and could not therefore be
invoked by

Corcyra to involve Athens in an attack upon Corinth,

a

Spartan ally, in violation of the Treaty of Euboea between

Athens and Sparta.

As for the reasons behind the Athenian

decision, Thucydides says only that war with the

Peloponnesians (Sparta and its allies) was felt to be
inevitable, and no one was willing to see the naval power of

Corcyra sacrificed to Corinth.
Thucydides says nothing more about the process of

Athenian decisionmaking except that "two assemblies were
held."

James Boyd White acknowledges that the Athenian

decision, as reported, seems to bear little relation to the
actual arguments presented by either side, even though the

decision favored Corcyra over Corinth. 59

Why then has

Thucydides bothered to provide nearly eight pages of
speeches when they seem to have so little relation to the
way in which the decision to form an alliance was made?

According to White, the speeches introduce the reader to

a

"culture of argument, of which it is Thucydides' object to
tell the history." 60

White maintains that it is language

which defines or constitutes the community of speakers, and

consequently it is language which furnishes limits upon the
actions performed by members of the community which it
White contends that the culture of argument

constitutes.

depicted in the Corcyraean Debate is successful on its own
terms even though the outcome of the speeches is the

beginning of

a

war,

for it is not the purpose of this
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culture to eliminate war but rather to make it manageable
within limits. 61
White's identification of language as an authoritative
source of limits would not have been an entirely alien

thought to the Greek culture of Thucydides

'

time.

Indeed

there are both tragic and Socratic/Platonic dimensions to
his argument.

But Thucydides'

text can also be interpreted

as specifically contesting those views rather than sharing

or endorsing them.

The text directly challenges the

presumption that language is

a

privileged repository of

limits by portraying language as little more than one weapon

among others to be wielded in the pursuit of domination or
advantage.

There are early indications of this view in the

Corcyraean offer to Corinth to arbitrate their differences
over Epidamnus

.

The offer was rejected by Corinth as long

as Corcyra refused to lift its siege of the colony.

In this

exchange, which is reported without commentary by

Thucydides, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that

neither side is willing to resort to the language of

arbitration unless it is likely to yield
advantage to its own position.

a

superior

Thus Corcyra is willing to

talk so long as it is permitted to simultaneously continue
its military options.

The delay of arbitration would then

disadvantage only Corinth.

But significantly, Corinth, too,

was unwilling to press for arbitration without securing
CO

greater advantage for itself in the process.

Later,

the Corcyraean Debate at Athens, Corcyra recalled the

a

in
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Corinthian rejection of arbitration as evidence of unjust
Corinthian intentions.

The Corinthians countered that,

under the circumstances, the Corcyraean offer amounted to no
more than

a

resort to arms in words as well as deeds. 63

Lest the Corinthians appear to occupy the moral high ground
in this debate, Thucydides mentions in passing that the only

reason for the Corinthian presence in Athens in the first
place was to prevent her own war aims from being impeded. 64
It has long been tempting to read Thucydides'

History

as a compelling drama of Athenian hubris (overreaching)

followed by the moral retribution of Nemesis. 65

From this

perspective, the Athenian alliance with Corcyra would

represent the first in

a

series of increasingly arrogant

Athenian actions which eventually led to her downfall.

Part

of the appeal of this interpretation is undoubtedly its

The text, however,

comfortable fit with modern moral views.
permits

a

contrary interpretation.

Soon after the

Corcyraean Debate, Athens will suggest to the Spartan
Assembly that the issue of justice is only raised by those
who seek their own advantage but lack other forms of

strength to secure it.

66

It is a claim which recurs

throughout the text, and it suggests that an adequate

assessment of claims of justice must take into account the
relative position of who is speaking.

Debate it is the Corinthians who are at

In the Corcyraean
a

strategic

disadvantage in confronting an alliance between Athens and
Corcyra.

And it is Corinth who raises the "cry of justice."

'
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Much later, in the hour of defeat, the Athenian commander
Nicias,
gods.

too, will speak of justice and reverence for the

But it remains to be decided whether,

view,

this is

a

in Thucydides

portrayal of poetic justice and Nemesis in

action, or whether it is confirmation of the law of nature

soon to be cited by Athens that the strong take what they

can while the weak cry out for justice.

Although the Athenian Alliance with Corcyra was to be

defensive in nature, it soon drew Athens inadvertently into
direct naval conflict with Corinth,

a

Spartan ally and

member of the Peloponnesian Confederacy.

As a result of

this and other grievances against Athens, Corinth and other

allies came to address the Spartan Assembly, and sought to
elicit

a

declaration of war from that body against the

Athenians.

Of all the allies to address the Spartans,

Thucydides records only the speech of the Corinthians, the
last to speak.

thrusts.

The Corinthian speech presents two major

It holds Spartan lack of resistance responsible

for the expansion of Athenian power,

and it contrasts the

bold adventurousness of Athenian character with the timid

procrastination of the Spartans.

The Corinthians accuse the

Spartans of being overly concerned with acting justly, and
fi7
too little concerned with resisting injustice.

For,

according to the Corinthians, the true subjugator of

a

people is not so much the immediate aggressor as it is the
68
one who could prevent it but does not.

There then follows

^
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a

long and striking comparison of Athenian and Spartan

national character.
The Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their
designs are characterized by swiftness alike in

conception and execution; you [Spartans] have a genius
for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total
want of invention, and when forced to act you never go
far enough.
Again, they are adventurous beyond their
power, and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger
they are sanguine; your wont is to attempt less than is
justified by your power, to mistrust even what is
sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that from
danger there is no release. Further there is

promptitude on their side against procrastination on
yours; they are never at home, you are never far from
for they hope by their absence to extend their

it;

acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what
you have left behind.

...

To describe their character

in a word, one might truly say that they were born into
the world to take no rest themselves and to give none to

others

.

At the metaphorical level,

the Corinthian speech

introduces two new elements into the Thucydidean view of
power.

The Peloponnesian War is to be seen not merely as

a

contingent war over prerogatives between adjacent citystates, but rather as

a

violent and necessary clash between

70
fundamentally opposite principles.

Secondly, Thucydides'

characterization of power is not limited to domination, but
includes within it the necessity of resistance to

domination.

The remainder of the text elaborates and

.
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explores the inner dynamic of this bipolar conception of
power
The Corinthian speech is set off against

speech by

a

Athenian envoys who, Thucydides tells us, just happened to
be present in Sparta on other business.

The intention of

the Athenian speech, according to Thucydides, was not to

defend Athens against the charges being brought against her,
but to show that war was not

a

matter to be hastily decided

upon but rather one which called for further consideration.
"There was also a wish to call attention to the great power
of Athens

.

.

.

,

"

Thucydides informs us, "from

a

notion that

their words might have the effect of inducing them [the

Peloponnesians]

to prefer tranquility to war." 71

The

Athenian speech reminds the Spartans of Athens' superior
contributions to the defeat of the invaders during the
Persian War,

a

victory which benefitted Peloponnesians as

much as Athenians.

Then,

in an interesting parallel to the

Corinthian speech, Athens charges that it was Spartan
reticence against the Persians that made the Athenian empire
both possible and necessary. 72

And furthermore, they

charge, had Sparta persevered contrary to her character,

then Sparta,

too,

would have been forced to follow the same

73
path to empire as Athens and incur the same hatreds.

Contrary to the Corinthian speech, however, which seeks to
goad Sparta into compensating for its earlier hesitations by
going to war against Athens now, the Athenian speech claims
that as a result of Spartan reticence the Athenians fairly
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earned and now deserve their empire.

Inherent in this claim

is a view of a natural order of things in which superior

power properly rises due to the weakness of others.
Moreover, the Athenian position implicitly denies

a

moral

dimension to the imbalance of power, attributing it to the
natural order.

There is no room for equality in this

conception; either Athens must dominate, or Sparta must

dominate according to the order of things.

At this point

the Athenians articulate for the first time the natural law

which commands their allegiance:

"...

for it has always

been the law that the weaker should should be subject to the

stronger."

It is only Spartan calculations of their own

interests, continue the Athenians, which now prompt them to
take up the cry of justice,

"a consideration which no one

ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had
a

chance of gaining anything by might.

Nevertheless,

Athens continues, in actual practice Athenian justice is far
more equitable than its superior strength would require, and
more moderate than the practice of others would be in the
same position.

Athens, in the very act of describing its own position
as just,

seems to be conceding some legitimate force to the

language and the principle of justice.

But the "justice"

which Athens acknowledges is upon closer inspection very

different from the "justice" apparently invoked by its
accusers.
is based,

Athenian justice, or the principle upon which it
resembles

a

gift of mercy or restraint which

a

. .
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conqueror might at its discretion grant to the conquered.
This principle is not at all at odds with the law of nature,
just cited by Athens in the same speech,

that the weaker

should be subject to the stronger.
The Athenian speech closes with

reminder to its

a

audience of the unpredictabilities of war once it starts,
and proposes that Spartan and Athenian differences should be

settled by arbitration as called for by their treaty.

The

apparent reasonableness of this final appeal is somewhat
tempered by two considerations.

Firstly, the Athenian

character described by the Corinthian speech is far better
suited than the conservative Spartan character to take

advantage of the imponderables of war.

And secondly, the

Athenian offer of arbitration is not only consonant with the
treaty,

it also coincides with the Athenian strategy of

delay indicated earlier by Thucydides

75

Following the Athenian speech, the Spartan assembly

dismissed both the Athenians and their own allies in order
to debate the question of war among themselves.

Thucydides

presents the speeches of two Spartan leaders, King

Archidamus and the ephor
Archidamus is

a

S tenelaides

76

The speech of

model of prudence and moderation consistent

with the king's reputation and the cautious Spartan

character.
however,

As reasonable as the king's speech may sound,

it is worth noting that the issue of

justice is

never touched upon, but instead the king's counsel of

patience and preparation is based entirely upon strategic

.
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considerations detailed in the speech.

In context,

the

king's advice to continue talking to the Athenians
while

preparing for war shows that the Spartans, too, resort
to
language for strategic and tactical gains.

"I do bid you

not to take up arms at once," the king advises the assembly,
but to send and remonstrate with them in a tone not too
suggestive of war, nor again too suggestive of
submission, and to employ the interval in perfecting our
own preparations. ... If they listen to our embassy,
so much the better; but if not, after the lapse of two
or three years our position will have become materially

strengthened, and we can then attack them if we think
proper.
Perhaps by that time the sight of our
preparations, backed by language equally significant,

....

will have disposed them to submission
added] 77

[Emphasis

.

The long (three pages) speech by Archidamus is offset
by a very short (one paragraph)

speech of Sthenelaides

78

Sthenelaides mistrusts words and uses very few of them
himself.

He announces tersely that he does not understand

the long speech of the Athenians.

"They said

a

good deal in

praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that they are

injuring our allies

.

.

.

."

Against proposals to let

"lawsuits and words" settle the matter, Sthenelaides calls
for immediate war against the Athenians.

It is not by words

we are harmed, he says, but by Athenian actions, and

furthermore "long deliberation is rather fitting for those
who have injustice in comtemplation
on action, however,

.

"

Despite its emphasis

the speech of Sthenelaides disdains all
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strategic considerations in favor of the justice of prompt

retaliation against Athens.

He urges immediate war based on

considerations of honor, duty to friends, and what Athenian
behavior deserves.

"With the gods," he says in conclusion,

"let us advance against the aggressors," regardless of con-

siderations of money, ships, and horses.

Sthenelaides

'

speech is interesting because even though

it identifies words as disnonorable instruments of

injustice, it does not conclude that justice is nowhere to
be found.

Sthenelaides clearly believes that there is

a

moral order to the cosmos, and that that order is upheld by
the gods.

He finds justice in certain actions

— acts

of

resistance against aggression, and acts of assistance to
injured friends, for example.

It is an uncomplicated,

perhaps admirable, moral view which Thucydides does not

initially condemn.

Instead he treats it as irrelevant.

Having just presented the reader with twelve additional
pages of carefully staged speeches, Thucydides declares

succinctly that
[Spartans] voted that the treaty had been broken,
and that war must be declared, not so much because they
were persuaded by the arguments of the allies, as
the

because they feared the growth of the power of the
Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to
them.

79

Once again, the text provokes the question, Why has

Thucydides presented these speeches in such detail, only to
inform us at their conclusion that the succession of events

49

has little to do with what was said?

To answer the question

we must refer back to the fundamental distinction made by

Thucydides between that which appears in speech and that
which does not.

Beginning with the affair of Epidamnus,

Thucydides announced his intention to first "give the
grounds alleged by either side, which led to

breaking out of war." 80

.

.

.

the

But this was to be clearly

distinguished from the truer cause, invisible to speech,
which was the growing power of Athens.

Twenty pages of

speeches reveal to us what the various parties told each
other, and told themselves, about the necessity of war.

They also serve to introduce several opposing views of
justice, or its absence, as justifications for war.

We need

not treat what was said in the speeches as meaningless or

deceptive rhetoric.
truth.

The speeches do show us

a

level of

These are the things which people say, or said, when

preparing for war.
reasons for war.

On one level,

the speeches reveal the

But Thucydides informs us that this is not

the deepest level from which to view the causes of war.
For,

in his view,

these were the sorts of things the

speakers had to say. 81

Thucydides here suggests that there

is an order to power which has the character of

inevitability, or necessity.

From this point of view, the

speakers and the parties to the war are caught up in
larger,

a

inexorable movement of power which they may not

understand, but which nevertheless governs the direction of

50

events.

At a deeper level,

then, Thucydides

text portrays

'

not people using power, but power using people.

Having presented, as promised, the spoken reasons for
the war,

the text then turns to the unspoken cause:

growth of Athenian power.
of the Fifty Years,"

The Pentacontaetia

,

the

or "Account

follows immediately after Thucydides'

statement of the real reasons behind the Spartan vote for
war. w

This section recounts the growth of Athenian power

from the end of the Persian War up to the events already

described by Thucydides.

The Pentacontaetia portrays

a

restless Athens ceaselessly engaged in battle, building up
its fleet,

subjugating formerly independent allies, and

extending its power in all directions.

Thucydides almost

seems to apologize for the relentless quality of this
section, saying that "My excuse for relating these events,
and for venturing on this digression,

is that this passage

of history has been omitted by all my predecessors."

"besides," he adds almost coyly,

But

"the history of these

events contains an explanation of the growth of the Athenian

empire

" OJ
.

In a particularly allegorical description reminiscent
of the growth of the empire itself, Thucydides relates the

manner in which the Athenians hurriedly rebuilt and expanded
the walls of their city at the end of the Persian War.

"For

of the
the bounds of the city were extended at every point

without
circumference; and so they laid hands on everything
84
exception in their haste," he states portentously.
i
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According to Thucydides, the allies begged Athens not to
fortify itself on the pretext that if the Persians should
return,

such fortifications would only serve to aid an

occupying enemy force.

"The real meaning of their advice,

the suspicion that it contained against the Athenians, was

not proclaimed," Thucydides informs us,

signalling the

reader that we are in the subterranean realm of true but

unspoken causes. 85

The Athenian stratagem for extending its

defensive fortifications is representative of the Athenian
use of language to achieve its ends.

Upon hearing of

Spartan objections to the Athenian project, the Athenians

proposed that negotiations should be held at Sparta to
decide the issue.

The Athenians then delayed the talks long

enough to secretly complete their fortifications before

announcing that negotiations were no longer necessary.
Similarly, throughout the Pentacontaetia Athens regards

a

truce of any kind as an opportunity to further expand in

another direction.

Following the Spartan vote for war, and after some

delay during which the favor of the god at Delphi was
ascertained,
Sparta.

a

second Peloponnesian congress was convened at

This time the question was put before the Spartan

allies as a whole and, after some debate, the majority voted
for war.

Once again it is the Corinthians who are portrayed

as the most aggressive and persuasive speakers,

and on this

occasion it is only the Corinthian speech which is
86
reproduced by Thucydides.

The Corinthians portray Sparta
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as the pre-eminent power in Hellas,

having

duty to lead

a

united resistance against "enslavement" by Athens.

a

The

Corinthian speech assesses the relative strengths of each
side and predicts

a

Peloponnesian victory based largely on

the superior courage and discipline of the Spartan side.

After

a

period of preparation and some trading of

charges between both sides, the Spartans issued

ultimatum to Athens:

a

terse

"[Sparta] wishes the peace to

continue, and there is no reason why it should not, if you

would leave the Hellenes independent." 87

As modest as this

proposition may sound, compliance would certainly have
entailed the dismantling of the Athenian empire, increased
exposure to danger, and the loss of Athens' heroic status. 88
It may well have been deliberately formulated as a demand to

which Athens could not possibly submit.
the ultimatum,

5

Upon receiving

the Athenians held an assembly to debate the

Athenian response.

Thucydides informs us that there were

many speakers to address the assembly, some urging peace and
others urging war.

Of all the speeches, however, Thucydides

chooses to reproduce only one:

that of Pericles,

"the first

man of his time at Athens, ablest alike in counsel and in
action.

.

.

." 90

Pericles:

The Heroic Ideal

The speeches of Pericles are widely considered to be

major focal point of Thucydides' History.

a

This judgment is

due in part to the high tribute paid to Pericles in

53

Thucydides' own remarks.
in his own voice,

91

since Thucydides rarely speaks

his favorable opinion of Pericles is taken

to be highly significant.

But there is another structural

factor supporting the treatment of Pericles' words
as having
key significance.

The usual pattern of Thucydides is to

present speeches in antithetical pairs, but this pattern is

abandoned in the case of Pericles.

Three speeches of

Pericles are reproduced in the text, all in fairly rapid
succession, and all are unanswered by any opponent.

On the

other hand, elements and themes of Pericles' speeches

continue to resonate throughout the text, and are often

reflected ironically in the speeches of other major figures
such as Cleon, Alcibiades, and Nicias.

The privileged position of Pericles' speeches in the
text suggests that, on one level, Pericles occupies the role
of the traditional, Homeric hero in Thucydides'
the Homeric world,

History.

In

the normal course of events is cyclical

in a more or less vertical plane,

following

from low to high and back to low again.

a

trajectory

In the Iliad,

the

greatest heroes tend to die at the acme of their glory, as

measured by the greatness of their opponent.
a

heroic death achieves

a

Paradoxically,

measure of immortality through the

legendary fame of the hero untarnished by the inevitable

decline which would have otherwise occurred.

This kind of

heroism is akin to the brilliance of an exploding star.
There are certain standard ingredients to the heroic
formula.

First of, all the requisite heroic height is
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usually achieved in battle or contest.

Secondly, the ascent

to heroic heights is itself a factor in bringing about death
at the proper moment.

Ideally, death would be neither

accidental nor unrelated to the heroic pursuit.

Pericles'

brilliant career closely approximates this heroic
trajectory, but the fit is imperfect due to his apparently

untimely death from plague.

Nevertheless, he died near the

peak of his greatness and his reputation was spared its

predictable decline. 92

The career of Themis tocles

which

,

Thucydides draws upon to represent the normal course of
events, stands in contrast to the career of Pericles.

Themistocles

,

described by Thucydides as among the greatest

men of his time, was the architect of the brilliant Athenian
naval victory over the Persians during the Persian War, and
he was the founder of Athenian imperialism.

Despite his

near-heroic status, he ended his life as an outlaw and
traitor to his country.
On yet another level, however,

the true hero of

Thucydides' History is Athens itself, and Pericles merely
On this

stands for, and speaks for, Athens at its height.
level as well, Thucydides' history conforms to the

traditional heroic paradigm of the Iliad except that large

movements of collective power and greatness replace feats of
the heroic individual, and personal interventions of the

gods are replaced by the less personal operation of natural
forces.

In turning to the speeches of Pericles,

then,

as

spokesman for the Thucydidean version of the heroic ideal,

"
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we can expect to gain a clearer view of the
geometry of

power which Thucydides finds portrayed in the Peloponnesian
War.

Initially, Pericles' first speech has the structural

function of answering, and thus balancing, the Corinthian
speech assessing the relative Spartan and Athenian strengths
and predicting Spartan victory.

But in introducing

important new themes, Pericles' speech goes beyond that

antithetical role to occupy new and uncontested heights.
one respect the first speech of Pericles can be read as

rejoinder to the Spartan ultimatum.

In
a

The speech, however, is

not directed to the Spartans but to the Athenian Assembly
for the purpose of persuading that body to vote for war.
a

In

brief earlier reference to Pericles, Thucydides had

described him as

"

.

.

.

the most powerful man of his time,

and the leading Athenian statesman; he opposed the
[Spartans]

in everything,

and would have no concessions, but

ever urged the Athenians on to war."

Pericles confirms

this unyielding characterization in his opening remarks,

saying that his one guiding principle through everything is
"no concessions to the Peloponnesians

.
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He portrays

himself as disciplined, resolute, and uncompromising in

contrast to the irresolution of ordinary men in the face of
chance and changing events.

Pericles goes on to cast Athens

as the victim of Spartan aggression,

and the approaching war

as a necessary stand against Spartan enslavement.

He also

faults the Spartans for failing to offer negotiation of
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their differences, as provided in the treaty, before
issuing

bellicose demands.
Two points about this speech initially stand out.
First of all, up to this point the text has consistently

portrayed Sparta to be

a

conservative, hesitant land-power

in contrast to the audacious and acquisitive sea-power of

Athens.

Secondly, the Spartans would appear to have sound,

historical reasons for distrusting any Athenian call for
negotiations.

In context,

then,

the specter of enslavement

invoked by Pericles appears to be designed more to arouse
the zeal of the assembly in support of war than to point to

any real,

immediate danger.

In the same speech, Pericles provides his own assess-

ment of the military factors affecting each side, and his

inventory is remarkably similar to that presented in the

Corinthian speech to the Spartan allies.

The chief

divergence between the two speeches in that respect lies not
in their perception of the "facts," but in their evaluation

of the relative advantage the facts will give to either

side.

Unlike Corinth, Pericles argues that the military and

political situation favors Athens over Sparta, and that the
advantage lies chiefly in the concentration of Athenian
resolve (gnome) compared to the characteristically
The

irresolute tardiness and division among the Spartans.

fact that the text portrays no significant disagreement over
the "objective" military assets of the two sides supports
the view that Thucydides considers this war to be less

a
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confrontation of military factors measurable in terms
of
men, money,

and ships,

than

clash between less tangible

a

factors such as "character" and "resolve."
We have already heard the Corinthians describe the

character of the Athenians as active, innovative, and daring
compared to the slow, ponderous caution of the Spartan
character, and the text consistently confirms that

description.

But Pericles'

first speech introduces a major

new chord upon the same theme.

He attributes Athenian

swiftness and decisiveness to their superior gnome, and he
finds the roots of this gnome attached to Athenian political

arrangements. 96

In the same vein,

Pericles faults the

Spartans for their lack of unity and consequent lack of
strength, and he associates this fault with Spartan

political institutions.

Pericles clearly equates superior

power with steadfast unity (gnome), and he associates this

superior cohesion and resolution with political structure.
The claim that superior Athenian power and unified

resolve are due to superior political institutions is made
more explicit in Pericles' second speech, the "Funeral

Oration," where he bestows lengthy praise upon the many

advantages accruing to Athenians from their democratic
institutions. 97

The chief advantage of democracy, in

Pericles' view,

is the power it delivers to the state.

Pericles' speech does cite the many freedoms and comforts

derived from democracy in ordinary life, but the final
standard by which to evaluate the greatness of Athens, in
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every case, turns out be measured in terms of
Athenian
power.

Pericles pronounces Athens to be the "school of

Hellas," by which he means that Athenian arete,
competitive
success,

is the envy of the Hellenic world.
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Athens'

superiority is "a plain matter of fact," Pericles proclaims,
which
the power of the state acquired by these habits
proves.
[T]he admiration of the present and
.

.

.

succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not left our
power without witness, but have shown it by mighty
proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist,
or others of his craft
we have forced every sea
and land to be the highway of our daring, and
.

.

.

,

everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left
imperishable monuments behind us."

There is probably no better statement of the heroic
ideal than Pericles'
the most famous,

funeral oration.

It is appropriately

and the most frequently cited of all the

speeches in Thucydides

'

History.

Most recitations, however,

emphasize its praise of democracy and the sacrifice of
private ambition to the common interest.

Rare attention is

paid to the Periclean standard by which democracy is judged
to be commendable:

it confers the power to rule over

others, and the means to achieve eternal glory through

memorable feats of war.

100

The Homeric theme is pursued and extended in the third
and final speech of Pericles.

This speech is aimed at an

angry and demoralized Athens two years into the war.

.

.
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Periclean war strategy had called for full development
and

projection of Athenian naval power, coupled with

a

refusal

to be drawn into land battles against the Peloponnesians

As a result, Athenian territory beyond the walls had been

laid waste at will by invading Peloponnesian forces, while,
at Pericles'

Moreover,

insistence, Athenian citizens looked on.

the city had been devastated by plague with its

attendant widespread suffering and death, further eroding

Athenian will and resolve.

Demoralization reigned and

Pericles addressed them in an attempt to restore their
In the course of his speech Pericles reminded them

gnome.

that

your country has the greatest name in all the world
because she never bent before disaster, and
because she has expended more life and effort in war
.

.

.

than any other city, and has won for herself

a

power

greater than any hitherto known, the memory of which
will descend to the latest posterity;

even if now, in

obedience to the general law of decay, we should ever be
forced to yield, still it will be remembered that we

held rule over more Hellenes than any other Hellenic
state, that we sustained the greatest wars against their

united or separate powers, and inhabited a city
Hatred also is shortunrivalled by any other.
.

.

.

lived; but that which makes the splendor of the present
and the glory of the future remains forever unforgotten.

Make your decision,
now

therefore, for glory then and honor

101

With the addition of the "general law of decay"

articulated in this speech, the portrait of the heroic ideal
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is complete.

pass away.

All things human have

a

tendency to decay and

But this general law can be thwarted through

great and memorable feats of battle.
be "good" deeds.

Great deeds need not

What counts is scale.

Great deeds

"whether for evil or for good," create immortal monuments in
the living memory of posterity.
in Thucydides*

view,

It is worth recalling that

the Peloponnesian War was the greatest

war of all time not because it was a "just" war, or even

victorious war.

a

It was the greatest war in history because

the scope and the depth of the suffering and dislocation it

caused was unprecedented.
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But what is the status of this general law of decay

evoked by Pericles?

It is,

to be sure,

things toward disintegration.

the tendency of all

But what is its relation to

that other general law cited earlier, and soon to be cited

again by Athens, that the weaker should be subject to the

stronger?

These two laws appear to represent counterPower is expressed as

a

tendency

toward combination; weakness is expressed as

a

tendency

tendencies in nature.

toward fragmentation.

Thucydides has made it abundantly

clear that in his view, power, at least the greatest power,

transcends individuals and is collective in nature.

This

premise is the basis of his interest in war rather than

muthodes

,

or the quarrels of individuals.

The collective

character of power is associated in the speeches of Pericles
with gnome, steadfast resolution, and gnome is associated in
turn with the political practice of democracy.

Power,

to
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put it simply,

is a coming together,

something— call

it "will"

a

uniting of

for lack of a better word--which

makes concerted action possible.

The historical movement

toward association, expressed in the founding of cities
and
the formation of alliances, has

a

natural force of its own,

judging from the history of power portrayed by Thucydides in
the "Archaeology."

But the historical movement toward

amassed power is not unopposed in nature.

The tendency

toward integration and resolution is countered (but not

necessarily balanced) by an opposite tendency toward
disintegration and dissolution.

This tendency is poignantly

portrayed by Thucydides in the parallel events of the plague
at Athens,

and stasis, civil strife, at Corcyraea.

Pericles, in his heroic role, understands these

countertendencies as conflicting natural forces which he
must dominate.

But Thucydides,

in a more complicated

vision, portrays them as opposite poles of power, each

opposing, yet each generating the other.

Pericles understands the collective, and therefore
political, nature of power.

He claims in his speeches that

Athenian superiority over the Peloponnesians is rooted in
the Athenian form of government--democracy--which is said to

yield superior gnome, or common will and determination,

compared to the oligarchic governments of the Spartan
confederacy.
view,

is

We might ask, however, what,

in Pericles'

responsible for this coincidence of gnome and

democracy?

What is it about democracy which provides for
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and sustains the singlemindedness from whence it derives its

power?

In the Funeral Oration,

Pericles praises the

Athenian constitution for the many benefits it confers upon
its members.

It favors the many instead of the few.

Its

laws provide equal justice for all in private disputes.

Advancement in public life is the reward of ability, not
class or wealth.

But beyond these few explicitly political

considerations, Pericles' list extends praise to many

comforts of ordinary Athenian life whose connection to

democracy is less clear.

He cites,

for example,

the absence

of interference from one's neighbors in one's private

affairs.

And he further commends the general respect for

law which flourishes despite the freedom of private

relations.

And for our recreation, he says,

we celebrate games and sacrifices all the year round,

and the elegance of our private establishments forms

a

daily source of pleasure and helps to banish our cares;
and the magnitude of our city draws the produce of the
world into our harbor.

.

.

Undoubtedly these and other pleasures of Athenian life
which Pericles goes on to mention, can be attributed in some

fashion to political institutions and practices at Athens.
Surely they are intended to compare favorably to the more
regimented, austere lifestyle practiced at Sparta.
just as surely,

a

And,

high level of equality is prerequisite to

the success of Athenian political arrangements.

answer remains obscure.

What,

in Pericles'

Yet the

opinion, is the
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source of the singlemindedness which constitutes
Athenian
power,

and which, he claims,

Athenian democracy?

is uniquely associated with

It is by no means obvious that

political equality and private comfort necessarily lead to

a

common will of uncommon strength.
For the answer we must turn back to Pericles' first

speech responding to the Spartan ultimatum to Athens.

In

that speech Pericles analyzed the strategic differences

between Sparta and Athens and concluded that "they are

incapacitated from carrying on

a war

against

a

power

different in character from their own, by the want of

a

single council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous

action." 104

The "single council-chamber" identified by

Pericles refers to the Athenian assembly, and it appears
that in Pericles' view, that body is the source of Athenian

gnome and power.

It differs from the Peloponnesian

organization "in which every state possesses an equal vote,
and each presses for its own ends,

a

condition of things

which generally results in no action at all."^®

Although Pericles has in this speech located the
decisive gnome of Athens in its democratic assembly, while
locating the opposite principle in its Spartan counterpart,
it is increasingly clear from the text that both tendencies

are simultaneously present in the assembly.

also its weakness.

Its strength is

While the assembly may be superior at

achieving consensus and uniting public opinion behind

a

common course of action, it is equally liable to greater

.
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fickleness, divisiveness

,

and lack of focus.

be resolutely carried away in

a

Worse,

it may

direction which is

ultimately self-defeating, as in the disastrous Sicilian
expedition.

Thucydides himself is more ambivalent than the words of
Pericles would suggest about the strengths of Athenian

democracy as embodied in the assembly.

Looking back to the

Corcyraean Debate, in which the Athenians had to decide
whether or not to accept the Corcyraeans into alliance, we
recall Thucydides mentioning almost in passing that "two

assemblies were held" before reaching
with Corcyraea
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a

decision to side

This unobtrusive comment signals early on

in the text that the assembly may be somewhat less than

decisive.

Later,

following Pericles' third speech, in which

he assailed the Athenians for wavering in their resolve in

the wake of the plague and repeated Peloponnesian invasions
of the Athenian countryside, Thucydides again points to the

ambivalence of the assembly.

According to Thucydides,

Pericles succeeded in convincing the Athenians "as

a

community" to prosecute the war with renewed vigor.
"Still," he reports,
as private individuals they could not help smarting

under their sufferings.

...

In fact,

the pubic feeling

against him [Pericles] did not subside until he had been
Not long afterwards, however, according to the
fined.
way of the multitude, they again elected him general,
and committed all their affairs to his hands.

107
.

.

.
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Thucydides' disdainful reference to the "way of the

multitude" suggests less than whole-hearted confidence in
the ways of democracy.

Later in the war,

in the debate over

the fate of the rebellious colony of Mytilene, Thucydides

would still more dramatically portray the indecisiveness of
the Athenian assembly.

Mytilene was an independent colony

in possession of its own naval forces, which

of Athens,

revolted and joined the Peloponnesians

.

The revolt

ultimately failed and the Athenians voted to put to death
the whole adult male population of Mytilene, and to make

slaves of the women and children.

108

The next day, after

a

lengthy debate reported by Thucydides, The Athenians elected
by a slim majority to rescind the original decree and to

impose a slightly less harsh punishment upon the population.
The language in which Thucydides reports the reversal

emphasizes the "division" and "change of feeling" among the
Athenians.
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Thucydides' own verdict upon the democratic

assembly is found in his endorsement of the abilities and
policies of Pericles.

...

by his rank, ability, and known
integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent
control over the multitude in short to lead them

Pericles,

—

instead of being led by them. ... In short, what was
nominally a democracy became in his hands, government by
With his successors it was
different. More on a level with one another, and each
grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the
conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude.
the first citizen.

,
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This, as might have been expected
produced a host
of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition. 110
.

.

Despite Pericles' earlier assertion that Athens was
free of the defect of disunity which he found in the

Peloponnesians

111

the text is clear that the Athenian

assembly, and, by implication Athenian democracy, harbored

within itself the two contrary tendencies of nature.

In one

direction lay the possibility of superior unity and
therefore great power.

In the other lay the possibility of

great fragmentation and weakness.

Pericles' greatness,

in

Thucydides' view, lay in his unparalleled ability to

consistently tip the balance in favor of preserving and
enhancing the great power of Athens.

Unlike his successors,

Pericles is said to have sought no power for himself, but
only for the city.

His successors, each grasping at

supremacy for themselves, and each currying favor with the
multitude, managed to prevent Athens from reaching its

greatest potential height in war, and introduced civil
strife at home.
The Fall

On one level,

the text might be read as the story of

Periclean leadership and the slow decline of Athens
following his death from the plague in 429 B.C.

On this

reading, the greatness of Athens is to be attributed to the

almost superhuman statesmanship and incorruptibility of
Pericles.

Only Pericles could retain and act upon the

unifying vision of the common interest.

Others, with their
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limited, selfish visions could appear only as hollow

imitations of the Periclean ideal.

Their leadership, which

substituted private aggrandizement for the public good,
tainted the greatness of Athens and led it into moral and
civic disintegration.

This is the moral skeleton beneath

many conventional readings of Thucydides' History, and it
admits of many excellent variations upon

a

theme.

It

permits political lessons to be drawn emphasizing the

importance of placing the common interest above private
concerns, for example.

Furthermore, Thucydides"

characterization of Pericles' policies as moderate and
conservative 1 ^ can be used to support an interpretation of
the text utilizing the moral axis of hubris and nemesis.

From this perspective, Pericles represents the moderate
center.

His successors pursue extreme policies which, in

moral universe, bring about the nemesis of defeat as

a

a

form

of retribution of the divine or natural order.

Thucydides' text is not unamenable to such pedagogical
uses.

On the other hand, in order to fit the text, such

moral approaches tend to overlook and leave untouched much
of its rich and profound complexity.

113

but far

A similar,

more interesting and sophisticated approach to the text

examines the phenomenon of language as portrayed by
Thucydides.

A particularly lucid and influential version of

this approach is advanced by James Boyd White.
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focuses on the speeches of the text and identifies

White
a

progressive loss of limits traceable to the Athenian use of
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language.

White's premise is relatively uncontroversial

:

a

community is largely constituted by the language it speaks.
Conversely, language is subject to misuse of

sort which

a

can erode and destroy the basis of community.

According to

White, Thucydides' text portrays just such misuse by Athens

resulting in the steady disintegration of the Greek
community.

White argues that Athens' use of language to justify

aspirations to unlimited supremacy undermines

a

traditional

language of justice which imposed limits upon those who
White's argument is sophisticated in

shared the language.

part because it seeks to avoid attributing transcendental

status to language even while identifying it as

source of

The outline of his argument runs as

limits to behavior.
follows.

a

The language shared by Athens and the other Greek

city-states defined

a

culture of argument in which

language of justice could be used to justify
but not all, of behavior.

a

a

shared

wide range,

Thucydides' text portrays members

of the culture pursuing self-interest by using the language

of justice in imaginative ways.

Under normal conditions,

the language of justice would tend to become strained to its

limits, but would not break those limits.

The portrait,

according to White, serves to highlight the functional
limits residing in accepted linguistic practices.

The

of
language could be used creatively to justify the pursuit

simply
advantage, but it could not be forced to justify

anything at all.

There were limits, and those limits lay in
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respecting, at least to the extent of paying lip service to,
the premise of a rough equality of power between members
of
the culture.

But Athens was,

and sought to be, more

powerful than any other city.

The Athenian attempt to

reshape the language of justice to accommodate and justify

unlimited empire could not possibly be accepted by other
speakers of the language, according to White, because it

refuted the premise of equality, and demanded acquiescence
to a state of permanent inferiority.

In White's

interpretation, Athens sought to impose

a

perverted language

of justice which could not be shared by others.

The

Athenian use of language violated the unspoken limits which

defined the community, thereby contributing to the demise of
that community.

White points out that "as language

deteriorates, so does everything else," 115 and he argues that

Athenian ambitions were self -negating because they

undermined the cultural framework of meanings which might
have sustained those ambitions.
White repeatedly characterizes the Athenian position

portrayed in the text as "incoherent" and "irrational"
because it is self -destructive

.

This is an important

characterization of "rationality," but it fails to take into
account the heroic premises of Thucydides' text.

In the

heroic conception of time and the universe, everything
passes away in due course.

In that world,

self-destructiveness loses its force:
destructive, everything decays.

the accusation of

everything is self-

Speaking from within that
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world, Thucydides can claim that Athenian behavior is

perfectly rational and eminently realistic.

Athens pursues

the only kind of permanence available in the heroic world:

immortality in memory.

White might respond that, even so,

Athenian self-interest lay in preserving the culture which
gave meaning to Athenian ambitions, if only to preserve an

institutional memory which would exalt Athenian deeds.
Thucydides' text constitutes his rejoinder to the

hypothetical argument.

It is partly through his text that

the greatness of Athens,

"for evil or for good," is still

remembered and debated.
White concedes that there is

a

certain compelling logic

to the "realistic" position of Athens in the text.

"In a

world of unequal power, talk about justice has no place," he
admits.
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But, White asks rhetorically,

"could equality be

seen not as the factual precondition of the discourse of

justice but as its product, as something that it creates and

makes real in the world?"

Thus, despite its rational and

pragmatic aspirations, White's argument is forced to fall
back on

a

moral plea.
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Thucydides recognizes and gives

118
voice to similar pleas throughout the text. °

Indeed,

the

text may even, as White claims, intentionally incite such

pleas.

But part of the "message" of Thucydides'

text is

that in the heroic world, such pleas cannot be heard or

understood.

They have no ontological footing.

depicts and defends

a

Thucydides

world in which equality has only

precarious place between great powers.

In that world,

a

the
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plea for equality can only be heard as an attempt by the

weak to become strong at the expense of the powerful.

In a

world where power is all, talk of justice and equality can

only be heard as

a

clever strategy of power, no different in

status from any other strategy.

The heroic world of

Thucydides' text is coherent and self-contained.

It cannot

be adjusted to accommodate and appreciate claims to equality

from unequals.

It can only be replaced by a different

conception of reality.

White's pragmatic effort to avoid

attributing privileged ontological status or location to
language is laudable, perhaps even dictated, by modern

standards of academic argumentation.

But it deprives him of

any foundation for the moral plea which he is forced to

advance.

Without that foundation, his plea cannot penetrate

the world of the text, but must remain external to it.

11Q
*

White acknowledges that Thucydides' text is deeply
ambiguous.
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On one hand it might be read as

a

profoundly

moral drama portraying the destructive effects of the

Athenian abuse of language.

On the other hand, if Athens

was forced by historical necessity to talk as it did, then
the text portrays Athens enmeshed in a web of forces beyond
its control.

White's own interpretation places the text in

the category of moral drama.

In doing so, however,

it has

position of
the distinct merit of emphasizing the important
pointing
language in Thucydides' text while simultaneously
significance.
to an alternative interpretation of its

The

of
alternative interpretation would look to the portrait

*
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language presented in the text as it follows the trajectory
of necessity.

The conventional moral framework focuses on what

appears to be

a

progressively distorted use of language

portrayed in the text,

a

distortion which closely parallels

the decline in Athenian fortunes.

Three events tend to

occupy the foreground of the moral "decline-and-f all " genre
of interpretation:
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the Corcyraean Revolution, the Melian

Dialogue, and the Sicilian Expedition.

The Corcyraean

Revolution, in which the cohesive force of language breaks
down,

is conventionally interpreted to represent the social

disorder and corruption of language which flows from the
pressures of war and the pursuit of self-interest.
"Political anarchy readily symbolizes

a

moral anarchy,"

according to the interpretation of W. Robert Connor.
the same perspective,

the Melian Dialogue,

22

From

in which Athens

refuses to honor any talk of "justice," represents the
supreme violation of moral limits.

Following the conclusion

of that debate, Athens imposed the same cruel punishment

upon Melos which it had earlier refrained from imposing upon
Mytilene.

Lastly,

the disastrous Sicilian Expedition

represents, in Christian terms, the sin of pride or, in

Greek terms, excess.

The crushing defeat suffered by Athens

in its ill-advised attempt to conquer Sicily then comes to

symbolize Athens' final fall and the retribution of justice
or Nemesis.
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The conventional reading of the text is very useful
and

Yields some very sophisticated interpretations, much as
simple theme can be expanded and embellished to yield

Beethoven symphony.

Moreover, Thucydides

a

a

text does not

unambiguously demonstrate the conventional approach to be
mistaken.

Indeed, the celebrated ambiguity of the text

lends itself to

a

variety of interpretations.

But

allegiance to the theme of moral decline-and-f all tends to

overlook many interesting elements of the text which do not
seem to neatly fit the theme. 123

and-fall paradigm assumes

a

Furthermore, the decline-

constant view of natural order

which has shifted very little from Thucydides to today.
Consequently, the notion of retributive justice at work in
the conventional interpretation, for example, along with the

structure of natural order which supports it, is left

unexamined along with the various alternative versions of
justice articulated in the text.

Those versions which do

not fit the standard are easily consigned to the category of

"distortion," "abuse," or "pathology," 124

substitutes for "sin."

— all

respectable

Left out of this approach is the

possibility that Thucydides does not share the presumptive
paradigm but actively resists it in defense of an earlier

conception of natural order.

The remainder of this chapter

looks more closely at the three episodes

— the

Corcyraean

Revolution, the Melian Dialogue, and the Sicilian

Expedition--from this latter perspective as an alternative
to the decline-and-f all framework.
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The "Corcyraean Revolution" refers to the condition of
stasis, or civil strife, 125 which infected Corcyra early in
the war, but which later spread throughout the Hellenic

world to finally envelop Athens itself.
furnishes

a

Thucydides

brief history of the stasis at Corcyra, but

makes it clear in the process that that event is part of

larger pattern of truth revealed in the war.

a

The Corcyraean

stasis had its origins in the circumstances of the affair at
Epidamnus, which Thucydides had earlier recounted as part of
the aitiai and diaphorai, allegations and complaints,

leading up to the Peloponnesian War. 126

That account was to

be carefully distinguished from the truest prophasis

root cause, of the larger war.

,

or

Turning later to the

Corcyraean stasis, Thucydides brings us up to date on the
"progress" of that original dispute, and simultaneously
lifts the curtain somewhat on the truth of war and the truth
of history.

Epidamnus, it will be recalled, was itself rent by

factions between the many and the few, the demos and the
oligoi. 121

The oligoi had been exiled by the demos, and the

former retaliated by joining with barbarian, non-Greek

enemies to attack the city.

would itself have been

a

To assault one's mother city

crime of considerable magnitude

to
against Greek views of what was proper even in war, but

have been
ally with barbarians to accomplish the deed would
a

transgression of the greatest proportions.

Yet it was

against the
this exiled faction with whom Corcyra sided
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demos of Epidamnus.

1 ^8

the god at Delphi,

the religious center of Greece,

Epidamnus, with the endorsement of
then

appealed for support to Corinth, the mother city of Corcyra.
Corcyra then attacked and defeated both its own mother and
child,

so to speak.

Thucydides concludes his account of the

Epidamnian affair with the decision of democratic Athens to
accept oligarchic Corcyra into alliance because of the

potential value of the Corcyraean navy, leaving democratic
Epidamnus to appeal to oligarchic Corinth for assistance. 129
When Thucydides returns his attention to Corcyra in the
fifth year of the Peloponnesian War, the city is rent by

internal strife.
the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those
of their fellow-citizens whom they regarded as their
.

.

.

enemies.

Death thus raged in every shape; and as
usually happens at such times, there was no length to
.

.

.

which violence did not go; sons were killed by their
fathers, and suppliants dragged from the altar or slain

upon it, while some were even walled up in the temple of

Dionysus and died there.
Thucydides' account vividly describes the savagery, the

treachery and the terror of stasis, and goes on to link its

contagion to

a

loss of stable meanings for words.

Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and
the places at which it arrived at last, from having
heard what had been done before, carried to a still
greater excess the refinement of their inventions, as
manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and the
atrocity of their reprisals. Words had to change their
ordinary meanings and to take those which were now given
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them.

Reckless audacity came to be considered the
courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious
cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for
unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question,
inaptness to act on any.
Frantic violence became the
attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable
means of self-defense. The advocate of extreme measures
was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be
suspected.
To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd
head, and to divine a plot, a still shrewder; but to try
to provide against having to do either was to break your
party and to be afraid of your adversaries. 131

The disorder which is stasis is thus attributable to,
or paralleled by, a disintegration of language.

The deepest

horror of stasis, in Thucydides' view, lies not only, if at
all,

in its violence,

of unity.

but in its loss of coherence, its loss

Even here, Thucydides can be seen to be concerned

with the nature and the sustenance of power.

Power,

it will

be recalled, is collective, and is associated in Thucydides'
text with the concentrated resolve of gnome.

Gnome in turn

is associated with Periclean leadership of the Athenian

assembly.

At the time of its revolution, Corcyra was

democratic, 132 and certainly one facet of Thucydides'

description of the Corcyraean stasis is
fragility of democratic cohesion.

a

reminder of the

More broadly, however,

stasis reflects the general law of decay cited in Pericles'
third speech.
The general law of decay is one of two counter-

tendencies of nature at work in Thucydides' text.

The other
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is a tendency toward combination.

The tendency toward

combination, or unity, is associated with power, while the

tendency toward decay and decomposition is associated with
weakness.

In linking disunity with the breakdown of

language, Thucydides

account of the Corcyraean stasis

'

begins to make more explicit one of the most persistent, but

unspoken themes of the text:

political power and stability

are linked to the use of language as a form of persuasion.
W.

Robert Connor notes that the episode of the Corcyraean

stasis is narrated by Thucydides as

persuasion.^ 3

a

series of attempts at

James Boyd White further points out that the

meaning of the Greek term for persuasion, peitho, is deeply
imbued with political connotations of power and authority.
"To persuade is to compel obedience; to obey is to be

persuaded," he explains, thus emphasizing the link between
language and power.

^

Pericles' greatness in Thucydides' estimation lay in
his unparalleled ability to unify and lead the assembly by

means of his great powers of persuasion.

Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated,
he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other
hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once
In short, what was
restore them to confidence.
nominally a democracy became on his hands, government by

the first citizen.

1S
1JJ

1

and
By means of persuasion Pericles was able to sustain

dominate the common meanings attached to

a

public discourse

discourse
As long as Pericles was alive this common

"
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sustained the unity of the Athenian assembly with the

singlemindedness which constituted the decisive gnome of

Athenian power.

Following his death the common discourse

sustained by Pericles was appropriated for the more limited,
private ends of individuals seeking supremacy over the
assembly.

This, and not the narrow escape of Mytilene, is

the foremost significance of the debate between Cleon and

Diodotus over the fate of that city.
first time in Thucydides
to oppose one another,

'

text,

At Mytilene,

for the

Athenian speakers are heard

signifying the divisions which

followed Pericles' death. 136

Behind Pericles' rhetorical command lay the apparently
selfless, unifying vision of Athenian imperial greatness.

"With his successors it was different", Thucydides tells us.
"More on a level with one another, and each grasping at

supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of

state affairs to the whims of the mul ti tude

XJ

.

In a

parallel passage referring to the causes of the Corcyraean
stasis, Thucydides tells us that "The cause of all these

evils was the lust for power arising from greed and

ambition." 138

It is important to observe that Thucydides

does not here condemn the imperial quest for domination.

condemns the lust for power of

a

He

more limited, selfish type.

It is the pursuit of personal supremacy which corrodes the

common interest and the common language, reducing society to
an arena in which "no man trusted his

f ellow

.

"

But the

"common interest" defined by Pericles and endorsed by

79

Thucydides consists in the pursuit of Athenian domination
to
its furthest limits.
Thucydides condemns the individual
pursuit of supremacy not because he condemns Athenian
domination, but because the contest for personal supremacy

produces division which forestalls the collective action and

collective greatness achievable in war.

There is not

that Thucydides deplores the violence of war.

a

hint

Instead he

deplores the squandering of greatness lost to personal
contests for power.
It is tempting to conclude at this point that Pericles
is the conventional hero of Thucydides'

History.

In his

time Athenian greatness was at its height, Thucydides tells
us,

but his successors, following private ambitions and

private interests, led Athenians into military "projects
whose success would only conduce to the honour and advantage
of private persons,

and whose failure entailed certain

disaster on the country in war." 14^
too facile.

But the conclusion is

Thucydides gives us ample reason to believe

that Athens would have become great even without Pericles, 141
and that Athens would have eventually declined even with

Pericles.

Thucydides praises Pericles because under him it

became greater than it otherwise might have, and, had he
lived,

it might have become greater still before its

inevitable decline.

Thucydides is quite clear that it was stasis which
finally undid the heroic strength of Athens, and not the
142
superior force of its opponents.

There is

a

fall here but
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it is not a moral fall in the conventional sense.

Athens

fell because it lost its common voice, its common will.
the narration of the Corcyraean stasis foretells,

As

the

contest for personal supremacy in pos t-Periclean Athens
imposed private meanings upon words, and the public language
so skillfully orchestrated by Pericles disintegrated into a

tool for personal rather than national advancement.
W.

Robert Connor argues that under the pressures of war

language became an instrument of violence. 143

But Connor's

interpretation is implicitly based on the assumption that an

uncorrupted language had once been something other than
instrumental.

From the beginning, however, Thucydides

'

text

consistently portrays language used instrumentally by each
side to secure advantage for itself even prior to the war.

Apparently aware of the problem, and unwilling to defend the
purity of Pericles' language because of its support for war,
Connor later points to
Homer by Thucydides. 144

a

solitary, uncritical quotation of

According to Connor, the quotation

refers the reader "back to an age of fabled tranquility and
beauty, of poetry and order.

We enter a festival of

families bound together in common observances, contests of
simple, physical joy.

How complete a contrast to the

145
perverted festival we have just witnessed in Corcyra!"

Connor goes on to claim that the "episode provides the

contrast that lets us assess the events of Thucydides' day."
If Connor is correct,

he has apparently identified the

of
single, brief passage in an otherwise forgotten portion

.
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the text in which Thucydides has encoded the lost ideal

which animates his entire History.

It seems more likely

that the logic of Connor's decline-and-f all paradigm demands
an Eden-like reference point or standard by which to judge

the steepness of the fall.

Like James Boyd White, Connor ascribes to language the
task of setting limits, and he views the Corcyraean

Revolution as
language.

a

loss of limits previously to be found in

The Corcyraean story is told as

a

series of

attempts at persuasion, Connor observes, but the theme is
ironic, he contends, because "discussion, argument,

persuasion produce no conciliation only growing horror and
violence." 146

What, we are entitled to ask,

is the basis of

this expectation that talk should produce conciliation?

Connor apparently, and without reflection, presumes the

existence of

a

Platonic universe in which language refers to

and reflects a harmonious natural order.

Thucydides

1

The structure of

text disputes that presumption, however.

Thucydides' text shows us

a

vision of reality and a

conception of natural order which is anything but
harmonious.
and,

In Thucydides'

world nature is deeply agonistic

without being chaotic, permanently at war with itself.

Language has no special status in this world, and it is in-

distinguishable from any other instrument to be employed to
advantage
In describing the Corcyraean Revolution, Connor

repeatedly refers to the "distortion," "abuse," or
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"pathology" of language, thus referring by his own language
to a standard of purity missing from the Corcyraean

portrait.

If something like Platonic harmony or

"conciliation" is thought to supply the missing standard of
purity, it would also give meaning to Connor's reference to

limits which are violated in stasis and war.
the standard,

then violence constitutes

of that standard.

a

If

harmony is

natural violation

Armed with the Platonic ideal, Connor can

then read Thucydides'

text as a condemnation of war.

"War

becomes a teacher of violence," he claims, attributing the
thought to Thucydides.

147

The "moral implication" of the

Corcyraean episode, Connor concludes, is that the "drive for
dominance, self-aggrandizement, and ambition are all

manifestations of something in the very nature of man." iW
Connor's interpretation skirts the terminology of original
sin, but the similarity between Thucydides'

account of the

Corcyraean stasis and his account of the plague at Athens
demonstrates to Connor that the "something" in human nature
is akin to a disease.

Much of the persuasivenes of Connor's position hinges
on a controversial translation of

Thucydides. 149

a

critical phrase from

Where Connor reads that war is

violence," Peter Pouncey reads that war is
violent)

teacher." 150

the immorality of war;

a

a

"teacher of

"harsh

(or

The former interpretation points to
the latter leaves it open to ask what

is the lesson or truth imparted by war?

We need not decide

correct.
at this point which translation is most

It is
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sufficient to observe that Connor's Platonic presuppositions
woven into the moral decline-and-f all framework draw the

interpretation in one direction to the exclusion of others.
Thucydides' account of the Corcyraean stasis suggests

another view of the relationship between language, truth and
power.

Recall that in Thucydides' view, great political

power is collective in nature.

It is the expression of a

united will or consensus behind

a

action.

particular course of

In the case of the Athenian assembly this

singlemindednes

,

or gnome,

skillfull use of language.

is produced by Pericles'

No Athenian leader after

Pericles is able to produce and sustain that singlemindedness, even though Pericles' words echo through their
efforts.-^ 5

-1

-

The reason for their failure, Thucydides

indicates, is a deficiency of scale in their vision.

The

vision of greatness which informed the language of post-

Periclean leaders was limited by standards of personal gain.
On the other hand, the vision of greatness which informed

Pericles' language was

a

vision of unlimited Athenian power

and domination.
In the Platonic view implicitly imported by Connor,

language approaches
truth of

a

a

transcendental status reflecting the

harmonious cosmos violated by violence and war.

In the heroic view of Thucydides, however,

agon,

the cosmos is an

an arena of strife and competition for ascendence and

advantage.

In the heroic order,

language is an instrument

capable of producing an artificial harmony through artful
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persuasion, a form of subjugation through words, but

language itself does not reflect or refer back to an
original, harmonious truth.
reality,

In the heroic configuration of

the position of Platonic truth is occupied by war.

In place of Platonic truth,

Pericles'

language invokes

a

vision of competitive greatness (arete) so vast that it
dwarfs the personal aspirations of ordinary mortals.

The

heroic ideal which informs the public discourse of Pericles,
and which also sustains the celebrated Athenian single-

mindedness, is an ideal of greatness in war.

Tragically,

however, Thucydides also shows us that in the world which he

portrays, war necessarily prepares the way for stasis.

The

prescribed path to greatness contains within itself the
seeds of its own demise, and the way up is also found to be
the way down.

The Melian Dialogue

The opposition between war and stasis presents

paradox to post-Platonic thought.

a

To the Platonic way of

thinking, peace and war represent the opposites of unity and

disunity, harmony and dissonance.

But in the heroic,

agonistic world of Thucydides" text, war represents the
unifying ideal, the force of integration, while stasis
represents the force of dissolution and disintegration.
Yet,

remaining within the confines of the heroic conception

of nature reflected in the text,

it would be misleading to

stasis as
think of the counter- tendencies of war and
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entirely separate forces.
together as arcs on

a

They are opposites united

vertical circle; they generate and

succeed one another much as seasons of the year.

Thucydides

necessarily

a

1

observation that war leads to stasis is not

condemnation of war, for war is also heralded

as the epitome of greatness.

Instead, the observation may

be an acknowledgement that the general law of decay is a

governing principle of the cosmos along with the principle
of concentration.

The heroic stance of Athens, which seeks

immortality through deeds so great, "whether for evil or for
good," that they will never perish from memory does not

pretend to negate that law.

Rather the heroic choice

enlists that law to assure death or decay at the proper

moment--the acme of greatness-- thereby cheating not death
but time.

Once again, the model is Homer's Achilles, who

chooses not death over life, as if that choice were among
the destinies offered, but rather the moment and manner of

death which secures immortality in memory.
The universal status of the general law of decay is

attested to by Thucydides when he tells us that "the

sufferings which revolution [stasis] entailed upon the
cities were many and terrible, such have occurred and always
will occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the
same." 152

It is in this context that Thucydides says a few

lines later that "war

.

.

.

proves

it plausible that Thucydides'

rough master," making

a

meaning is not that war is

teacher of violence but that war is

a

teacher of truth.

a
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Thucydides

'

reference to the eternal recurrence of

stasis projects us both forward and backward in his own
text.

Only

a

few lines earlier we had been informed that

the Corcyraean stasis was a preface to a similar convulsion

which engulfed not only Athens but the whole Hellenic world,
a

convulsion which is dramatically portrayed in the final

chapters of Thucydides' work.

In the other direction we are

reminded of Thucydides' statement early in the text that the
future of mankind would resemble the past and that this

truth constitutes a "possession for all time."
It is fitting that the end refers back to the

beginning, for the timeless truth which Thucydides finds

embedded in the course of the Peloponnesian War is

a

circular path which joins together in an endless cycle the

opposites of war and stasis, integration and disintegration,
power and weakness.

The initial Archaeology of Thucydides'

text leads us step by step from

a

description of the nomadic

instability and impermanence of "early times" in which there
was no "greatness," through the formation of successively

greater cities and associations, greater concentrations of
power, until finally power coalesced into two great rival

alliances:

"At the head of the one stood Athens, at the

head of the other, Lacedaemon [Sparta], one the first naval,
153
the other the first military power in Hellas."

The

of
history of the war itself then tracks the ascending power

followed by
Athens to its unprecedented height of greatness,
stasis.
its inevitable decline into fragmentation and

The
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two great forces of nature-association and dissolution,

power and weakness

— are

linked by the law of Necessity:

each is inevitable, and each contains within itself the
seeds of its own opposite which will grow to overcome it. 154

Viewed in this configuration, power contains within itself
its only limits,

and those limits are not ethical or moral,

but tragic in a heroic sense.

Thucydides dramatically compresses the circular

movement of Homeric nature into his account of the notorious
dialogue preceding the Athenian massacre of the inhabitants
The dialogue appears at the rhetorical and

of Melos.

structural center of the text, and it is here that

Thucydides distills and arranges all of the contending
elements of the text into their respective positions.
To recapitulate briefly from Thucydides' account, 155

Melos was

a

rather small island,

which sought

a

a

colony of Sparta, but one

"friendly neutrality" between the warring

parties of Athens and Sparta, and alliance with neither.
The Melian position became unbearable to Athens who

considered it an affront to Athenian power.

Consequently,

Athens besieged Melos with overwhelming force, and delivered
an ultimatum:

submit or be destroyed.

Melos declined to

submit, and resisted briefly before being conquered by

Athens who then put to death all of the grown men, sold all
of the women and children for slaves,

island for themselves.

and colonized the
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The negotiations which preceded this annihilation
are

presented by Thucydides in the form of

a

stark dialogue in

which Athens restricts the subject of discussion to what
it
calls matters of interest and expediency, and explicitly

excludes appeal to notions of justice and right, since
"right, as the world goes,

is in question only between

equals in power, while the weak suffer what they must." 156
In its actions,

Athens claims merely to be following what it

calls the "law of nature" in which both gods and men rule

whenever they can.
us," Athens says,

"We found it

[this law]

existing before

"and we shall leave it to exist forever

after us; all we do is make use of it" as would any others
in our position.

15 ^

The Athenian position certainly appears to be
to unlimited power,

a

claim

and it is this apparent loss of limits

which places it at the heart of moral decline-and-f all
interpretations.

At Melos, Athens imposed without

hesitation the same harsh punishment it had rescinded for
Mytilene twelve years earlier, making it plausible to infer
that Thucydides intended to portray a progressive moral

Furthermore, the final line

decline on the part of Athens.
of Thucydides'

abruptly by

a

account of the Melian episode is followed
line introducing the grandiose and disastrous

Athenian plan to conquer another island:
juxtaposition lends itself to

a

Sicily.

The

view that Thucydides sought

to dramatically link the hubris of Athens at Melos with the
158
nemesis of Athenian defeat in Sicily.

Viewed from within
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the heroic perspective, however,

the Melian Dialogue

suggests an alternative view in which the dialogue portrays
not the moral inconstancy of Athens but rather the constant

trajectory of power according to the law of Necessity

governing the Homeric conception of nature.
The Melian Dialogue stands out as the only formal

dialogue within Thucydides

'

text.

Most other speeches tend

to be organized into balanced pairs, often widely separated,

and not addressed directly to each other but rather toward
an assembly or gathering of some sort.

The dialogue format

of the Melian episode emphasizes its importance even as it

heightens the sense of confrontation.
Thucydides informs us at the outset that the Melians

prevented the Athenians from directly addressing "the
people," permitting them only to address "the few." 159

The

Athenians respond to this tactic saying that they know full
well it is intended to prevent the Athenians from

"deceiving" the people with seductive arguments.

Athenians then propose

a

The

dialogue in which the Melians will

state their objections to the Athenian position, and the

Athenians will answer them.

In this manner we learn at the

outset that the language of the dialogue will have

different status and

a

a

different purpose from that of the

other speeches of the text.

The Athenian proposal to submit

to a dialogue counters the accusation of untruthfulness,

thereby associating the dialogue format with the revelation
of truth.
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This is not

surprising move for Thucydides to make,

a

for it was an evolving view at the time that the order of

language bore

a

special relationship to the true order of

nature and the nature of justice (physis and dike).
a

It was

position later to be systematically explored by Plato, of

course, but at the time it was deeply lodged within the

production and performance of Greek tragedy as
event.

a

public

Thucydides, however, casts the Melian dialogue in an

ironic light.

To the extent that Greek tragedy was founded

upon and defended

a

view of justice and nature at odds with

the Homeric perspective,

160

Thucydides employs the Melian

Dialogue to contest rather than endorse the tragic view.
As the Athenians are quick to point out,

the strongest

arguments of the Melians against their own annihilation or

capitulation depend upon hope of good fortune, faith in the
gods, and trust in the Spartans.

Against these and other

considerations of expedience advanced by the Melians, the
Athenians counter with their interpretation of the "law of
nature" and the primacy of power in the relations of both
gods and men.

The Melian Dialogue thus advances a view of

truth in which language is both an agent of and

a

reflection

of the general truth of power.

Does Thucydides mean then simply to side with the

Athenian view of power as domination, and the artificiality
of all limits?

Few have ever believed Thucydides' work to

be so uncomplicated.

The Athenian version of the truth of

power must be seen in its proper position on the wheel of

.
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the dialogue, which is

and weakness.

a

dialogue between positions of power

It has often been observed that the Athenian

position articulated in the Melian Dialogue resembles that
of the Persians against Athens in the Persian War as

recorded by Herodotus.

Furthermore,

the Melian reply to the

Athenians is posed in almost identical terms as the Athenian
reply to the Persians when faced with
submission. 161

a

similar demand for

Athens did not submit to the Persians, nor do

the Melians submit to the Athenians.

The Athenians were not

destroyed, of course, as were the Melians, but instead

successfully repelled

a

far superior force against all odds

at the decisive Battle of Salamis.

But if the position of

Melos resembles Athens' past, it also resembles Athens'
future in its defeat in Sicily in

many respects
There,

a

a

battle which would be in

mirror image of the Battle of Salamis.

in Sicily,

in its hour of defeat and in one of the

most memorably moving portraits in all literature, Athens,
in the voice of Nicias,

the Athenian commander, would echo

Melos in its invocation of hope, justice, and favor of the
gods

162

What are we to conclude from these resemblances, these

possible substitutions?

Must we concur with the decline-and

-fall view that the Melian Dialogue, poised between Salamis
and Sicily, dramatically portrays the moral blindness and
Not necessarily.

hubris of Athens?
also be viewed as
power.

a

The Melian Dialogue can

temporal diagram of the trajectory of

Along the circumference of the circle traced by the
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dialogue are all of the stages of physis:

infancy,

strength, decline; morning, noon, and night.

At the moment

of the dialogue Athens occupies the acme of power, much
as

Persia had before it.

The image of Melos with its

intimations of Sicily joins Athens' past and future, thus

closing the circle.
The circumference of the Melian Dialogue dramatically

recapitulates the trajectory of the Peloponnesian War, which
completes

a

circle from Athens' weak position against the

Persians to Athens weak position against the Sicilians.

In

between is imperialistic Athens at its greatest and most
active height at Melos, where Athens resembles former Persia
and Melos resembles the Athenian army in Sicily.

Each point

along the circumference of power is associated in the text

with

a

particular view of justice, dike.

Midway in its

ascent to power, at the first congress at Sparta, Athens

would first articulate the law of nature that the weaker
should be subject to the stronger.

But Athens' view then

was muted and qualified by an ambiguous deference to

moderation and restraint.
complemented by

a

The Athenian view was

further claim that cries of "justice" are

raised only by the weak to further their own interests
against the stronger, only to be abandoned whenever force

might do as well.

Opposite Athens position on the circle,

below the plane of equality, stood Sparta.

Sparta's view of

justice was laconically voiced by Stenelaides who distrusts

words and urges

a

simple faith in the justice of the gods to

.
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rectify the imbalance.

Later, at Melos, against the

implicit claim that language constitutes the mirror of
justly balanced order of nature and

a

a

limit upon power,

language would be stripped of its persuasive strategies and

unmasked as

a

pure instrument and expression of domination.

Later still, however, in the evening hour of its defeat in
Sicily, Athens too would appeal to hope,

favor of the gods,

justice, and the

just as Melos and Sparta had done before

it

Does this trajectory convict Athens of hubris, and

vindicate the truth of dike as
in the cosmos?

Not exactly.

accuses Athens of

a

a

self -balancing moral force

Not in the sense that it

moral flaw in its failure to sustain a

straighter, flatter trajectory.

The changes which Athens

exhibits in character are not shifts of
Athens follows

a

a

moral nature.

path which exists before it and one which

will continue to exist long after it, according to the

timeless truth portrayed by Thucydides.

The demand that

Athens should be morally consistent is

a

Platonic demand

which can operate meaningfully only in

a

world which has

been reconfigured to accommodate that demand.

What does

remain truly constant, in Thucydides' cyclical view of
history,

is not the current occupant of any particular

position on the circle, but only the circle itself.
view,

In that

the only limits to power are those which power

necessarily generates itself; and the only justice is found
in time.

.

.

.

'
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CHAPTER

3

TRAGEDY AND DEMOCRACY

From Oikos To Pol is
It is noteworthy that we learn from Thucydides next to

nothing of the internal political arrangements or structure
of Athenian democracy.

Nor do we learn many details of the

actual decision-making processes which lay behind the

policies and conduct of the war Thucydides so brilliantly
chronicles.

This seems odd since Pericles explicitly, and

Athenians generally, attributed their city's power and

greatness to its democratic rule.

We have already

encountered of course Thucydides' own apparent disdain for

democracy and his claim that what passed for democracy in
Athens was in fact leadership by the "first citizen." 1

But

can the omission be attributed solely to Thucydides'

antipathy to democracy, or perhaps to the author's editorial

decision to confine his History to external events of the
war?

The alternative possibility must be considered that

the Homeric conception of

a

cyclical natural order--with its

corollary views of language, truth, power and justice
serves Thucydides so well as
war,

a

— which

theoretical account of the

simply can not be extended to provide

a

comparable

account of the democratic polis as well.
Politically, the most significant development between
the Homeric age exemplified in the Iliad and the Periclean
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age of fifth-century Athens was the emergence
of the Greek

polis, or city-state.

The Iliad portrays

a

world in which

political organization is minimal and might be described
without too much distortion as "tribal."

Ties of loyalty

and obligation were defined by membership in extended

household or kinship groups, and by reciprocal bonds of
philia between members of different families.

The term

philia is conventionally translated as "friendship" but
would probably be better rendered as "alliance." 2

modern ear "friendship" connotes

a

To a

relationship based more

on mutual affection than one based on favors earned and
owed.

Yet the latter dimension takes considerable

precedence over the former in the early Greek relationship
of philia.

The notion of alliance is critical to an understanding
of social relations in the pre-political world of Homeric
As described by A. W. H. Adkins

society.

lived in

a

,

"Homeric man

society of virtually autonomous small social

units called oikoi, noble households each under the

leadership of

a

local chieftain.

.

.

.

The oikos was at once

the largest effective social, political and economic unit,"

and only a tenuous, shifting structure of relationships

existed between oikoi. 4

Warfare was

a

prominent part of the

normal relations between oikoi, where these households

either fought one another or joined together to fight others
in a permanent quest for

time,

or honor.

5

The customary

expectation of reciprocal service and protection surrounding
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the relation of philia, or guest-friendship,

supported

primary network of alliances in these conflicts.

a

It must be

emphasized that these relations were personal, not political
in a modern sense.

Bonds of mutual obligation and

protection were formed between persons not communities,
although these personal bonds might in certain circumstances
be extended to other members of the family unit.

While the

bonds of philia and similar ties may well have been the

forerunner of political and military alliances between more

recognizably political units, such abstract units did not
yet exist in a meaningful sense in the Homeric world. 6

The personal and apolitical nature of these earlier

alliances is well-illustrated by an episode in the Iliad.^
In the heat of battle the Greek warrior Diomedes encounters

the Trojan warrior Glaucus.

In the course of one of those

extended genealogical accounts which identify heroes in
Homer,

the two men discover that they are mutual philoi by

virtue of

a

compact of guest-friendship made by their

grandfathers.

Consequently, even though they have never met

before, and despite the fact that they are enemies in war,

Glaucus the Trojan and Diomedes the Greek will not fight one
another out of respect for the bond of philia between them.
The same episode illustrates the apolitical, or pre-

political, character of the Trojan War.

conflict between nation-states but rather

This was not
a

a

personal

vendetta between the Greek brothers Agamemnon and Menelaus
on the one hand, and the Trojan Paris on the other,

fought
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in order to avenge a violation of the code of
guest-

friendship committed by Paris against Menelaus.

The Greek

"army" is a loose assembly of great households under

independent chieftains bound together by personal bonds and
the perennial pursuit of honor, glory and booty.
is the leader

("commander" would be too strong

a

Agamemnon
word)

in

part by virtue of his close relationship to Menelaus and in
part because he is able to secure the assistance of the

largest forces.

Nevertheless, as the Iliad makes clear,

Achilles or any other chieftain is free to leave and

withdraw his forces at any time, restrained only by concern
for one's own personal reputation and honor.

The identity of the Greek polis as a political

structure evolved slowly as relations between the chieftains
of these great households solidified and stabilized.

consequences seem to follow.

8

Two

First of all, the original

polis would tend toward aristocracy, oligarchy, or the rule
of the few.

Secondly, the central problem facing the

emerging community would be the problem of power.

The polis

would naturally tend toward aristocracy because it

originated as an association of chieftains of great
households, and not initially as

a

merger of those

9
households into an overarching community.

were, collectively,

standards.

the aristoi,

These chieftains

the best men, by Homeric

Their primary loyalty was always to their own

oikos and its philoi, and their primary aim was always to
secure and advance their own powerful status through
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competitive success, arete, and the acquisition of tribute
and honor,

time.

10

Early Greek culture was, and remained,

fiercely competitive.

Its heroic values were well-suited to

its agonistic texture, and they were deeply embedded in an

agonistic view of nature which justified those values and
that culture. 11
In its earliest stages then the Greek polis was a

precarious "assembly" of the powerful leaders of distinctly
autonomous groups. 12

In any such association the problem of

power must be paramount.

For there to be an association at

all there must be some form of rule; and some form of rule

implies some form of submission.
aristoi,

Yet to the heroic Greek

submission could only be equated with defeat.

Competitive success, arete, the highest virtue of heroic
Greek culture, could only mean one thing:
domination.

victory and

The Homeric conception of natural order

contains no space for an affirmation of equal power.

Everything is either on its way up or on its way down in an
endless cycle of growth and decay, strength and weakness.

Equality is but

a

transient moment not to be sustained in

the eternal contest for ascendance.

The early history of

the polis therefore is necessarily marked by intrigue, civil

strife, and intermittent tyranny against a background of

uneasy cooperation between heads of great households.
Whatever mystery attaches to the origin of the Greek
polis,

it is grounded in deeply rooted and tenacious Greek

values of freedom, independence, and self-sufficiency.

.
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Within the Homeric universe, freedom, eleutheria,
was a
"competitive combative concept, closely linked to arete,

the

quality which enables one to have freedom oneself and
control over others." 13

The early Greek idea of freedom is

inseparably linked to the ideal of domination or rule over
others.

To be free is to rule others; to submit to others

is to be unfree.

would be viewed as

No other options were thinkable.
a

mere standoff, not

a

Equality

goal to be

pursued
Nevertheless, the freedom sought and defended in early

Greece was never the freedom of the individual in the modern
conception.

Just as no element of the natural universe

could escape its assigned place in
(dike),

occupied

a

larger order of things

to a Greek mind every individual also necessarily
a

prescribed position within

a

larger social order.

Moreover, the social order was always embedded and reflected
in the natural order of the cosmos, as is evidenced by the

consistent appeal to dike as the most fundamental principle
of good order,

both natural and social, which persisted

throughout Greek history.

The early Greek conception of

order, either natural or social, did not yet imply equality,

but it did imply a certain reciprocity and an acknowledged
set of limits, however vague or contestable, upon both ruler

and ruled.

To aspire to the disconnected and unlimited

freedom of the modern individual would have been considered
a

form of madness to an ancient Greek.

Such

a

terrifying
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and insecure freedom would also constitute the most severe

form of punishment in the Greek world:

exile.

The Greek concept of freedom in the sense of self-

sufficiency always referred to
individual.

larger social unit than the

Initially it may have applied to the family

unit of blood relations.
oikos,

a

Eventually it applied to the

the extended household, and its philoi.

Finally it

applied to the polis itself and its constituents, but not
before the Homeric conception of natural order, dike, was

undermined and transformed by its own extension beyond its
original sphere.

Homeric dike is compatible with the hierarchical
relations of mutual dependence which define the Greek oikos.
And the same conception of dike might be stretched to fit
the more or less egalitarian alliances between small numbers
of aristoi for specific strategic purposes.

But the lack of

ontological space for permanent equality severely tests the

possibility of

a

larger, more stable political order

premised upon equal power, even if that power-sharing is
confined, as it initially was, to
of great households.

a

few aristocratic heads

It would be overly facile to imagine

democracy evolving "naturally" from such strategic alliances
among equally powerful aristoi.

Before the idea of

democracy could emerge and be sustained as

a

legitimate,

justifiable political order, the very concept of "nature"
from which it is thought to evolve would need to be

radically transformed.

It is this transformation,

more than
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the origins of the polls itself, which is mysterious.

democracy, as

a

For

sharing of power among the common people as

equals, could not evolve from the principle of dike, with
its limited space for equality,

inscribed in the Homeric

conception of nature.
Although the actual conditions for

a

transition from

aristocratic rule to democratic rule were undoubtedly
complex and slow to evolve, the formal institutionalization
of democracy in Athens is conventionally dated to the

reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 B.C. following the

Peisistratid tyranny.

14

Prior to Cleisthenes' reforms

Athenian history had been dominated by conflict and

a

struggle for power between three or four great aristocratic
families and their philol.^

Cleisthenes, who was himself

a

member of the great Alkmeonid family, as was Pericles after
him,

reorganized the polis on

a new,

rather than the former clan basis.

purely geographic basis
In place of the four

Ionian tribes which traditionally made up Attic society,

Cleisthenes set up

a

system of ten new tribes in such

way

a

that each tribe was now composed of demes, or districts,

from each of three regions of the city:
the center,

those closest to

those on the coast, and those in between.

consequence each tribe then embodied

a

As a

cross-section of

populations, regional characteristics, and activities which
made up the city.

Cleisthenes is also credited with introducing the
practice of attaching the deme name to one's own name
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instead of the traditional attachment of the father's
name.

Although this practice was slow to catch on, it did

eventually become standard, and its intent was apparently to
emphasize membership in the new civic organization over

traditional hereditary ties.

The final innovation of

Cleisthenes was the introduction of ostracism,
where annually the assembly might send

a

a

procedure

single man into

exile for ten years without depriving him of either his

citizenship or his property.

Apparently, however, this

particular provision went unused for another twenty years
until 487 B.C.

Admittedly, it is not immediately clear from this brief

account why Cleisthenes' reforms should be credited with the

institutionalization of democracy in Athens.

But the

opacity of the account is apparently not due to its brevity
or incompleteness.

both ancient 1

**

Others have also puzzled over claims,

and modern, that Cleisthenes was the creator

of democracy in Athens.

1^

What is not disputed is that the

reforms were intended to dilute or "mix up" traditional

aristocratic concentration and influence.

More

controversial is the interpretation of Cleisthenes' own
strategy.

Was it a complicated and shrewd attempt to

rearrange the city in such

a

way as to benefit the

Alkmeonids over the other aristocratic families, as
Forrest argues? 18

W.

G.

Or did Cleisthenes seek power for himself

only in order to institute his reforms and transcend the old
19
conflicts, as Ehrenberg argues?

On the first

Ill

interpretation Cleisthenes was

outsmarted himself.

a

clever politician who

Unable to achieve sufficient support

from the other families, he was forced to enlist the backing
of the demos,

the common people,

democracy accidently.

Cleisthenes was

a

thereby initiating

On the second interpretation

selfless politician who sought to overturn

the traditional dominance of the aristocratic families,

including his own, for the greater good of the city.
Efforts to resolve the question have often sought to

ascertain the exact geographic boundaries of the demes, as
well as more precise knowledge of the patterns of influence
of the great families.

This approach has thus far proven

futile because the historical record is simply insufficient
to determine the answers.

misdirected.

Moreover the attempt is

Of far greater import is the question of why

Cleisthenes' reforms, whatever their strategic status,

should have been widely, even enthusiastically received
among both demos and aristoi.

That they were well-received

is attested by the relative internal stability

democracy for almost two hundred years. 20
observes,

As M.

of Athenian
I.

Finley

"Neither the sovereign Assembly with its unlimited

right of participation, nor the popular jury-courts nor the

selection of officials by lot nor ostracism could have

prevented either chaos on the one hand or tyranny on the
other, had there not been the self-control among enough of
the citizen-body to contain its own behavior within

bounds." 21

But what accounts for those bounds and what is

.
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the source of this "self-control" which Finley
attributes to
the prior Greek sense of community?

if,

prior to

Cleisthenes' reforms, the Athenian polis, like all Greek
polei, was strained by tension between the aristoi and the
demos-,

and if, as all observers agree that it did,

tension persisted as

a

prominent strain in Athenian

politics, reference to
to beg the question.

that

a

primary sense of community appears

For it is precisely the source and

cohesion of that sense of community which needs explaining.
Finley is right:

Cleisthenes' reforms could not create that

sense of community if it did not already exist in some

fashion

Elsewhere Finley frames the issue differently.
wonders, did the reforms of Cleisthenes not provoke

Why, he
a

political debate over the theoretical question of
legitimacy?

Instead, he says,

of justice.

In the "absence of any need to grapple with the

the Greeks debated the nature

problem of legitimacy,"^ Finley concludes that external
"conquest alone made possible political stability.'""

Finley *s conclusion fits with the Homeric/Thucydidean view
of natural order that an equality of powers is sustainable

only so long as that equality is

domination over others.

a

contingent strategy of

And it vindicates the heroic view

that democracy and imperialism go hand in hand, each

supporting and, eventually, each undermining the other in an
endless cycle.
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But Finley's conclusion overlooks the possibility
that

the continuing Greek debate over the nature of justice
(dike)

may have functioned in fact as

political legitimacy,

a

a

debate over

debate in which the heroic legacy

and its political implications were contested.

The social

order was traditionally thought to be embedded in the

natural order, and human law or custom (nomos) was thought
to be justified by the order of nature.

Greek context we would then expect that

In the ancient
a

question as to the

propriety of the political order would ultimately be posed
as a question of dike itself.

Dike:

From Eunomia to Isonomia

We should not be surprised to learn that the meaning of

dike tends to be elusive, not least because it tends to
shift over time.

From its earliest beginnings as an

exclusive circle of ruling aristoi, the emerging structure
of the polis presented a paradoxical challenge to the older

Homeric conception of dike.

In the older view "nature"

could be seen as an agonistic order of power in which the
eternal struggle for dominance brought about

a

regular

succession of victories and defeats for the various elements
(i.e.,

powers) of nature.

lawless nature, however.

This was not

a

conception of

The principle of dike, order,

referred to the regularities and the limits of the contest.
"Nature" embodied

a

series of concentric spheres, each

separate arena of contest.

Every element of nature was

a
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confined to its appropriate sphere and had its natural
opponent.

To be unjust, to violate dike, was to leave one's

proper sphere and to challenge an inappropriate opponent.
The order of nature prescribed

a

relatively fixed hierarchy

of spheres within which competition would assure not only

that each sphere was ruled at any given moment by the best,
it would also assure an "orderly"

transition whenever the

best inevitably weakened and became unfit to rule.

Of

course "best" in this conception of order meant best at war
or competition.

But under the harshly competitive

conditions of Homeric society, that was certainly an
important measure of "good" or "best."

It was also

consistent with the hierarchical social structure of the
oikos in which one man ruled at the top.
In principle,

extended to justify
life.

the older conception of dike could be
a

hierarchical organization of polis

But with its limited space for equality, and with its

emphasis on continual strife rather than cooperation, the
same conception of dike was strained to provide

basis for stable rule by

a

a

legitimate

group of aristoi from different

oikoi, none of whom was prepared to concede superiority or

even equality to any other.

The emerging polis thus

somewhat paradoxically demanded

a

conception of dike which

might justify both equality and inequality at the same time.

Equality at the top was needed in order to achieve stability
among the ruling aristoi, and to prevent disintegration into

tyranny or stasis.

But,

in order for the aristoi to

—

,
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preserve their ruling status, inequality between the
aristoi
and the demos below needed to be justified as well. 24
What

was requ ired

in short, was a justification of equal rule

over oth ers who had little or no participation in that rule.

Under the pressure of these twin political imperatives
the political principle of isonomia

— literally

emerged to satisfy the first condition:
rulers, a condition premised upon

between ruler and ruled.
inequality

— was

a

"equal law"

equality among

fundamental inequality

The second condition

— hierarchical

justified by the traditional principle of

eunomia, good order, anchored in the traditional conception
of dike as a hierarchical arrangement of spheres.

J.

Peter

Euben provides an admirably succinct characterization of
eunomia:

Eunomia rested on the acknowledgement of natural
hierarchies and inequalities.
Eunomia was the
.

.

.

recognition and observance of the boundaries that marked
and defined those places and ways.

To ignore them, to

cross the boundaries and encroach on an area where one

didn't belong, was to violate nature, confound the law,
make for disorder and injustice, and commit an act of
impiety.

...

In the world of men as in the world of

25
the gods, hierarchy and differentiation were the norm.

The problem which arose, however, was that isonomia and

eunomia each claimed to be universal principles of justice,
yet each was grounded in a vision of natural order

incompatible with the other, making it difficult to sustain
both isonomia and eunomia simultaneously.

Isonomia could
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justify equality among the aristoi, and in principle, it

could justify equality among the demos, but it could not
justify inequality between the aristoi and the demos.

The

traditional principle of eunomia, on the other hand, could
justify inequality between ruler and ruled,

aristoi and

demos, but the same principle could not also serve to

justify equality among rulers.

This is the dilemma of

legitimacy which furnished the theoretical breeding ground
for the emergence of democracy at Athens.

Against the traditional principle of eunomia it was

initially isonomia

equal law, not demokratia

,

,

rule by the

people, which was used to justify the reforms of

Cleisthenes.

Indeed there is considerable reason to believe

that at the time of Cleisthenes' reforms the term demokratia
The term isonomia did designate

did not yet exist.

a

principle of political equality, an ideal, which eventually
came to justify democracy,

a

form of government, but

originally the principle of isonomia did not necessarily
imply

a

democratic polity. 71

"Isonomia" is
(equal)

a

compound word of two parts:

and nomos (law)

.

iso

The term thus lends itself most

readily to translation as "equality under the law" or
"equality through the law."

The full meaning of the term is

adequately conveyed, however, only through an appreciation
of law as an expression or medium of power and rule.

In

that sense isonomia means an equalitarian distribution of

power among participants, i.e., those who share power, in

a
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political community.

Furthermore the sense of equality

expressed in the term isonomia does not imply

a

harmonious

equalizing, and therefore neutralizing, of power.

The

equality found in isonomia refers to the sustained tension
involved when one power is pitted against another power in

a

perpetually balanced opposition.
Although isonomia was always

a

political principle, we

know little of its actual use in the debates leading to

Cleisthenes' reforms.

We learn of its meaning partially

from medical texts roughly contemporaneous with the reforms
of Cleisthenes.

Alcmaeon,

a

physician, attributed the state

of health to the maintenance of a symmetrical balance

(isonomia) of power between opposing forces such as the hot

and the cold,
sweet, etc.

the wet and the dry, or the bitter and the
Ill health or disease he ascribed to a

"monarchy" in which one power achieved supremacy over its
opposite.

28

The unhealthy state, the unnatural state, is

thus one in which

a

single power is superior to all others.

The healthy state is one in which power is equally divided

among opposing forces.

Health is therefore conceived as

a

state of dynamic equilibrium in which power is always

limited by an equal and opposite power.
The use of political imagery to describe health and

disease in medicine is consistent with the practice of preSocratic thinkers to explain natural phenomena in political
terms.

We should not too hastily conclude, however, that

the use of political metaphor is "merely" rhetorical.

The
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use of political metaphor to explain events in the physical

realm secures its effect precisely from the fact that both
nature and the political realm are seen as arenas of power
in conflict.

Alcmaeon's conception of physical health as an

isonomia of powers, and his corresponding conception of

disease as

a

monarchy suggests that the problem of political

power and its limits formed

a

major axis of thought during

the period.
As noted earlier,

isonomia furnished the principal

justification for Cleisthenes' reforms, and it continued to
justify further extensions of democratic practice over time.
Once having ascertained the meaning of isonomia as an

equilibrium of power between those elements participating in
the rule of a political community, it might seem as though
we have sufficiently accounted for the appeal of this

principle to both the aristoi and the demos of Athens in
508 B.C.

But we have not.

To modern thought which already

believes in the transcendence of democratic rule it might
appear that in any fair contest pitting equality and

inequality against one another, equality would "naturally"
win.

But this view implicitly attributes to equality an

immanent,

teleological or transcendent status it did not and

could not possess prior to the sixth century B.C.
appeal of isonomia as

a

The

political ideal is grounded in

a

conception of nature in which order exists and is maintained
because nature is an equilibrium of powers engaged in

perpetual but balanced opposition to one another.

This
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conception of nature as an equilibrium of powers is most
strongly associated with the thought of the Ionian physicist

Anaximander of Miletus, ca. 575 B.C.
In a radical break with tradition Anaximander was

apparently the first systematic thinker to conceive of the
cosmos in geometrically spherical terms in contrast to the

more layered Homeric view.

In Anaximander

'

s

view the earth

lay at rest at the center of the cosmos, equidistant from
all points of the surrounding sphere. 29
the earth was located in

a

In the older view

hierarchical structure midway

between the world above and the world below.

position the earth was thought to require

a

In that

support or

foundation, an arche, on which to rest in order to retain
its stability.

But in a bold view which eliminated

hierarchical considerations and dispensed with the need for
a

foundational arche, Anaximander

'

s

cosmology attributed the

earth's stability to its location at the geometric center,
as though it were suspended by the equal radii governing the

spherical structure of the cosmos.
The term

"

arche" has various meanings.

It can mean

"foundation," the firm ground upon which something rests.
Or,

it can mean "origin" or "first principle" in the sense

of "that from which all else follows."

Thirdly,

it can mean

"rule" in the political sense preserved in the terminology
of "monarchy," rule of one,

"oligarchy," rule of the few,

and "anarchy," no rule at all.

The common thread which ties

these meanings together is the concept of power.

That which
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supports everything else, that which is the source of

everything else, and that which rules or dominates
everything else are all superior powers.

geometry of Anaximander
a

'

s

The spherical

cosmology eliminates the need for

power superior to all others.

To Anaximander the earth is

stabilized, held in place, simply by virtue of its position
in the center of the cosmos,

equidistant from all other

points on the celestial circumference.
The order which governs Anaximander

static nor entirely harmonious.

'

s

cosmos is neither

The elements which

constitute the members of the cosmos are conceived by

Anaximander as mutual opponents, pairs of opposites, each of
which encroaches upon and seeks to dominate the other.
Order is preserved, however, by the fundamental "law," dike,
of the cosmos which is isonomia, an equilibrium of powers.

The elements of the cosmos are balanced against one another
in such a way that if one of them is dominant for

a

time,

it

is in its own turn then dominated by its opposition.

The language of Anaximander
fragment)

'

s

text

(actually only

a

is permeated with political concepts and

terminology.

The elements of the cosmos are construed both

as "powers" and "members" or "constituents" which "encroach"

upon on another.

The elements are said to "pay reparation"

or "penalty" to one another for their "injustices" according
to the lawful "judgment" of time.

With reference to the

earth's position, it remains in the center, it does not
fall,

because it is not "dominated" by anything.

This

.
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language strongly suggests that the school of thought for
which Anaximander was the spokesman represented an attempt
to deal theoretically with the political problem of power

which in turn was recognized as

problem of limits.

a

Unlike his predecessors, however, Anaximander saw no
need to account for order and stability in the cosmos in
terms of the rule of a superior power.

From Anaximander

'

s

perspective, the older, hierarchical view posed an

insurmountable problem of limits.

For if one element of the

cosmos should possess sufficient power to dominate all the
then that power would necessarily be unlimited and

rest,

would, of necessity, envelop and destroy all the rest. 30

Anaximander

'

s

solution to the problem lay in his geometric

conception of an equilibrium of powers.

For Anaximander it

was equality, not supremacy, which furnished theoretical

limits to power and implied

a

guarantee of order in the

cosmos

Anaximander

'

s

cosmology retained many features of

traditional Greek thought.
and animated by power.

The universe was still infused

It was still an agon,

contest of forces in conflict.

a

universal

And, most importantly,

still conceived of power as self -limiting

Homeric view the path of power followed

a

.

it

In the older,

vertically

circular course in the manner of an upright wheel.

In the

course of its trajectory from low to high and back to low
again, power naturally sought its greatest possible height.

within
But in so doing, power also necessarily generated
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itself the seeds of its own opposition and destruction.

It

generated an opponent which would inevitably grow to
overcome it, one which would itself then turn and repeat the
same eternal trajectory of hubris and self-destruction all

over again.

It is a familiar pattern repeated throughout

Greek literature.

Aeschylus recalls it in the Prometheus

Bound where Zeus is said to have overcome his father,
Kronos, only to fear his own overthrow by
turn.

Thucydides invokes

of Athenian power.

a

a

future son in

variation in the rise and fall

And distant echoes of the theme still

resonate in Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics where
each form of polity is paired with its characteristically

degenerate form.
Although Anaximander

'

s

conception of the cosmos retains

the most prominent features of traditional cosmological

thought,

those features are reconfigured to yield

radically new conception of limits embedded in

conception of dike.

In Anaximander

'

s

a

a

new

cosmology the upright

wheel of Homeric order is turned to rotate nearly

horizontally on its axis.

In this configuration each point

on the circumference of the circle rises briefly, but not
too steeply or too far, above the others, only to decline

and occupy the diametrically opposite position soon after.
In this configuration all the points of the circle,

representing all the members of the cosmos, are seen in
symmetrically reciprocal relationship one to another:
one rules and is ruled in turn.

a

each

Ascendance and decline are
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no longer equated with victory and defeat, dominance and

submission.
a

Instead, ruling and obeying are compressed into

new temporal order in which each position is seen to be

the reciprocal of its opposite in a single, simultaneous

relationship of isonomia.

Anaximander

'

s

reconfiguration of the cosmos into an

equilibrium of powers in rotation yields for the first time
an ontological footing for political equality.

longer refers to

a

balance out only in

Anaximander

'

s

Dike no

succession of victories and defeats which
a

complete cycle of historical time.

conception dike comes to refer to

a

In

regular

rotation of power in which all elements of the cosmos

participate on an equal basis, one in which ruling and being
ruled come to be seen as complementary positions within the

framework of a single, mutually shared relationship.

Without foundation in the cosmology of Anaximander it
isonomia could have

is unlikely that the political slogan of

had more than limited appeal in a traditional, hierarchi-

cally ordered polity.

To be sure, the ruling circles of the

aristocracy would have found in isonomia an attractive
solution to
But even so,

a

problem of power-sharing among themselves.
isonomia would have lacked legitimacy in the

sense that it could not be rendered compatible with

traditional notions of dike and arete in the same way that
eunomia might be.

And absent any grounding in

conception of dike such as Anaximander

'

s

,

a

new

any link between

isonomia and demokratia, rule by the ordinary people, was
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certain to be encountered and resisted by the aristoi as

a

threat to traditional, aristocratic conceptions of justice
and good order.

Before it could lend legitimacy to equal

participation in power among traditional rulers, the
political principle of isonomia required

new conception of dike such as Anaximander

equilibrium of power.
however,

isonomia posed

foundation upon

a
'

s

a

universal

Even with the requisite legitimacy,
a

new problem.

It could justify

equality among participants in power, but it could not then
turn and restrict participation in ruling power to

a

select

Once the legitimacy of isonomia was established by the

few.

need for stability among the traditional ruling circles, the
path to democracy was relatively assured.

Dike is by its very nature

Without

a

a

universal conception.

prior conception of justice to support unlimited

equality in power-sharing, the movement toward rule by the
demos,

the people as a whole, would almost certainly have

led to stasis, civil strife,

Athens.

31

instead of stable democracy at

The fact that isonomia as

a

political principle

apparently did find sufficient appeal in 508 B.C. to
overcome residual resistance by the Athenian aristoi
suggests that the new equalitarian conception of dike had
32
already partially displaced the older Homeric conception.

In this context Cleisthenes'

reforms do not themselves

institute democracy so much as they signal

a shift in the

conception of justice, dike, away from one configuration
toward another.

The reforms of Cleisthenes then do not so
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much institute

a

new political order as much as they remove

elements of an old one already in the process of passing
away,

thereby making room for an extension of democratic

reforms and practices.

Among those practices were

unrestricted participation for citizens in the ruling
assembly, election to office by lot, and rotation in office
to assure maximum political equality and nearly universal

participation, all of which practices existed to

a

limited

degree prior to Cleisthenes' reforms. 33

Tragedy and Theory:

The Oresteia

Despite the enormous intellectual, literary and

political legacy of ancient Greece, the inventors of

democracy never left us with, and apparently never
formulated

a

systematic theory of democracy. 3 ^

They did,

however bequeath us Greek tragic drama from which we might
extract something like

"theoretical" we mean

a
a

theoretical point of view, if by

cosmological view of nature which

serves to ground and justify democratic institutions and

practices. 35

Although it may seem curious to look for

political theory in the dramatic action of the theater, the
link is not so farfetched as it initially may appear.

Tragedy and democracy were both Athenian inventions which
developed, flourished, and eventually declined together.
The association is more than coincidental.
a

Tragedy was both

political and theoretical institution which played

31
role in the democratic education of the demos.

a

vital

In its own
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way tragedy was as much

Council or the Assembly.

a

political institution as the
It was sponsored and financed by

the state in the same manner as the all-important Athenian

fleet.

Admission was either free or subsidized and was open

to all citizens.

Attendance was, if anything, even more

democratic than the Assembly since women apparently were
permitted to attend the theater while being barred from

participation in the Assembly. 38

Tragedy, moreover, was

commissioned for and performed on the annual holiday on
which the city of Athens celebrated its own democratic
structure:

the City Dionysia.

39

More than mere entertainment, tragic theater was in its

physical setting, its performance and its vision,

theoretical act.

a

The geometry of the Greek theater

recreated the circular structure of the cosmos.

Within that

design, including the seating arrangements of the audience,
all of the structural tensions of the city were re-

capitulated.

It is useful to know that etymologically

"theater" and "theory" share
sight, gaze,

a

common root meaning to "see,

look upon, behold, admire, and contemplate." 40

What is seen in the Greek theater is the nested, concentric

spheres of the cosmos in general, and the political sphere
In tragedy the city "puts

of the polis in particular.

41
itself on the stage and plays itself."

played out on the stage is
dike,

a

What is finally

conflict between two visions of

42
two conceptions of universal order.

of the Homeric world,

One,

the dike

portrays the heroic politics of an
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oi/cos-centered social order transposed to the
context of the

emerging polls.

The second version of dike derives from the

cosmology of Anaximander and is reflected in the political
principle of isonomia underlying the democratically ordered
polis.

On one hand, heroic dike represents for the polis

the constellation of values and behavior which must be

opposed if the polis is to be sustained.

Against heroic

dike tragedy portrays and affirms the dike associated with
isonomia.

On the other hand, heroic dike cannot be entirely

rejected and obliterated.

It too has its necessary moment

if the polis is to be defended and preserved.

Oedipus, for example, is a heroic figure.

Sophocles'

He is both

essential to, and destructive of the city's preservation.
The heroic principle for which Oedipus stands must be

permitted its time to rule, but it cannot be permitted to
rule uncontested.

The perpetual contest between mutually

incompatible but mutually necessary opposites provides the
tragic principle of limitation essential to moderate and

stable political power, and it is this principle which is

portrayed and affirmed in Greek tragedy.
The tragedy which best illustrates the contest between
one dike and another is in many respects Aeschylus' trilogy,
the Oresteia.

Produced in 458 B.C., shortly after the final

consolidation of democracy in Athens, the Oresteia is the
only trilogy of Aeschylus to survive completely intact.

With the exception of the Persians, an early play, the other
extant plays of Aeschylus each represent only

a

single part
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of a trilogy,

an incompleteness which renders their

interpretation relatively more speculative.
The Oresteia consists of three separate but related
plays:

the Agamemnon,

Eumenides.

the Libation Bearers,

and the

By modern standards of dramatic action very

little actually happens in the Oresteia.

The dramatic

tension occurs largely in the dialogue where contested

interpretations of the major events of the trilogy are given
voice by the chorus and other characters.

In the play which

bears his name, Agamemnon, king of Argos and head of the

House of Atreus, returns home from the Trojan War only to be

murdered by his wife, Cly taemnestra

.

In the second play,
i

the Libation Bearers, Orestes, son of Agamemnon and

Cly taemnestra

,

returns home to avenge the murder of his

father by killing his mother.

Eumenides

,

In the third play,

the

the scene shifts to the city of Athens where

Orestes has been driven by his mother's Furies, or demons.
There the protector of the city, the goddess Athena,

empanels

a

jury of Athenian citizens to conduct a trial of

Orestes' guilt.

That is the bare bones of the action which

occurs on stage.

Indirectly throughout the dialogue we learn of other
events and actions which frame those viewed by the audience.
We learn of Helen, sister of Clytaemnestra and wife of

Menelaus, Agamemnon's brother.

The seduction of Helen by

War in
Paris of Troy is recalled as the cause of the Trojan
the
which Agamemnon and Menelaus, sons of Atreus, organized
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great Greek expedition to conquer Troy, retrieve Helen,
and
right the wrong done to Menelaus and to Argos by Paris and
Helen.

We learn too that in the course of sailing to Troy,

Agamemnon's fleet was becalmed, apparently through the anger
of a goddess.

In order to appease the goddess and free the

fleet to sail, Agamemnon ritually sacrificed his daughter,

Iphigeneia.

Later, on the return home following the

complete destruction of Troy,

a

violent storm struck the

Greek fleet, scattering and destroying it, leaving only

Agamemnon's ship to return safely to Argos.
Eventually we learn of the existence of
the entire House of Atreus

.

a

curse upon

Some time in the past, Atreus,

father of Agamemnon and Menelaus, had quarrelled with his
own brother, Thyestes.

Thyestes had seduced Atreus' wife

and sought to supplant him as the ruler of Argos.

Defeated

and exiled for his attempts, Thyestes later returned with
his children to Argos as

a

suppliant to Atreus.

reconciliation, Atreus invited Thyestes to

a

Feigning

feast at which

Atreus served to Thyestes his own roasted, slaughtered

children which Thyestes innocently ate.

Upon learning the

nature of the meal he had just eaten, Thyestes cursed the
House of Atreus and fled with his only surviving child,
Aegisthus, who was later to become consort and co-

conspirator with Clytaemnestra in her murder of Agamemnon
and usurpation of the throne of Argos.

From even this brief synopsis it should be clear that
the separate threads which weave this story together are

.

130

deeply knotted and entangled.

What does it all mean?

Although there are many themes and symbols which recur
throughout this dense tragedy, it is widely agreed that the

meaning of "justice" (dike) is
trilogy

a

preeminent concern of the

44

According to what has now become

a

standard

interpretation of the text, the trilogy unfolds as

progression from

a

a

"primitive" sense of justice, the lex

taliones in which the crime of murder is repaid in kind by
the by the family of the victim, to

a

higher,

"truer" sense

of justice in which the family vendetta is replaced by the

impartial rule of law in the political state. 45

clearly some merit to this interpretation.

There is

But in its most

superficial form it risks turning Aeschylus' tragedy into
mere political propaganda celebrating the central authority
of the state over more traditional forms of social

organization.

At best it presents us with a vision of the

narrow confines and conflicts of the traditional family-

centered social structure transcended and reconciled within
the broader bonds of the political community.

There are at least two difficulties with the standard

progressivist interpretation.

One is raised by Lazlo

Versenyi who notes that Aeschylus' introduction of trial by
jury as a "solution" to the problem of blood feud poses

dramatic problems of its own because the trilogy then
presents two sets of law diametrically opposed to each other
without addressing the legitimacy of one replacing the
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other.

Versenyi appropriately raises the issue of

legitimacy without which Aeschylus' trilogy, and especially
the Eumenides,

approaches political propaganda.

His

criticism goes awry, however, because he can conceive of
"legitimacy" only in terms of philosophical rationality

which is absent from the Oresteia.

To his credit, Versenyi

recognizes that the Eumenides fails to resolve the conflict

between competing conceptions of justice.

But the Platonic

or Hegelian standard of rationality by which he measures the

text and finds it wanting forces him to conclude that

Aeschylean tragedy is primitive and "incoherent." 47
Conflict fails to yield to unity; therefore nothing has been

resolved and, apparently, nothing has truly been said. 48
The second difficulty, closely related to the first, is
that the progressivis t interpretation sees the establishment

justice as

of "true"

a

matter of conflict resolution,

harmony, and reconciliation of opposites.

*

But,

as Simon

Goldhill has painstakingly argued, to the extent that the

progressivist interpretation locates
opposites and

Eumenides

,

a

reconciliation of

final resolution to conflict in the

it must overlook or oversimplify significant

elements of the text. 50
critics,

a

According to Goldhill and similar

"the problem of dike

...

51
solved but endlessly restated."

in this trilogy is not

Conflict, not harmony,

continues to reign in the end.
The desire to find a politically ordered resolution to
the conflicts of the Oresteia in the establishment of
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"rational" legal institutions finds support in the text of
the Eumenides where the goddess Athena establishes the first

court to try cases of murder,
last for all time.

a

court which is ordained to

But the longing for harmony which this

interpretation represents is forced to ignore other parts of
the text which do not readily fit the interpretation.

For

example, what are we to make of the fact that the jury of

citizens is evenly split on the guilt of Orestes, 52 and that
it takes the act of a goddess to determine the outcome of

the trial?

In what sense is this "resolution," and why

should opposing forces feel reconciled by Athena's

apparently arbitrary vote 53 which finds Orestes formally not
guilty but not wholly innocent either?

What are we to make,

furthermore, of the Furies, those female demons who

represent the stubborn forces of darkness and the past in
this tragedy?

Contrary to the progressivist interpretation

they are never truly harmonized into the higher order of the
state.

They never fully emerge into the light.

They remain

submerged underground from where they continue to exert
their terror.

To be sure, they are not excluded, indeed

they cannot be banished from the political order, as Athena

assures them and us.
defeated.

They have power and cannot be

Nor is it entirely clear that their force can

always be fully "channeled" to work only on behalf of the
state, as the progressivist interpretation would have it.

All that can be said with confidence is that the political

order represented by Athena and Athens in this trilogy
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depends for its own success upon forces which are opposed to
it.

Nor is it even certain that the political domain

represents the realm of light against the realm of darkness
in this most murky tragedy.

All the text permits us to say

is that the political realm is constituted by and depends

upon continuous tension between pairs of mutually exclusive
yet mutually dependent opposites such as light and darkness.

What kind of justice is this?
of isonomia

,

It is the justice

{dike)

the justice of Anaximander, not the justice of

Plato or Hegel.

Aeschylus does not present us with

a

choice

between hierarchical order or conflict, as does Plato.

Nor

does he present us with the evaporation of conflict in the

actualized political order as does Hegel.

Instead Aeschylus

presents us with an image of universal tragic justice in
which sustained conflict between equal opponents is affirmed
as the guarantee against an oscillation between absolute

chaos {stasis) and absolute power (monarchy) represented by
the heroic configuration of justice.

The tragic justice of Aeschylus affirms equality but
does not therefore disavow conflict.

Aeschylus, and Greek

tragedy in general, remains strongly within the ancient

Greek tradition in which the agon, the contest, represents
the supreme reality and the ultimate metaphor.

Tragic

justice does not reject the contest but rather affirms the

equality of the opponents, thus assuring that the contest
ever
will continue but that no victory and no defeat will

complete.

Equality of power not supremacy; perpetual

b<
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conflict not harmony provides the tragic guarantee of

political order.

"No anarchy, no rule of

a

single master"

decrees Athena, echoing the Furies 54 and identifying

a

mean

established not through the elimination of conflict but
through its continuation.

Against the progressivist interpretation of the

Oresteia stands

a

more conservative reading in which ancient

Homeric justice is affirmed rather than rejected or
transcended.

The most prominent articulation of this view

comes from H. Lloyd-Jones,

55

who explicitly rejects the

progressivist reading of the trilogy.

"The cliche which we

have heard all our lives that the Eumenides depicts the

transition from the vendetta to the rule of law is utterly

misleading," he writes. 5

**

According to Lloyd- jones, the

essence of Homeric justice is the inexorable punishment of
wrongdoers.

Those who violate the law of the universe are

punished by the gods.

Those who violate the laws of the

state are punished by the state.
same.

The principle remains the

In the Homeric order the justice of the cosmos was

enforced by those mortals to whom Zeus made known his will
such as Agamemnon.

In the Athenian state justice comes

through the law court established by Zeus' daughter, Athena.
For Lloyd-Jones,

the court of Athena does not replace the

demonic Furies as agents of Zeus.

Instead, he says, the

court is established to assist those venerable agents in
their fearful task.

57

,
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As with the progressivist interpretation
which it

opposes, the conservative reading must find
harmonies where
the text is dissonant or ambiguous.

For example, the

conservative reading finds agreement between Athena and
the
Furies while explaining away or ignoring the fact that

Athena casts her vote against them at Orestes' trial. 58
Moreover, the conservative reading presupposes

unchanging conception of justice.

a

timeless,

What shifts over time is

merely the mechanisms or agents of enforcement, from
religious to political, and not the order of justice itself.
Continuity, however, is purchased only through

oversimplification.
(dike)

Lloyd-Jones concurs that "justice"

refers not only to the established order of the state

but also to the whole order of the universe. 59

But,

contrary to Lloyd-Jones, throughout the Oresteia and
throughout the history of Greek thought, "dike" always means

much more than merely the punishment of lawbreakers.

Indeed

it is the profoundly dense ambiguity of the term "dike"

which furnishes the dramatic subject-matter of the Oresteia
an ambiguity which is suppressed by the conservative

interpretation.

Lost in the search for continuity is the

possibility that the Oresteia portrays two complex versions
of dike,

two incompatible versions of universal order, one

against the other.
the Agamemnon,

The first, located most prominently in

is associated with eunomia and the

traditional oi/cos-centered social organization of the Iliad.
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The second, most prominently portrayed in the
Eumenides, is

associated with isonomia and political democracy. 60
The progressivist and conservative readings of the

Oresteia each tend to focus on one part of the trilogy at
the expense of others.

example,

The progressivist reading, for

tends to concentrate on the Eumenides at the

expense of the more heroic Agamemnon.

From the

progressivist perspective, the mere establishment of

a

trial

court in the Eumenides suffices to overturn the more

"primitive" justice of the Agamemnon.

From the conservative

point of view, the heroic justice of the Agamemnon seems to
be affirmed while the more "naive dramaturgy of the

Eumenides" is dismissed. 61

Each view oversimplifies the

notion, and the problem, of justice in the Oresteia while

largely overlooking the unique association of tragedy with
the origins of democracy.

Along the way it has somehow been

forgotten that in sponsoring the production of tragic drama
the Athenian polis performed the political function of

educating, not propagandizing,

the demos in a "theoretical"

view of the natural order which legitimized democracy.
it did so,

And

furthermore, by interrogating and reinterpreting

its own past in a remarkably sophisticated way.

It is time

for another look at the Oresteia.

Heroic Agamemnon
It is no accident that the Trojan War provides the

frame of reference for the Agamemnon, first play of the
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Oresteia.

The Trojan War was a heroic war and the
Agamemnon

is heroic drama.

fought as

a

62

The Trojan War, it will be recalled, was

matter of justice against the Trojans for Paris'

abduction of Helen in violation of the Greek code of guestfriendship.

But it must also be recalled that Greek justice

(dike)

was more than

also

matter of natural order.

a

legal or military affair.

a

It was

The traditional account of

the Trojan War with which every Greek was familiar through
the poetry of Homer's Iliad conveyed the cyclical pattern of

natural order and justice which constituted the dike

upholding heroic culture and its oi/cos-centered political
structure.

The Agamemnon, with its treatment of the House

of Atreus, recapitulates that traditional order even as it

calls it into question.

Heroic dike follows

a

trajectory of rising and falling,

victory and defeat, success and failure reminiscent of the
arched path of celestial objects.

In its circular course,

however, heroic dike conveys more than

succession of victories and defeats.

a

mere repetitious

The principle of dike

operating in the heroic universe inscribes

a

pattern of

necessity in which the only path to victory also leads to
defeat, a pattern in which the necessary means to success

also set the stage for eventual failure.

It is a recurrent

theme in Greek literature traced by Homer's Achilles in the

Trojan War, Thucydides

'

Athens in the Peloponnesian War, and

Aeschylus' Agamemnon in the Oresteia, among others.
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Agamemnon was

a

hero of the Trojan War and it is

primarily through his character in the Oresteia that
Aeschylus traces the essential elements of heroic dike. 62
In the opening lines of the play a watchman speaks of the

"grand processionals of all the stars of night" resembling

dynasties of men waning as others arise.

What we see in the

Agamemnon is the moment of Agamemnon's star falling just as
Clytaemnestra

'

s

rises, and the play explores the connection

between these two events.

Indeed, they are finally seen to

be as intimately connected as spokes on a wheel so that they

constitute not two events but

a

single movement of rotation.

Agamemnon's actual presence upon the stage is brief.
He has fewer than ninety lines of dialogue in a play more

than 1670 lines long.

His action is equally brief.

Agamemnon returns home from the war in his chariot.

He is

persuaded by Clytaemnestra to alight without touching the
earth but to pass directly into the house upon precious
tapestries, where she kills him.

Agamemnon's arrival in his

chariot, his failure to descend to earth, and his immediate

death all combine to remind us that Agamemnon's fate is

directly tied to his heroic status and the war.
Although Agamemnon's appearance upon the stage is
brief, his dramatic presence spans
years,

in fact,

a

much greater time, ten

the length of the Trojan War.

If

Agamemnon's murder at the hands of Clytaemnestra marks the
end of the Trojan War, his own sacrificial slaughter of

their innocent daughter,

Iphigeneia, marks its inauguration.
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That past event is recounted by the chorus early
in the
play 64 so that it constitutes an introduction to
the later
events presented upon the stage.
Ten years previously, the chorus recalls, Zeus had

dispatched the army of the Atreidae to sail against Troy in
order to avenge the abduction of Helen.

But at Aulis,

before the fleet could reach Troy, the goddess Artemis held
back the winds, leaving the fleet powerless to sail upon its

ordained mission of justice.

In order to appease the

goddess and free the fleet to sail, Agamemnon was required
to sacrifice his daughter,

Iphigeneia.

His only alternative

was to abandon the expedition, with all the shame attendant

upon that course.
It is perhaps too easy from a modern perspective to

condemn as immoral Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice his

daughter in order to save the fleet and prosecute the war.
Viewed from within the framework of heroic culture, however,
the choice confronting Agamemnon constituted

dilemma.

a

genuine

As king of Argos and head of the dominant house of

Atreus, it was Agamemnon's duty and responsibility to

protect his "house"

(oikos)

and its followers along with the

other houses of Argos from attack or violation.

The

abduction of Helen constituted an attack upon one of the
most sacred customs of the Greek world, the custom of

"guest-friendship" by which strangers were protected from
harm outside their land, and who in turn refrained from

doing harm to their protectors.

This was no mere courtesy,
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but rather

a

fundamental principle by which an insecure and

vulnerable world achieved
stability.

65

a

modicum of peace and

Violation of this customary law by Helen and

Paris tore at the very roots of whatever social order

existed in heroic culture.

For Agamemnon to fail to defend

his "house" would not only be viewed as cowardice on his
part, a serious enough charge, but it would also threaten to

unravel the only system of justice known to his world.
It would be a mistake to view Agamemnon simply as a

character with

a

fatal flaw who could have and should have

chosen other than he did in order for good to win out in the
end.

Agamemnon's dilemma was legitimate and resided in the

fact that in order to fulfill his role as protector of the

house (oikos) he had to sacrifice an intimate and cherished

member of that house.
commit another one.

In order to avenge a crime he had to
In order to protect justice he had to

commit an injustice.
In Aeschylus' drama Agamemnon chooses to resolve his

dilemma by sacrificing his daughter and going to war.

We

misread the play, however, by concluding that Agamemnon
simply chooses war over family, implying perhaps that men
will always choose war and that women and children will

always pay the price.

There is much to be said for that

angry view but it nevertheless oversimplifies the play.

Agamemnon had no guilt-free course open to him.

Under the

circumstances, and apart from the larger conflicts of
justice of which the play treats,

it is clear that if
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Agamemnon did not fulfill Artemis' condition and sacrifice
Iphigeneia, everyone, including Iphigeneia, would die. 66
That is not to say that, contrary to modern intuitions,

Agamemnon chose rightly.
"rightly."

It depends upon what we mean by

Within the play, choosing rightly means

"choosing according to justice (dike)."

But in Agamemnon's

situation, each choice open to him is both just and unjust
at the same time.

And we are led to infer that this

paradox, too, is according to dike.
But what kind of justice is this?

may be heroic or it may be tragic.
of

It is ambiguous.

It

It is heroic if an act

justice necessarily breeds an act of injustice which

ultimately brings the heroic actor to his death. 67

It is

tragic if the necessary conflict, the paradox in which an
act is simultaneously just and unjust, prevents the tragic

actor from moving too far in one direction and flying too
near the sun, so to speak.
Each conception of justice is associated with

conception of limits.
high arch, is

a

In heroic dike,

a

the overreaching,

necessary part of of the trajectory.

the

The

correction, the inevitable fall, comes later in time as the
wheel of justice turns and the opponent bred by the original

action overtakes and fills the space previously occupied by
the the heroic actor.

over

a

In tragic dike the limits occur not

period of time but more nearly simultaneously, as the

inherent injustice contained within

a

just act restrains the

.
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tragic actor, holding him to

a

flatter trajectory, and

preventing him from overreaching his bounds.
Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice his daughter was
heroic, and the life of Agamemnon portrayed by Aeschylus

follows the heroic path.

He arose to heroic heights in the

Trojan War and died at the pinnacle of his glory in Argos
Symbolically, he never set foot upon the earth following the
war,

but returned home in his chariot only to enter his

house upon fine tapestries and meet his death.
Cly taemnes tra
Agamemnon.
justice.

too,

,

is no less a heroic figure than

She is his opposite on the wheel of heroic
She rises as he falls.

She justifies her act of

murder in part because it rights; that is, it balances over
time the injustice of Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia.
He has slain a family member,
a

woman, she kills

a

man.

and so does she.

He has slain

He has acted to protect the

"house" in the extended sense; she acts to defend it in the

more immediate sense of family.
Cly taemnes tra

'

s

act has justice on its side,

sure, but it is unjust as well.
a

crime.

to be

She has killed her husband,

She has killed the king,

a

greater crime.

And she

has usurped the throne of Argos, perhaps the greatest crime
of all in the eyes of democratic Athens.

Clytaemnestra
continues it.

'

s

Predictably,

act does not end the heroic cycle; it merely

Her own unjust act of justice inevitably

leads to her own death at the hands of exiled Orestes, her
son.

The figure of Clytaemnestra represents no alternative

.
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to Agamemnon's rule but rather its inversion.

Her rule

represents the other side, the underside, of Agamemnon's

heroic trajectory.

It is Clytaemnestra s rule
'

(arche)

which, together with Agamemnon's, completes one cycle of

heroic dike.

The cycle then appears to begin anew as

Orestes returns to kill his mother in retribution for the

murder of his father.
Like Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra before him, Orestes is

bound to commit an act which is both just and unjust at the
same time:

the killing of his mother.

It is a just act

because, as the only surviving son of Agamemnon, Orestes is

bound by the codes of the social order to avenge the death
of his father.

CO
°

It is an unjust act because the same code

of social justice forbids the crime of matricide.

Unlike

Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra, however, we shall see that
Orestes' character is tragicly balanced and not heroic, thus

lending his name to Aeschylus'

trilogy.

Agamemnon and

Clytaemnestra are each heroic figures because each
represents only one side of

a

complete circle.

Each is the

other's opposite, and it is this one-sidedness which

Aeschylus identifies as an essential quality of the heroic
figure

69

When we first encounter Agamemnon at Aulis, he is torn
by the choice presented by Artemis:

save his daughter and

lose the fleet, or save the fleet and lose his daughter.

"Which of these things goes now without disaster?" he

complains as he agonizes over his fate.

But then he
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"endured" or "dared" 71 to become the sacrificer
of his

daughter, and as he did so, the chorus tells us,
his

character changed.
When necessity's yoke was put upon him
he changed, and from the heart the breath came bitter
and sacrilegious, utterly infidel
to warp a will now to be stopped at nothing.
The sickening in men's minds, tough,

reckless in fresh cruelty brings daring.
then
to sacrifice his daughter

.

.

He endured

72
.

,

Under the yoke of necessity, Agamemnon passed from agonizing

indecision to singleminded resolution as he decided that
"such sacrifice of innocent blood

...

is right." 73

The chorus associates the shift in Agamemnon's

character with
at nothing"

daring."

a

— and

loss of limits
a

— "a

will now to be stopped

"sickening in men's minds" which "brings

The "sickening" harks back to Alcmaeon, the

physician, for whom ill health represented

between equal and opposite forces.

attributed to

a

a loss of

balance

Good health he

sustained but tense equilibrium {isonomia)

of opposing forces.

7^

In his anguish,

then,

torn by

indecision over his fateful dilemma, Agamemnon was painfully
but healthily balanced.

The sickening of Agamemnon's mind

referred to in the text represents
balance, that isonomia, followed by

which led to reckless daring.

a

departure from that
a loss of

restraint

It is Agamemnon's resolution,

his singleminded shedding of his agony, and not his decision

—
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to sacrifice Iphigeneia which is referred to by
the chorus
as a sickness.

decision.

To be sure, Agamemnon had to make

a

But he did not have to passionately agree that

the sacrifice of innocent blood was unambiguously "right."
He did not have to cease to suffer over the injustice

intertwined with the justness of his decision.
The one-sidedness

,

the imbalance which constitutes

Agamemnon's newfound resolution, is partially represented in
the text by the silencing of Iphigeneia.

For Agamemnon not

only sacrifices his daughter, he ceases to hear her voice
"her supplications and her cries of father were nothing" 75

and he gags her mouth in

a

—

move which the chorus

characterizes as drowning speech in strength.

6

At the

moment of sacrifice the chorus, too, is drowned by silence.
"What happened next

announces. 77

I

saw not, nor speak it," the chorus
•

•

What is this curtain of silence which drops

over the scene?

It is the silence of the other voice,

the

other side of Agamemnon's identity, which ceases to be heard
and therefore ceases to exercise its restraints.

At the

moment when Agamemnon decided that the shedding of innocent

blood was unambiguously right, Agamemnon became unbalanced,

relieved of his agony.

He ceased to be warrior-king and

father both, to become warrior only, unrestrained by the

claims of close family.
Later, when Agamemnon arrives upon the stage, still in

his chariot signifying his heroic heights,

sidedness rules his speech.

the same one-

He praises the gods whose agent
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he was in the destruction of Troy.

He speaks in terms of a

unanimous vote in which the gods one-sidedly favored the
death of Troy and all her people.
[i.e.,

"Above the opposite vase

the vase to hold opposing ballots]

and there was hope," he recounts,

the hand hovered

"but no vote fell." 78

in

this speech which implicitly equates justice with success,

venerable Greek view,

79

a

Agamemnon speaks only of the

lopsided victory which the Argives achieved over the
Trojans.

He gives no hint, he says not a word of the

enormous cost in lives and sacrifice paid for his and the
gods'

heroic conquest.

He speaks only of the pride and

glory of total victory.
A more balanced view is provided by the herald who

precedes Agamemnon's arrival upon the stage.
initial speech,

The herald's

filled with references to daylight and

sunshine, relays the immense scale of the Trojan defeat.
"All their plain has been laid waste.

altars,

Gone are their

the sacred places of the gods are gone

.

.

announces as he praises Agamemnon, ominously, as
fortunate to be honored far above all men alive.

a
"

OKJ

,

.

"

he

"man
Soon,

however, under pressure from the chorus, the herald begins
to reveal a darker, more painful side to the Argive victory.

The heroic glory of battle was accompanied by immense

hardship, suffering, and loss of life for ordinary people.
"But why live such grief over again?" asks the herald in

true heroic fashion.

"That time is gone for us, and gone

for those who died."

The one-sidedness of the heroic path
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is captured in the herald's timeless query.

live man count the numbers of the slain
"For us survivors," he continues,

"Why must

..."

he asks.

"the pleasure wins, pain

casts no weight in the opposite scale." 81

The herald

extolls the glory which will accrue to Argos as
the great victory over Troy.

a

a

result of

Immortal fame and honor will

live on in memory; the dead do not count in this tale.

Eventually, however, after further entreaty from the chorus,
the herald reluctantly reveals the true cost of victory in

human terms.

Only one ship, Agamemnon's, has returned

safely from the war.

All the others have been lost at sea.

This is the underside, the silent side, of the heroic quest
for justice.

Juxtaposition of the herald's speeches with that of
Agamemnon allows the audience to question the value, indeed
the very meaning of "success" and "victory" in a way not

possible for Agamemnon.

There is no doubt that in

traditional terms the expedition against Troy was

resounding success.

a

But what kind of success, Aeschylus

seems to ask, is purchased at such enormous cost to both

victor and vanquished alike?

In some of the most bitter,

biting lines of the play, the chorus recalls that not only
the houses of heroes suffered from the war and the

transgressions of "some strange woman.

Every house in

Hellas suffered the loss of loved ones as the funeral urns,
83
returned
packed smooth with "ashes that once were men,"

home from the war.

A disproportion is introduced here in
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which the undying fame of heroes is purchased with the blood
of nameless,

unheroic citizens.
Sickness, Suffering and Wisdom

It is tempting from a modern point of view to try to

understand Agamemnon's "sickness," his one-sidedness

,

sign of mental or moral deficiency in his character.

as a

And to

support such efforts we would have available to us the

familiar Greek notion of "hubris," or excess.

To take that

path, however, would do little more than to affirm modern

categories of thought and to obscure, if not falsify, Greek
history.

A whole range of behavior which eventually became

condemned as excessive was once commended as appropriate and
even necessary to the pursuit of justice.

The shift

involved precisely those aristocratic characteristics once

associated with Homeric heroes, such as the competitive
pursuit of honor and glory in personal combat and the

accumulation of booty or wealth to signify and confirm their
greater status.
The eventual rejection of the extremes of traditional

aristocratic behavior in the democratic polis

— behavior

which sought to exalt particular individuals and families
over the city itself

— was

historically associated with

a

84
shift in the techniques and strategies of warfare.

Homeric heroes were hippeis, owners of horses and chariots
who fought individually in combat to secure and protect the

honor due themselves and their families.

Later, in the
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seventh century, the hippeus came to be replaced by the

hoplite phalanx, heavily armed men fighting in an

unbreakable line, the shield of each man protecting the man
next to him.

With the shift in battle technology came
values.

The warlike frenzy,

a

shift in

lyssa, which once propelled the

individual hero into battle, permitting him to perform

extraordinary feats of courage, was now discouraged as
excessive and dangerous to the success of the coordinated
hoplite phalanx.

Success would now depend upon each hoplite

soldier resisting the temptation of individual combat and

personal glory to hold his position in the line and not
The virtues of self-restraint and respect for

break ranks.

equality began to take precedence over the competitive self-

glorification of heroic arete.
Agamemnon's "sickness," his singleminded resolution so
reminiscent of Periclean gnome, 85 must be seen in historical
context and not through modern moral or psychological

categories.

To accuse Agamemnon of hubris, excessive

behavior, and let it go at that is to lose the ambiguity of
his character.

To be sure, Agamemnon does go too far.

We

learn from the herald that he has destroyed the Trojan

altars and the sacred places of their gods, actions which

Clytaemnestra had previously warned might anger the Greek
gods, endanger the expedition, and inaugurate
86
fresh wrongs demanding to be repaid.

actions at Troy represent

a

a

new round of

Clearly, Agamemnon's

loss of limits, an illicit
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crossing of boundaries.

But those actions cannot be

isolated from his actions at Aulis, for it was at Aulis that

Agamemnon first affirmed that the sacrifice of innocent
blood is right {dike)
stopped at nothing."

thereby acquiring a will "now to be

,

Left unresolved by the charge of

hubris, which seems to imply

a

flaw in moral judgment, is

the question of why Agamemnon lost a sense of limits in the

first place.

The answer is found in the chorus' reference

to the "yoke of necessity" which first introduced the change

in Agamemnon's character.

"When necessity's yoke was put

upon him, he changed," the chorus tells us in

complicates our vision of hubris.'

view which

a

The chorus seems to be

saying that the shift in Agamemnon's character, the resolute

closing of his mind to restraining voices, had

a

fateful

quality of necessity, of inevitability, about it.
On one level the yoke of necessity applies to

Agamemnon's identity as

a

hero.

His decision at Aulis to

sacrifice his daughter represented

a

decision to go to war

But for a hero to enter battle and fight

and enter battle.

in a truly heroic manner it was necessary for him to become

unbalanced; that is, it was necessary for him to enter into
a

state of relatively unrestrained frenzy (lyssa) which

would produce and sustain the stamina and courage necessary
to heroic combat.

oo
00

On another level,

the "necessity" which applies to the

shift in Agamemnon's character at Aulis also posesses

universal quality associated with dike.

a mor<

Zeus has mandated
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the Trojan War as an affair of justice.

the presence of lyssa,

But war requires

the fierce determination which

overcomes fear and produces resolute courage.

Lyssa is

a

necessary ingredient of both victory and justice, but, on
the other hand,

it is an imbalance which almost guarantees a

transgression of limits which will then demand fresh

retribution in the future.
recurs.

It appears,

And so the cycle eternally

at least to Aeschylus,

that Zeus'

justice in its heroic configuration necessarily generates

injustice which must eventually be repaid by
of ambiguous justice,

and so on,

a

further act

forever.

Aeschylus' Agamemnon faithfully recapitulates this

heroic cycle of justice even while it also calls it into

Recurring to Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia

question.

as representative of the heroic configuration of dike,

it is

notable that the episode is neatly framed in Aeschylus' text
by two references to "suffering" and "wisdom."
.

.

.

"Zeus has

laid it down that wisdom comes alone through

suffering," 89

says the chorus, introducing the tale of

Agamemnon's dilemma.
of Iphigeneia,

Later,

immediately following the death

the chorus repeats that "Justice so moves

90
that those only learn who suffer."

These lines have often

been thought to contain the central "moral" of this tragedy
91
but their meaning is elusive.

taken as

a

"Suffering" is commonly

reference to the pain of punishment while

"wisdom" is often interpreted aa learning obedience to
92
political or religious authority.

But this interpretation
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is less than adequate for a number of reasons.

Firstly,

everyone in the text to whom the lesson might apply already
quite justly believes that he or she is already obeying the
law in the proper sense. 93

anything in the Oresteia.

Secondly, no one ever learns

They are for the most part simply

killed, as one scholar has observed. 94

The complexities of the Oresteia suggest that

complicated interpretation is in order.
reflects

a

a

more

If the Oresteia

contest between two complex versions of dike, one

associated with heroic traditions and the other associated
with the new democracy and isonomia; and if Agamemnon's

sacrifice of Iphigeneia dramatically portrays the dike

upholding heroic traditions, then we are not unlikely to
find that the lines which frame that portrait point in the

opposite direction.
The Greek word for wisdom,

sophrosyne

,

is historically

associated with the terms dike and kosmos, both of which
refer to universal order.

The constellation of these

terms suggests that wisdom consists in comprehending the

order of the cosmos and acting according to its law, its
dike,

and we may well ask whether the text portrays

Agamemnon as wise.
follows

a

The text is unambiguous that Agamemnon

path laid down by Zeus in the pursuit of justice.

Indeed, Agamemnon's character dramatically embodies Zeus

'

s

justice in its heroic configuration and we should therefore

expect him to be portrayed as wise, but that is not the
case.

In his brief sojourn on stage Agamemnon is portrayed

.
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as a returning,

conquering hero, but not

brilliant or insightful one.

Indeed,

a

particularly

in his exchange with

Clytaemnestra, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that

Agamemnon is quite dull and even stupid.
all, perhaps,

Most telling of

it would seem that if Aeschylus had intended

Agamemnon's character to stand as

a

portrait of wisdom, the

text would have commended his decision to sacrifice

Iphigeneia as honorable.

By heroic standards Agamemnon's

decision was appropriate and just.

It should have been

regarded as difficult, perhaps, but wise.

Instead,

in a

reversal of expectations, the text describes it as shameful
and mad.^

Aeschylus' reversal effectively calls into

question traditional notions of wisdom and justice.

Agamemnon follows the dike of the heroic cosmos, yet he is
Therefore, either wisdom consists of something

not wise.

other than justice, or the dike which Agamemnon follows is
not truly the justice of Zeus.
latter.

Aeschylus suggests the

He does not reject the equation of wisdom and
97
Nor does he suggest that Zeus is not just. 71

justice.

does suggest that Zeus*

He

justice has been incorrectly

understood
Wisdom comes to those who suffer.
wisdom.

Suffering leads to

So states the chorus reflecting upon Agamemnon's

dilemma at Aulis.

The usual interpretation suggests that

this is a sequential relationship:

pain is followed by

wisdom, with the implication being that wisdom reduces or

avoids further pain.

It may be,

however, that Aeschylus
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holds that the actual relation is one of identity:

suffering and wisdom are in some sense united as one. 98

Wisdom consists not in the elimination of suffering but in
its retention.
I

What can this mean?

Aeschylean "suffering,"

propose, refers to the constant tension of being pulled in

opposite directions simultaneously which is characteristic
of isonomia,

the dike of Anaximander

'

s

universe and the

ontological justification of equality in the democratic
polis.

Aeschylean "wisdom" consists in sustaining that

balanced tension, living with it, bearing up under

it,

rather than diffusing or expelling it in some heroic act.
The identification of suffering and wisdom found in the

Oresteia challenges the traditional view of dike which

undermines democratic order in favor of
preserves it.

a

newer dike which

Once again, Agamemnon's character serves to

illustrate the contrast.

When Agamemnon first contemplates

the terrible choice confronting him at Aulis, he is torn in

agony.

And "agony" is precisely the appropriate term here.

Agamemnon's identity embodies and reflects the universal
agon, or contest, which identifies the character of the pre-

Socratic Greek cosmos.
itself.

Agamemnon's identity is at war with

It is self -contradictory as it pulls in opposite

directions simultaneously.

Agamemnon is, in modern terms,

both head of state and head of family."

To be king he must

sacrifice his daughter in order to protect the state.

To be

father he must sacrifice the fleet upon which the safety of
the state and, consequently,

all families depend.

Each
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course open to Agamemnon is mandated by who he is and each
is forbidden by who he is.

When Agamemnon chose to sacrifice his daughter he acted
courageously, resolutely, heroically.

one-sidedly.

But he also acted

He told himself that such sacrifice of

innocent blood was unambiguously right.

Shedding his agony,

Agamemnon heard only the voices of fighters calling for the
execution of justice.

The voice of his daughter softly

pleading against her own execution fell on deaf ears.

Agamemnon excised half of his identity and thereby shed his
suffering, but as he did so he lost his balance and his

self-restraint, signified by his failure to honor the sacred

sanctuaries of the gods in his pursuit of war.
If wisdom consists in acting justly,

Agamemnon was wise

by heroic standards, according to which the necessary part
of one's multiple identity dominates at the necessary

time.

1 ^0

But Agamemnon was unwise by tragic standards

according to which opposing parts of the self act in unison
(but not in harmony)

to restrain each other,

a

restraint

which ceases to operate when one side dominates and silences
the other.

Agamemnon was unwise because he ceased to suffer

the agony of his identity.

He ceased to be warrior-king and

father both to become warrior only, unrestrained by the

contradictions of his character.
to choose and he had to act.

necessary to choose as he did.

To be sure, Agamemnon had

And perhaps it was even
Still he did not have to gag

his daughter's mouth and cease to hear or remember her
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cries.

But Agamemnon shed his agony and forgot it.

He

ceased to suffer and he was unwise.
Tragic Orestes, Tragic Wisdom
In contrast to Agamemnon,

whose character represents

the heroic dike of the past, the character of Orestes

represents the tragic dike of the present in the Oresteia.
Numerous parallels can be drawn between the figures of

Agamemnon and Orestes, the most obvious of which is that
each kills an intimate family member.

daughter and, in

a

Agamemnon kills his

mirror image of that action, Orestes

kills his mother (who of course has killed Agamemnon)

.

The

immediate effect of these reverse parallels is to suggest
that the wheel of heroic dike continues to turn and "right"
itself, so to speak.

Until its last few lines, that initial

impression seems to be dramatically confirmed by the events
of the Libation Bearers,

the second play of Aeschylus'

trilogy.
In the Libation Bearers, Orestes returns home to Argos
to avenge his father's murder and assume his rightful place
at the head of the ruling house of Atreus.

The language of

the play is saturated with references to "right"

(dike)

and

things returning from darkness to light, all of which

suggest the eternal cycle of heroic justice based on the
temporal image of the movement of the sun.
who is invoked as

a

Orestes himself,

hero and bringer of justice in the final

lines of the Agamemnon and in the early lines of the
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Libation Bearers, appears to his sister Electra from
of concealment into the light. 101

place

a

Soon afterwards the chorus

explicitly associates the "turning of justice" and acts of

retribution with the "age-old wisdom,"

a

wisdom which will

be challenged in the final lines of this play and in the

events of the Eumenides.
The action of the play is simple.

Under the guidance

of Apollo, Orestes has returned home to avenge his father's

murder by killing his mother, Clytaemnestra

.

With Electra

and the chorus of serving-women, Orestes hatches a plot to
the enter the house and carry out the "innocent murder." 102

After the slaying, Orestes is aflicted by the horrible
Furies who drive him from the stage in fear and anguish.
Like Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra before him, Orestes is

required to perform an act which is both just and unjust at
the same time.

And,

like Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra,
i

i

Orestes initially approaches his task in the traditional,
heroic manner; that is, he approaches it one-sidedly,
resolutely.

Indeed, Orestes is perhaps even more resolute

in his task initially than was Agamemnon.

Prior to his
i

decision Agamemnon was portrayed as agonized by his dilemma.
Orestes, on the other hand, is confident from the outset in
the pure justice of his cause.

He sees no dilemma.

Apollo

has sent him on his mission of justice, Orestes claims,

armed with a litany of horrible punishments which Orestes

would incur at the hands of his father's Furies if he should
fail in his assignment.

It is notable,

however, that
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Apollo,

the rational god,

is also one-sided.

He has

tellingly neglected to inform Orestes that he would also
incur similar punishments from his mother's Furies if he

should succeed in his assignment.

Within the play, then, Agamemnon travels from agony to

resolution while Orestes' path takes him from resolution to
agony.

Once again the suggestion is present that Orestes

will complete the circle and finally right the imbalance

afflicting the accursed house of Atreus.

Repeatedly

throughout the play the approaching action of Orestes is
invoked by the chorus and others as the event which will
once and for all "wipe out the stain of blood shed long
ago." 103

Only after the murder, in the final lines of the

play, do the chorus and Orestes recognize that locked within
the hope of eternal justice there is found only the promise
of eternal injustice.

chorus,

104

"Where is the end," cries the

echoing Orestes' discovery that he has both

ins
succeeded and failed at the same time. J
•

Like the hero that he must be, Orestes prepares for the

approaching contest with his mother by inducing
lyssa to carry him through.

a

state of

For more than two hundred lines

Orestes, Electra, and the chorus alternately invoke the

traditional justice of Zeus with accelerating frenzy and
violence, at the end of which the chorus announces that "The
rest is action.

.

.

.

Your heart is set

106
strike and prove your destiny."

.

.

.,

now you must

Orestes' carefully

constructed resolve falters momentarily before he acts, as
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Clytaemnestra reminds him that they are mother and
son.
hesitates briefly but sheds his doubts, recovers his
imbalance and resolutely slays his mother.
however, his doubts return to haunt him.

audience as to

jury and defends himself.

a

right [dike] that
pleads.

107

I

He

Immediately,
He turns to the
"it was in all

achieved this death, my mother's," he

He tries to frame his act as purely just.

He has

been assured that it has the approval of Zeus, Apollo, and
the citizens of Argos

.

He even tries to characterize his

mother as some worthless "water snake, some viper" unworthy
of sympathy.

agony.

"I

108

But he is unsuccessful and he slips into

grieve for the thing done, the death," he cries.

"I have won but my victory is soiled

pride [honor]." 109

[polluted]

,

and has no

At the fever pitch of Orestes'

inner

doubt he is assailed and haunted by the Furies who

eventually drive him to Athens to escape his torment.

Now

an outcast driven from his homeland and his household by the

Furies, he makes one last public appeal.

"I killed my

mother not without some right," he submits. 110
The distance travelled from Orestes' first submission
to the audience- jury that his act was entirely right,

to his

final plea that it was not without some right that he killed
his mother represents the difference between tragic error

and tragic wisdom.

Tragic error coincides with heroic

wisdom and consists in acting and thinking one-sidedly, in
failing to hear and honor competing claims upon oneself

simultaneously.

Tragic wisdom consists in recognizing that
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every act of justice contains within itself the seed of
injustice, and in somehow balancing these opposing claims

simultaneously.
law,

Tragic wisdom recognizes isonomia as the

the esssential dike of the universe.

Orestes'

initial claim that the murder of his mother

was entirely just and right echoes Agamemnon's earlier claim
that the sacrifice of innocent blood was entirely right.

At

that moment Agamemnon lost his balance and his wisdom

because he ceased to suffer, and honor, the contradictions
of his identity.

In a reverse trajectory Orestes arrives at

wisdom when he recognizes that the justice of his act of

retribution is limited and partial because it is

simultaneously an act of injustice deriving from his
relationship to his mother,

a

previously submerged side of

his identity.

From the outset Orestes had approached his task soley
as his father's son.

As Agamemnon's son, Orestes was

required by the customary code of justice to avenge his
father's murder and occupy his father's rightful place at
the head of the house.

From this perspective, which Apollo

adopts, Orestes' murder of his mother is entirely

justified. 111

But Orestes is not only his father's son.

is his mother's child as well,

He

and from this perspective,

which is that of the Furies, the killing of his mother is

entirely unjust; it is purely criminal.

Prior to the

murder, listening to Apollo, Orestes had discounted his

relation to his mother.

Only moments before he strikes does

.
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Agamemnon's son begin to recognize himself as the son of

Clytaemnestra as well.

Then, at the moment he acts, Orestes

recovers, and suffers, the contradictions of his identity,
and he begins to be wise.

He comes to recognize that his

act is necessarily polluted, ambiguous.

purely just nor purely unjust.

It is neither

It is both simultaneously.

Shall we say then that tragic wisdom consists in

enduring the torment suffered by Orestes at the end of the

Libation Beearers?

If action

necessarily generates both

justice and injustice, must we conclude that the highest

wisdom consists in the paralysis of inaction?

The answer is

provided by Athena in the Eumenides, the final play of the
trilogy.

As has already been noted above,

112

the trial of

Orestes which takes place at Athens represents an

irreconcilable deadlock between opposing forces in which
nothing is finally resolved.

According to the human jurors

the claims on both sides, represented by Apollo and the

Furies, are equal.

This deadlock represents the tragic

balance, the isonomia of the universe.

It is only the vote

of Athena which decides that Orestes shall be acquitted of

the charge of matricide, and she votes on quite arbitrary

grounds
Athena votes to acquit Orestes of his crime on the
113
grounds that she is "always for the male."

Before we

114 however, perhaps
dismiss this vote as hopelessly sexist,

we can view it in a wider light.

The action of the

Eumenides lifts the themes of "wisdom" and "justice" from
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their locus within human characters and situates them
in

a

broader political order represented by Athena, goddess of
wisdom.

The location is Athens and the political order is

democracy.

Like Agamemnon and Orestes before her, Athena

confronts an impossible dilemma.

She must decide for or

against Orestes* guilt on the charge of matricide.
Dramatically, the question turns upon whether Orestes
is his father's or his mother's son.

The question sounds an

odd note to modern ears, and we are tempted to interject
that "he is both, of course," as though that would solve the

problem.

But the ancient Greeks were not primitive thinkers

and before we leap to the conclusion that we are so much

wiser than they, we might consider that our response is

precisely the same as would be proffered by any Greek
audience.

And therein lies Aeschylus' trap.

For if Orestes

is both Agamemnon's and Clytaemnestra s son,

then his action

'

was inextricably just and unjust at the same time.

consequences for society are grave.

The

For if Orestes had

failed to act against his mother, then, by

a

crime of

omission he would have condoned tyranny and undermined the
only principle of orderly political succession known to his
world.

In carrying out his duty and murdering his mother,

however, Orestes' action violated the foundations of the

very order he sought to defend.
indeed the bearer of

a

Simply put, if Orestes was

dual identity,

then,

as a matter of

justice, he was both bound and forbidden to to carry out the

same act of vengeance.

Moreover, either course-action or

.
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inaction— leads fatally to the erosion

of law and order and

the corrosion of political and social foundations.

Athena's dilemma:

That is

Should Orestes have acted or not acted?

Is he guilty or not guilty?

Either verdict upholds

a

legitimate version of justice while hoplessly shredding the
fabric of the social order.

Certainly it would be better for Athena if Orestes'
"actions" were separable, but as the failures of Apollo for
the defense and the Furies for the prosecution make clear,

they are not.

Orestes has committed

a

single act which is

by different standards both just and unjust alike.
as Orestes has committed a single act,

(although he has
such:

a

dual identity)

guilty or not guilty.

And just

so Orestes is one man

and must be judged as

Athena votes to absolve him of

his guilt but she does so on grounds which seem to have

little to do with the issues posed by the contest.

She is

"always for the male," and it is just this apparently

arbitrary element which appalls many modern readers of the
play, not only for its apparent sexism but for its apparent

dramatic ineptitude.

But the modern reader should perhaps

consider that, just as the ancient Greeks were not primitive
thinkers, Aeschylus was not a primitive dramatist.

Surely

the arbitrary quality of Athena's decision was apparent to

Aeschylus and his audience and was not without its dramatic
intentions
The vote of Athena constitutes

a

political act in

a

political context, and we can view it as representative of
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the often unavoidably arbitrary, and therefore unjust,

character of political decisions and political action.
Political decisions, by their very nature, determine which
set of fundamental arrangements will prevail over other

equally possible arrangements at any given time.

No matter

how just, such decisions must inevitably disallow and

dishonor some legitimate claims.^
Faced with her dilemma Athena acts, she makes her
choice.

But,

sidedly.

unilke Agamemnon, she does not act one-

She continues to hear and honor both sides at the

same time even though she must choose between them.

Her

vote favors Orestes and the male, but to fully appreciate
the ambiguous meaning of her vote we must attend more

closely to the contested arena which Orestes' character
represents and embodies.
Orestes is not

a

modern identity, and there is more at

stake in the Oresteia than his personal "guilt" or

"innocence."

represents
meet.

a

Like Agamemnon's character, Orestes' character

field of battle, an agon, where opposing forces

There are numerous pairs of opponents at war upon the

terrain named "Orestes."
the other,

On one side there is Apollo, on

the Furies; male versus female; youth versus age;

change versus tradition; reason versus passion; and finally,
the political family versus the family of blood ties.

voting for "the male," Athena has voted in favor of
army against its related opponents.

a

In

whole

But at the same time
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she has not in heroic fashion elevated one side to victory

while crushing the other side in defeat.

Athena upholds the side upon which Apollo fought but
she rejects his argument against Clytaemnestra
of Orestes.

'

s

maternity

Instead she couches her own decision in the

same words used by the female Furies, sustaining to some

degree the positions of both sides.

On balance, Athena

sides with Apollo that on the issue before her Orestes is

more his father's son than his mother's.

In doing so she

casts her vote for the political family over the family of

blood ties.

In this she once again echoes Agamemnon at
i

Aulis.

Unlike Agamemnon, however, she does not cease to

hear and honor the legitimate claims of the other side.

elevation of the Furies to

a

Her

position of power and authority

within the political order recognizes that the unlimited
i

victory of either side over the other leads only to

unlimited bloodshed and disintegration.
It is well to remember that while Athena casts the
I

deciding vote, it is still only one of many.

Her vote is

decisive only because the human jury was evenly split,
signifying the justice of isonomia.
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Athena's vote merely

tips the balance slightly, and perhaps only temporarily, in

favor of one side over the other while ensuring that the

contest will continue.
in favor of the male,

One might even construe her decision

while conceding no power of her own,

"forces," or
to be a statement that both the female and male

governing principles, are necessary to good order.
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Although Athena recognizes that justice speaks on both
sides through Apollo and the Furies, she also recognizes
that neither side can articulate a principle of limits for

itself.

Each side claims that the victory of the other

guarantees

a

loss of limits and a disintegration of order,

but neither side can hear the truth in the other's words.

Only Athena recognizes that they are both right.

She

recognizes, for example, that to the extent that Apollo
stands for rational order and the Furies stand for

a

passionate commitment to traditional loyalties, each has
legitimate time and

a

legitimate title to rule.

a

But she

recognizes also that the rule of either alone without the
other leads to unending bloodshed.
are,

each needs the other as

excesses.

a

As incompatible as they

limit to his or her own

Without fear or passion, the most violent acts

can be rationalized.

But without the restraint of reason,
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passion authorizes continuous violence.

wisdom to recognize that although

a

It is Athena's

decision must be made,

a

verdict rendered, an action taken, neither side can afford

complete victory over the other.

All sides must continue to

be heard and sustained in equal opposition.

In the

Oresteia, Aeschylus educates and celebrates the democracy of

Athens as the political embodiment of this wisdom.

.

.
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CHAPTER
PLATO'S REPUBLIC:

4

THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF TRAGEDY

Agony v. Identity
The dual vision and ambiguous language of Greek tragedy

reflects and represents on stage the principle of isonomia
(law of equals)

which justified Athenian democracy.

The

principle of isonomia is drawn from an image of nature which
yields conceptions of wisdom,

justice,

law,

truth and

goodness which are at odds with the traditional meanings of
those terms within the Homeric conception of nature

portrayed by Thucydides in his History.
politics is therefore at its very origins

A democratic
a

contest over the

meanings of words.
The natural order of the kosmos represented by isonomia
is one of a balance of opposing forces engaged in a

perpetual contest where no force is strong enough to defeat
any other.

Nature is seen to be composed of pairs of forces

which are mutually incompatible yet mutually dependent and

inseparable at the same time.

Opposites not only attract

and repel each other simultaneously, they mutually

constitute each other as units of power, or bipolar
identities
Isonomia is not

a

theory of power, strictly speaking.

It is a vision which implies a theory of limits to power.

That nature is an order of powers is taken for granted.

The

'
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principle of isonomia is based on the premise that no power
or force contains within itself the principle of its own

limitation.

Every force naturally seeks to dominate.

Limits are to be found only in the opposition of

different

a

but related force.

Isonomia characterizes itself as the law of nature

articulating the nature of justice.
different sense of justice and

a

But this is a very

very different law of

nature from that articulated by Athens in Thucydides
History.

In the heroic conception of justice found there

the forces of nature also seek to dominate, and they

succeed, but in so doing they generate their own opposition

which overcomes them in time.

Time contains the limits

which balance out the forces of nature in their eternal
cycle of domination and submission, victory and defeat.

Tragedy constitutes

a

tradition of Greek culture.

radical challenge to the heroic
The heroic tradition is not

overthrown or repudiated, however.
seen to be only

a

It is reinterpreted and

partial view of nature, representing
From the tragic perspective of time the

incomplete wisdom.

balance of the heroic cycle is seen to be an imbalance.

History appears as

a

cycle of domination and submission,

power and weakness, war and peace, victory and defeat only

because an imbalance has been introduced at some point.
Original nature is portrayed as isonomia,

a

balance of equal

forces each restraining the other, preventing the heroic
imbalance.

Tragedy portrays the heroic cycle as

a

special
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case of order.

What was once seen to be natural is now
seen
to be a distortion of nature.
The heroic balance in which

power and weakness naturally revolve over time
is treated

tragically as

a

loss of

a

more original balance. 1

Tragedy introduces the notion of politics as

dilemmas to be straddled rather than

a

a set of

war to be won.

Every

political act threatens to set in motion the vertical
imbalance of the heroic cycle.

The political art,

exemplified by Athena in the Eumenides, consists of

maintaining the balance even though it can never be
"perfect."

Political decision-making always privileges one

side or the other, but that privilege can never be

permanent.

It must be reciprocated if the perpetual

imbalance of the heroic cycle is not to rule.

Different conceptions of justice are reflected in

different forms of literature.

The heroic conception of

justice lends itself to the historical form, particularly
the history of war, as Thucydides recognized.

History

reveals the temporal "truth" of justice in its eternal cycle
of ascent and decline.

The justice of isonomia, tragic

justice, lends itself more to the dramatic form.

drama compresses time to portray justice as
tension of opposites locked in

a

a

Tragic

simultaneous

perpetual contest of equals

without final or full resolution.
Tragic drama affirms

a

democratic political order in

which opposites are honored as equals and no single force is

permitted to rule unopposed.

The wisdom of isonomia, and
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the wisdom of democracy, consists in the recognition
that

not only must opposition be tolerated out of fear of

reprisal, but one's own opposition must actually be honored
as good.

For without opposition there are no limits, and

tragic wisdom tells us that we need limits even upon (or
within) ourselves.

Without the limits found in opposition

every force ascends to crime and injustice.

That is the

wisdom of tragic isonomia.
The Greek idea of wisdom had long been associated with
a

knowledge of limits and self-restraint. 2

"Know thyself,"

the traditional formulation of wisdom inscribed over the

temple of Apollo at Delphi, originally meant to know one's

place in the social structure and not cross one's bounds.
To know thyself meant to restrain oneself and maintain one's

proper place in the social and natural order.

Tragedy continues that tradition but identifies that
order as contradictory in nature, placing oneself in an
arena of conflicting demands and loyalties.

Wisdom consists

not in eliminating the dilemmas and resolving the

contradictions, for that would introduce an imbalance, but
in somehow honoring all contestants and dishonoring none,

thus retaining one's precarious balance.

Greek wisdom had always been associated with words
while "goodness"

(arete)

was more traditionally associated

with successful action, particularly in battle, although
"goodness" was always also the quality of
person.

3

a

successful

Thus the poets were wise because they articulated
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in inspired language the "truth" of the natural
order.

Leaders and warriors were "good," on the other hand,
if they
were successful.

To be good was not necessarily to be wise.

In heroic hand-to-hand battle the quality of
successful

arete could almost be said to be associated with
restraint,

a

a

loss of

loss of balance, in the form of lyssa, the

frenzied possession which overcame fear and inspired
courage.

In time,

however, as successful battle tactics

shifted from hand-to-hand combat to the hoplite phalanx
where success depended on maintaining one's place in line,
noble "goodness" became more associated with inaction and

self-restraint, almost the opposite of what it had once
meant, and closer to the notion of "wisdom."
As the location of "goodness" shifted from outward

action to the inward "action" of self-restraint, the arete
of action and the wisdom of words were drawn closer

together.

Finally in democracy where warring words became

the medium of power and success, the domain of wisdom,

language, action, thought, and power overlapped the

political space of the assembly and the inner space of the
soul.

It was this historical conjunction which permitted

Socrates and Plato to politically address language to the
arena of the soul rather than the arena of the assembly.

Plato's 4 relation to democracy is paradoxical.

If we

are to take him at his word in the Republic, he considered
it the most nearly perfect form of political insanity

imaginable.

5

Nevertheless, Plato's Republic sets out to

.
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show us on what foundations

a

democracy would have to be

established if it were to succeed.
basis of self-restraint,
however,

a

It would require a new

new form of wisdom.

First,

its tragic foundations would have to be destroyed.

Plato's target in the Republic is not democracy as
such.

It is isonomia,

the original foundation of democracy.

Isonomia is an illogical principle.

antithesis of logic.

Indeed it is the very

Isonomia portrays and affirms conflict

and self-contradiction as the true soul of nature.

Opposites such as justice and injustice, friends and
enemies, are portrayed as inseparably bound together as one.

Consistent with this illogical view, the language which
articulates the law of isonomia is deeply and irremediably
ambiguous
From

a

Platonic view, isonomia would seem to be

a

dangerous foundation for politics because it seems to embody
the very principle of disorder itself:

contradiction.

To

Plato, contradiction is the metaphor of political

disintegration, stasis.
strife.

Stasis means more than mere civil

It represents the complete breakdown of order and

restraint such as would be found in

a riot.

frightening specter to all Greeks and

a

It was a

terrifying memory to

Athenians at the end of the Peloponnesian war.
In the Republic,

Plato seeks to replace the law of

isonomia upholding Greek democracy with the law of identity

upholding logic and mathematics.

The principle of identity

is the principle of non-contradiction.

There are many ways

183

of formulating the principle of identity.

It essentially

states that opposites cannot be attributed to
the same thing
in the same place at the same time.

Aristotle defined it as

"the most secure arche [foundation] of all." 6

it remains

"the most secure arche" of modern rational life. 7

Plato was the first political philosopher to attempt
to

place political order on rational, logical foundations, but
in order to do it he had to undermine and defeat the

principle of isonomia.

That is why the Republic bans tragic

poetry from the ideal state.

Tragic theater was the

institution which articulated the nature of isonomia and

dramatically represented it to the Athenian democracy.

The

exclusion of the tragic poets from the ideal city of the

Republic is not

a

peripheral aesthetic concern to Plato.

is the immediate target of his political project.

Language and law are closely related.

It

8

The affinity is

expressed in the Greek term logos, which refers to the
universal law reflected in orderly thought and language.
The law is articulated in words, of course.

But the

universal logos is expressed in the form of language itself.
Language must be properly formed and arranged if it is to

adequately reflect and express the highest logos of all.
That is the foundation of poetic wisdom.

From Homer to the

tragic poets to Plato, the source of poetic wisdom has
always been found not only in the spoken or written words,
but in the form of speech,

the inspired arrangement of the

words into an order which reflects the true order of nature.
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The law of isonomia is found in the paradoxical

ambiguity which haunts the language of the tragic poets.
The endless double meanings, double visions and oxymora

which give life to the tragic form are not warnings of the
chaos and perversion which threaten to envelop the political
order. 9

They affirm the vitality of the healthy political

order itself as a contest which preserves contradiction and
the coexistence of opposites in an uneasy balance.

It is

the balance of "self-contradiction" which restrains the

political order from oscillating between the dangerous
imbalance of tyranny, where one element would rule all
others, and stasis,

the absence of any rule at all.

warns against logical coherence as

a

Tragedy

dangerous dream.

The language of Thucydides's History challenges the
tragic view of language as a mirror of

a

paradoxically

ambiguous nature implying the law of equals.

portrays nature as

a

Thucydides

heroic contest in which language is no

more than another weapon in the struggle for domination and

inequality.

Thucydides and the tragic poets agree that

nature is an agon,
forces.
a

a

contest of power between opposite

They disagree on the geometry of that agon.

vertical cycle of ascent and decline, or is it

Is it

a

precarious horizontal balance between rotating opposites?
The answer yields conflicting views of politics,
law,

justice,

wisdom, and goodness.
If tragedy contests the traditional heroic view

both.
portrayed in Thucydides' History, Plato contests them

.
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Although tragedy contests the heroic view of equality,
both
Thucydides and the tragic poets retain the central image
of
the agon as the true metaphor of nature.

Plato is much more

radical in his repudiation of this defining metaphor of the
entire Greek tradition.

metaphor of stasis.

For Plato,

the agon is also the

Any politics founded on the image of

the agon at its core must ultimately produce stasis and

disorder
At the same time, however,

Plato is much more

conservative than the tragedians on the notion of equality.
Plato rejects the balanced equality of isonomia in favor of
the idea of sovereignty.

Sovereignty retains the vertical

stance of the heroic cycle but freezes the rotation at the
point in time where reason is at its zenith.

But tragedy

warns that even the sovereignty of reason represents

a

dangerous imbalance inviting crime and retribution.

Even

reason needs its opposition at times if it is not to ascend
to injustice.

The sophistic reason of Apollo in the

Oresteia could justify any crime, and Athena recognized that
the fear and horror of the female Furies did not represent a

loss of reason or control but rather the enforcement of

a

necessary restraint upon reason.
Sovereignty is the guardian against stasis in Plato's
thought.

But what,

the sovereign?

the tragedians would ask,

is to restrain

Plato's answer is that the true sovereign

will be self-limiting.

Indeed this is to be the criterion

by which the true sovereign is known.

Moreover Plato seems

.
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to believe that the principle of identity

(the good),

and

only the principle of identity, can fill that position.
The principle of identity, the Platonic good, is the

principle of "oneness," wholeness, and self-sufficiency.
Plato seems to believe that anything which is naturally
good,

i.e.,

grow beyond

internally self -consistent
a

,

cannot change or

certain point before it divides into two.

Large, rich cities,

for example,

are in reality not one but

many cities at war with one another, and no match for
smaller, more united city.

As long as the principle of

identity rules, then, there can be

sovereign

a

a self -limiting

10

Plato's paradoxical position with respect to the

tragedians and Thucydides is perhaps most evident on the

question of the status of language.

Tragedy portrays the

natural ambiguity of language as a mirror of nature with

democratic implications for the nature of political life.
The view of language endorsed by tragedy and isonomia would
tend to affirm a rather robust and raucous assembly in which
all views were aired and honored.

Political decisions would

tend to be understood as having elements of sacrifice to be

atoned for rather than acts of pure justice.

Thucydides portrays language as

a

weapon to be used in

the struggle for domination, and the political implications

are at odds with those of Greek tragedy and the democracy it

supported.

Thucydides shows Pericles dominating the

Athenian assembly during his life with his considerable
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persuasive powers.

Pericles' strength rested on his ability

to impose consistent public meanings on words and to

overcome the naturally indecisive and selfish language of
the assembly.

Pericles was able to exercise this power by

consistently invoking the image of the greatness of Athens
over the greatness of any individual including himself.

The

greatness of Athens and the prospect of immortality in
history was able to unite the Athenian assembly against the
image of death and dissolution.
If we can characterize Pericles'

decisive gnome as the

elimination of ambiguity from the language of the assembly,
then Plato is closer to Thucydides in his view of language
than he is to Aeschylus or Sophocles.

Plato would agree in

principle with the tragedians that language is

a

mirror of

nature, but he would disagree that the ambiguous language of

tragedy adequately reflected the truth of nature.

For Plato

the ambiguous language of the poets represents a dangerous

distortion of language leading inevitably toward the
collapse of meanings into political stasis.
of ambiguity,

The elimination

and the poets who employ it, would avert

stasis and place politics on

a

more stable footing.

Unambiguous philosophical language would have to replace
poetic language, and philosophers would have to replace the
poets as the wise men of

a

stable political order.

Where Plato sees stasis, tragedy sees limits.

Plato sees stability, tragedy sees
a loss of

limits.

If

a

Where

dangerous imbalance and

ambiguity is lost and philosophy
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rules,

tragedy asks, what is to restrain the philosophers?

Where is the principle of limits?

From

a

Platonic

perspective it is an almost incoherent question of course.
The notion that philosophy might need limits seems quite

logically absurd.

Philosophy would appear to be the very

embodiment of limits in its affirmation of the principle of

identity as the truth of nature and the fundamental

principle of political language.

An unambiguous language

would reflect the highest good as the true form of nature.

Philosophical wisdom and restraint would be reflected in

a

pure, unambiguous language just as traditional poetic wisdom

was reflected an incurably ambiguous language.

From the perspective of traditional arete and action

Thucydides would ask Plato what "good" is language in
practical sense?

a

Plato sees language as both wise and good

reflecting his position at the intersection of these two
separate strands of traditional thought and meaning.

Thucydides saw language as

a

Where

weapon to be used in public

battle, Plato sees a surgical instrument to doctor the soul.
If a wise language reflects the principle of identity at the

heart of nature, then

a

good language will be

device to bring the soul into
of identity,

a

healthy state,

useful

a
a

condition

at one with itself.

Plato seeks to replace the law of the agon in both its

heroic and tragic formulations with the law of identity

which yields yet

a

third view of politics and language which

will be traced out in the Republic.

The principle of
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identity is based on the axiom that contradiction and

conflict are unnatural, unreal and untrue.

A politics

founded on the basis of identity then will be free of

conflict and the pursuit of power, both of which are

contrary to nature.

Ambiguity will be purged from political

language and philosophers will replace the poets as the

guardians of language and the figures of political wisdom.
It is well to remember, however,

that when Plato

repudiated the agon as the central metaphor of politics, he
also eliminated the traditional source of limits to power.
As long as power was thought to be the natural and defining

characteristic of politics, political theory addressed
itself to the issue of limits.

Even Pericles who seemed to

hold out to the Athenians the vision of an empire without
bounds never doubted that the natural forces of decay and

disintegration would overtake the Athenians in time.

The

goal was not boundless power but eternal fame and glory.
be talked about forever was

language beyond death.

a

To

form of immortality in

Without the agon,

a

new source of

limits would have to be envisioned and articulated.

Plato

apparently believed that the sovereignty of identity in the
form of "the good" would fill that role as well.
The Government of Desire
In democracy language is the medium of power.

In the

Athenian assembly, the mysterious power of persuasion was
transformed into political power.

It is appropriate then

190

that Book One of the Republic initiates not only

a

discussion of the contested meaning of "justice" derived
from

a

proper understanding of nature but also

a

discussion

of the status of language itself which will be carried on

throughout the text.
The opening lines of the text find Socrates detained by
a

group of friends who wish him to stay and join their

festivities.

Polemarchus presents the options to Socrates:

he will be overpowered by the physical force of numbers

unless he can convince them to let him go. 11

Socrates

suggests persuasion as an alternative to force but he yields
when his friends respond that the power of persuasion will
be powerless if they refuse to listen.

The brief encounter raises important but unanswered

questions.

What is the difference between the force of

physical strength, represented by superior numbers, and the
force of persuasion?

Which is the superior power in terms
Which is more legitimate, we

of both arete and justice?

would ask, under what conditions and why?

How are we to

evaluate the consent required by persuasion to secure its
effect. 12

The conversation moves to the home of Cephalus, father
of Polemarchus.

sense.

Cephalus is

a

"good" man in the traditional

He is pious in the sense that he observes the proper

religious rituals.

He is wise in the sense that he is self-

restrained and moderate.

He is well-off but not greedy.

has less money than his grandfather but more than his

He
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father, and he has no desire to increase his
wealth.

honorable.

He

i,s

He has sufficient money to pay his debts
and

keep his word,

a

"noble," if simple, conception of justice.

He is not troubled by need or desire.

Socrates attempts to question Cephalus on his notion of
justice to see if it does not lead to contradiction, but

Cephalus declines the bait.
attend to
son,

a

He leaves the conversation to

religious duty but he bequeaths his part to his

Polemarchus.

Cephalus leads

a

good, but unexamined,

life.

He is

comfortable and secure and feels no need to question
traditional practices and beliefs.
and approaching death.

already passing away.
contained.

But Cephalus is elderly

He represents an age which is

And the new age is not so self-

It is no accident that the scene takes place in

the port district of Athens during the festival of a new
god.

Athens has become

a

cosmopolitan city and the port is

the symbol of exotic pleasure and sensual desire.

-^

Polemarchus takes over his father's position and
introduces the second, traditional formulation of justice:

helping friends and harming enemies.

Socrates thoroughly

confuses Polemarchus demonstrating that he does not know
what he is saying.

First he seems to discredit the

traditional view of justice as not useful.

which places a high value on success this is
argument.

In a culture
a

powerful

Socrates secondly shows that Polemarchus does not

know what it is that is due to friends and enemies, nor can
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he adequately distinguish real friends and enemies
from

apparent ones, and finally he does not know what is helpful
or harmful.

The conversation with Polemarchus serves to show that
the traditional formulation of justice has become an

incoherent and meaningless cliche.

But in the process

Socrates seems to have established that justice is
of knowledge and desire.

He has, moreover,

matter

a

injected the

tacit premise that justice and injustice, friends and
enemies, and even "helping" and "harming" are mutually

contradictory opposites which are never the same.

The

ground for the eventual rejection of tragedy is thus laid
early in the opening lines of the Republic.

Thrasymachus enters to provide the third formulation of
justice.

"Justice is the advantage of the stronger."

Thrasymachus also represents

powerful tradition.

a

He

stands for the timeless belief that power is the good and

absolute power for oneself is the highest good.

He also

stands for the Athenian view portrayed by Thucydides that

equality is merely

a

convention among the weak to restrain

the strong from harming the weak.

Socrates catches Thrasymachus in

contradictions.

web of apparent

But Socrates concedes that his victory over

Thrasymachus is unsatisfactory.
unsystematic and incomplete.
not consider himself defeated.

persuaded.

a

It was too easy,

Furthermore Thrasymachus does
He has been silenced but not

It is an insecure victory and Socrates knows it.
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But Thrasymachus is incapable of carrying on
the argument.
He is little more than an incoherent beast.

Does Plato

suggest that those who occupy the position of Thrasymachus
will never be persuaded but only tamed and domesticated at

best?
In any case Plato has gained much from the reader.

He

has seduced us into implicitly agreeing that the contested

terms of the argument are "knowledge" and "the good."

And

he has secured our tacit agreement that the antithesis of

knowledge is contradiction.
in argument are ignorant.

contradiction are false.

Those who contradict themselves
And arguments which lead to

By securing early and uncontested

submission to the principle of non-contradiction as the
standard of knowledge Plato has already secured the
foundation for his conclusion that tragedy must be banned
almost before the "real" dialogue begins. 14

Glaucon and Adeimantus take up the argument on behalf
of the silenced Thrasymachus.

They claim that most people

secretly, but silently, agree with Thrasymachus.

If

they

could have their way, most people would want everything for
themselves.

The convention of equality, they say, has been

adopted by the weak, who would end up with nothing, only to
curb the appetites of the naturally strong, who would end up

with everything.

The convention is thought to be unnatural,

however, and anyone able to violate it without being caught
or punished would naturally do so.
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It is not necessarily a perverse argument.

It is an

argument that could be made against democratic equality on
behalf of traditional arete and traditional forms of honor.

Honor was the form of praise which men either offered or

earned based on their standing or "goodness."

Goods,

in the

form of possessions and property, were merely outward signs
of the honor and status one had actually earned.

Goods

could not confer status; they could only confirm it.

From

this perspective, it is certainly possible to claim that

democratic equality upsets the natural order of things by
giving equal shares of honor to unequals.

It might

certainly appear that democracy was an arrangement which
gave to the undeserving more than they deserved while giving
less to the more deserving.

The key to the argument as it is framed in the text is
the link between justice and "happiness."

In traditional

aristocratic terms justice consisted of having the amount of
honor one deserved, and happiness consisted in being

satisfied with that amount.
natural limit to goods.
unjust.

Goodness,

arete,

supplied

a

To desire more than one's share was

Under commercial conditions, however, it became

possible to acquire an unlimited amount of goods with money.

Money represented

a

loss of limits.

If

democracy was

associated with the commercial classes, and the possession
of goods came to be associated with the acquisition of money

rather than traditional forms of success, then the

democratic pursuit of happiness could come to be associated
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with the unlimited acquisition of goods along with the power
such

a

pursuit would require.

equality would seem to be

a

From this perspective

necessary social convention to

compensate for the loss of limits associated with the
severed link between "goodness" and goods.
Justice and happiness are linked and so it is not

farfetched that the quest for the meaning of "justice" in
the text is pursued in terms of the meaning of "happiness."
It can be agreed that everyone desires happiness and that

happiness in an interior condition.

It is assumed that

justice is also an interior state (the text is concerned

with the "just man") but is it the same as happiness?

The

participants in the conversation contrive an experiment to
find the answer.

Socrates proposes that they look for

justice in the political state in order to better see it in
the soul.

He further proposes that they construct their

experimental state in words rather than examine an actual
15
0
state, presumably to encounter justice in its purest form.

There is no immediate discussion of this proposal which

establishes that truth is to be found analytically in words
and not empirically in deeds.

1 ft

The origin of the polis is said by Socrates to be

determined by need.

An association is necessary to fulfill

basic human needs because individuals are not self-

sufficient and cannot supply all of their own needs.

The

first premise of the association, division of labor, is

logical and follows from the stipulated lack of self-

"
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sufficiency.

Socrates' second premise,

"naturally fitted for
only one job,

17

a

that each person is

different job" and should perform

can also be said to be logical but not

logically required.

It is logical in the sense that it is

the axiom of identity in disguise which Plato is
inserting
as the foundation of the polis.

It

is not surprising that

it will later turn up as the mark of a just soul.

The first city constructed in this manner is simple,

self-sufficient, and self-contained.
as "true and healthy." 18

"primitive."

Socrates describes it

We would probably describe it as

Glaucon calls it

a

"city for pigs" because of

its lack of more sophisticated pleasures and luxurious

comforts.

19

The designation is ironic because we would be

more inclined to describe the fat, bloated city which
follows as more pig-like in its indiscriminate feasting on

pleasure than the more primitive city.
Glaucon'

s

objections are accommodated and the

consequences are several.

The city will need to greatly

expand in order to accommodate expanded desires.

It will

need to encroach upon its neighbors' territory and it will
be the object of their envious desire.

military to make war and defend itself.
importantly the city will need
force.

a

But more

government as

We would call it a police force.

"guardians

The city will need a

a

restraining

Plato calls them

.

The first city, the "true and healthy," city needs no

formal government and no police.

It is self-governing and
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self-restrained, possessing the characteristics
of wisdom
and freedom.
Its primary characteristic is its transparent
visibility.
else.

It is small enough for everyone to see
everyone

Everyone knows what they are supposed to do, they

know what everyone else is supposed to do, and they see
that
they do it.

It is a society in which everyone watches over

everyone else, everyone looks after everyone else, everyone
observes everyone else.

Depending on your vantage point

this kind of society is either stifling or caring.

But in

traditional Greek terms it would be free and wise; that is,
it would be self-governing,

sufficient

self -restrained and self-

.

It is the portrait of a classic shame culture.

Its

freedom derives from its transparent visibility, its
simplicity, its limited size, and its well-defined and well-

differentiated roles.

All this collapses with the expansion

of desire and the expansion of the city.
is no longer visible to itself.

other.

The engorged city

People cannot see each

They become anonymous and do not know each other.

Instead of looking after one another they must guard against
one another.
shame.

With

And with

a

loss of restraint.

wisdom.

a

loss of visibility comes

a

loss of

loss of shame comes a loss of limits, a
A loss of restraint signals a loss of

It is no accident that the guardians of Glaucon's

enlarged, cosmopolitan city must be philosophers, lovers of
lost wisdom.

The first "true and healthy" city of the

.
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Republic resembles Cephalus in that it too is

a

symbol of an

older age which is near death.

Invisibility and anonymity generate the need for
police force,

a

a

government to watch over the city and guard

it from enemies inside and out.

But who will watch over the

government; who will guard the protected against their

guardians?
freedom.

It is a classic paradox of government and

Plato answers that all must be governed by the one

law which governs nature, which he believes to be the law of

identity
Plato has framed the problem of government as one of
desire.

The need for government only arose in the context

of unrestrained desire for physical pleasures and comforts.
If the guardians were to be governed by those same desires

then they would surely turn against those they were

instituted to protect just as

a

shepherd fattens his sheep

only to harvest and fleece them, as Thrasymachus earlier

pointed out.
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The solution offered in the Republic is that

governors and governed must all be ruled by one desire, one
love, but the object of that love must be something of which

there is no conceivable shortage, "the good," which will

turn out to be logical identity.

The true good which

everyone really loves, Plato will argue, is not
thing at all but

a

a

physical

metaphysical thing, something which is

unlimited yet is itself

a

limit.

That "thing" is the good.

What we really seek above all, he will try to persuade us,
is a state of inner peace and harmony,

without conflict or
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contradiction.

This would be

a

state which conforms with

the true form of nature.
In order to maintain freedom while being ruled by

government, each person must rule one's self according to
the same law.

When we are wise we seek to conform

ourselves, our souls and our state, with the law of
identity.
many,

Each person must seek to be only one person, not

and perform the one task which they are naturally

suited to do to contribute their part to the city.

When

that happens the city will be one, at peace within itself.

Freedom and government are both maintained when each
obeys the same law.
in Greek thought.
a

Language, law and justice are related

The law which conforms to nature will be

just law expressed in a form of language which reflects

that nature.

This thought does not originate with Plato.

It is the traditional source of poetic wisdom.

The poets,

however, in Plato's view speak a false language and portray
a

false justice.

Plato's complaint against poetic language

is that it is ambiguous and contradicts itself.

therefore dangerous on two levels.

leading it toward stasis.

principle.

It corrupts the city,

And it corrupts the soul, leading

lunacy and criminality at worst.

it to confusion at best,

"Identity" is both

It is

a

logical and psychological

That is part of our Platonic legacy.

If logical

identity represents the form of the highest good, the true
form of nature, then if the soul is to become good, it must

seek to replicate logical identity.

The logos of nature and
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the logos of the soul must reflect each other
as one.

Then

and only then will the political sphere also
be good in the

same image.

The tool which accomplishes this political task

is philosophical language.

If the city is to be orderly and

well-governed then the speech of its guardians must also be
orderly and well-governed.
Most importantly, however, if the city is to be free
and self-governing, then its citizens must learn to speak to

themselves in
of each.

a

language which maintains the true identity

Language is

a

powerful political tool.

Used

correctly it can bring health to the city and health to the
As it turns out the primary function of the Platonic

soul.

guardians will be to guard language.

And the primary

function of Plato's Republic is to teach the young, the
future rulers and citizens, how to talk to themselves

philosophically instead of poetically or incoherently as in
ordinary language.
The need for government generated by unleashed desire

initially seems to pose an insurmountable problem to
Socrates in the text.

It seems that the rulers of such a

city would require contradictory natures.

ferocious and gentle at the same time.
to enemies and gentle to friends.

nature.

21

They must be both

They must be harmful

It seems contrary to

"How can we keep men with natures like that from

being savage to each other and to the rest of the citizens?"
Socrates asks.

"It seems impossible to reconcile

contraries, so it seems impossible to have

a

good
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guardian.

"22

The difficulty expresses the unnatural

character of government in Plato's view.

But then Socrates

remembers the existence of watchdogs who seem to
naturally
unite the contrary qualities in one being and he
concludes
that the possibility of government is not hopelessly

unnatural after all.
It is a curious exchange of dialogue made even
more

strange by Socrates' sudden realization that watchdogs must
be natural philosophers because they instinctively know how
to distinguish between opposites.

has made several points here.

23

In any case Socrates

Firstly, not all apparent

contradictions are real contradictions.

At first it seemed

that the guardian's nature would have to be self-

contradictory and therefore contrary to nature.

That turned

out not to be the case as proved by the existence of

watchdogs.

Nevertheless, the premise has been reiterated

that real self-contradiction is contrary to nature.

True

nature conforms to the law of identity.
Secondly, Socrates has suggested that friends and

enemies are true opposites.

enemies are not friends.
a

Friends are not enemies and

We should note again that this is

rejection of the tragic view.

friends

(family)

at the same time.

We see in the Oresteia that

can be enemies and enemies can be friends
The law of identity does not hold.

The

wisdom of the tragic identity is that it must honor

contradictory voices within itself, even when forced to
choose between them.

Agamemnon could not identify himself

.
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solely as the head of his political family and sacrifice his

connection to his biological family without
limits.

a

loss of

Orestes could not identify himself solely as his

father's son while sacrificing his mother without committing
crime.

The wisdom of Athena consisted of balancing and

honoring those inseparable but contradictory claims

simultaneously
The same point is made perhaps more explicitly in

Sophocles' Antigone, where Creon insists upon the rigid

distinction between friends and enemies which destroys his
family and brings a plague upon the state.

Creon resembles

Plato in his rigid separation of apparent opposites and his

philosophical resolution of conflict by the imposition of
hierarchy.

Plato challenged the political wisdom of the

poets, but clearly the poets were also busy contesting the

political wisdom of the Socratics.
Finally, Socrates has made

a

statement about the nature

of knowledge and the nature of philosophers.

The process of

knowledge is the process of distinguishing between
opposites.

It is an expert skill demanded of rulers which

philosophers perform best.

Natural philosophers are rare in

nature, however, suggesting that orderly government is

likely to be no less rare.

Having established the need for guardians the

discussion in the Republic turns to the form of their
education.

Not surprisingly, given the power of words to

imprint themselves on the soul, stories play a significant
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role in the early education of the guardians.

Socrates

first distinguishes between true and false stories because

guardians must be told only the truth or stories useful for
attaining the truth.
True stories do not contradict themselves or show the

gods or citizens at war with each other. 24

Socrates is

evidently not saying that such things never happen. 25

He is

saying that even if they do happen they are still untrue

because what is true is natural, and what is natural is an
absence of conflict and contradiction.

Truth is not

a

property of historical fact but of language correctly
composed to reflect the truth of nature.
Furthermore the gods must always be presented as good,
not evil, Socrates says.

"We must

.

.

.

prevent our

citizens from saying or hearing, in prose or in verse, that
a

god, being good, causes evil.

and a self-contradiction." 2 ^

That's pernicious, impious,

Self-contradiction is taken to

be sufficient proof of falsity.

"We must find some other

71
cause for evil," he says portentously.

Once again the anti-tragic implication is that the

opposites of good and evil are mutually exclusive and cannot
be present in a single identity.

The danger in this

position from the tragic point of view is that the quest for
a pure

identity will continually cast out on to others the

impurities produced and found in the soul,

just as Plato

will eventually locate the cause of evil in female nature,
and ban tragedy from the ideal city.

28
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Most dangerous of all from the tragic perspective is
the denial involved in the process which is symbolized by

Agamemnon's loss of memory and restraint after sacrificing
Iphigeneia in the Oresteia.

belong to

a

The denial that opposites can

single identity disables us from recognizing

that our hates are produced by our loves.

To love the good

is to love the one and hate the other which threatens to

pollute it.

If identity is to be the highest standard,

it appears that one cannot love without hating.

tragic form of truth denied in Plato's Republic.
is dangerous,

then

This is the
The denial

tragedy teaches, because it cannot confront

the sacrifices it makes and the furies it creates as its own

productions and engage them as its own children.
Platonic truth is
opens up

a

a

property of language not fact which

possible disjunction between truth and history.

A true language will reflect nature and not necessarily

history.

Language properly composed is

a

useful instrument

for doctoring and healing disordered souls.

But disordered

souls also speak and make ignorant speeches reflecting the

state of their souls.

In such cases their speeches are lies

but liars often make history.

distinguish lies from truth.

It is not always easy then to

Only the philosophers, the

guardians and doctors of language, can be trusted to make
the expert distinction, and only they can be permitted to
lie for good reason."

The most notable lie in the Republic is of course the

"noble lie" which says that the citizens are all one family
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born of the earth.
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The effect of this lie if it were to

be believed would be to eliminate divided
loyalties between

families, and to prevent competition for rule.

The noble

lie unites the city into a single political unit by

eliminating distinct family units altogether.

In this

situation there can be no conflict of loyalties between the
political family and the blood family such as agonized

Agamemnon in the Oresteia.

There would be only one family

and it would be identical with the state.
The signal characteristic of

a

"dilemma" is that it

cannot be resolved by privileging one side over the other
because, in either case, the sacrifice would be too great.

The characteristic of a "contradiction" is that it can be

resolved by eliminating or elevating one of the conflicting
elements over the other.

We would call it "prioritizing" in

the parlance of efficient organization.

The noble lie of the Republic transforms the tragic

dilemma of the Oresteia into

a

simple contradiction to be

resolved by eliminating one side.

This was precisely the

form of one-sidedness which, in the case of Agamemnon's

sacrifice of Iphigeneia, the Oresteia portrayed as sickness
not wisdom.

We may also recall that Socrates'

"medicine" in

treating the family as unimportant or disruptive is the same
cure prescribed by Creon in Sophocles' Antigone, where Creon

tried to remedy the ills of Thebes by subsuming the family

beneath the state.

There too the disease was stasis, but
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Creon's cure succeeded only in bringing about

worse plague

a

which threatened to destroy the state he had hoped to save.
Having identified the true content of the stories to be
told in the ideal city, Socrates turns to their form.

He

distinguishes between three basic styles of storytelling.
The first form is pure narration in which there is only one

voice to be heard, the voice of the author.

deception or concealment here.
identified.

There is no

The author's voice is easily

It is authentic because it maintains a single,

uniform identity.
The second style is the opposite of the first and

consists of pure "imitation" with no narration.

This is the

form of dialogue found in drama written for the theater.

In

the imitative style the author impersonates many voices and

many characters without ever revealing his own
say,

.

We might

along with Plato, that this style is unauthentic

because the author has no identifiable identity.

He appears

always as many, never as one.
Socrates identifies use of the narrative style with

good men and use of the opposite style with the "opposite
nature." 32

The standard of judgment is the standard of

identity.

Bad persons maintain no identity.

maintain one identity.

Good persons

On this basis the tragic poets are

judged to be worthless and are quietly but explicitly
33
outlawed from the city for the first time in the Republic.

basic
The law which is violated by the tragic poets is the
the
law of identity which has governed the regime from

"

"
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beginning:

"...our men are not variable," says Socrates,

"each does only one thing.

34

This principle is crucial to

the idea of justice and the idea of the good
at the core of
the Republic.

It says that a good person is one person

(not

many) whose soul naturally corresponds to one activity.

Justice prevails when these natures match.
In Book Four of the Republic Socrates declares the
just

city founded, and by

a

rather deft (and logically

suspicious) process of elimination he discovers that the

principle of justice holding it together is none other than
the founding principle that "each one must pursue the one

pursuit to which his nature is most naturally suited." 35

Following this declaration, the discussion seeks to

determine whether the same configuration of justice found in
the city coincides with the configuration of justice found
in the soul of a just man, as was the original intention of

the dialogue.
At this point in the text the discussion suddenly turns

much more meticulously logical.

The search begins with the

first formal articulation of the axiom of identity to appear
in the text.

"The same thing will never suffer or do

opposite things in the same part at the same time toward the
same thing....

3°

The principle is then elucidated and

37
repeated two more times in rapid succession for emphasis.

The formal statement of the principle inaugurates

a

demonstration of rigorous logical analysis evidently
designed to reveal the method of Socratic knowledge.

The
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method proceeds by identifying, analyzing and resolving

contradictions into their non-contradictory component parts.
If anything seems to contain its own opposite,

if

it appears

self-contradictory, then either the contradiction can be
shown to be merely apparent, not real, or the analysis has
not proceeded far enough to separate out the true,

fundamental identities.

The argument "proves" that the

soul, like the city, does indeed have the same three

corresponding parts and that justice does indeed consist in
fitting them together in the only way possible to preserve
them as a single, harmonious unit.

Reason must always

dominate, with the forceful part immediately below and the

emotional, acquisitive part always on the bottom under

Force is not required, however, since all sections

control.

will naturally agree on the order because of their love of

harmony.

Justice, Socrates concludes, "is really

°

concerned with internal activity--with the true self and its
business

.

"

J:J

Plato is fond of medical metaphors and he now has
Socrates compare justice and injustice to health and
disease.

"Producing health," he says, "means establishing

the parts of the body so that they dominate and are

dominated by each other according to nature, disease so that
they rule and are ruled contrary to nature."

Justice and

40
injustice in the soul are then defined in identical terms.

Once again Plato has inserted

a

veiled but explicit

rejection of the tragic principle of isonomia in favor of

.
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the principle of sovereignty.

portrays health as neither
rather

a

a

in a medical context isonomia

harmony nor

a

hierarchy but

contest in which the opponents are equally

balanced. 41

The Oresteia, which enacts this image of health

upon the political stage in the Eumenides, reiterates that

a

loss of balance implies either anarchy, no rule, or

monarchy, the rule of one.

What appears to Plato as an

unlimited good--the rule of reason
tragedy as

a

— can

only appear to

dangerous loss of balance.

The sovereignty of

the good identity in which Plato finds the only possible

limits represents to tragedy the exact opposite:

dangerous loss of any possible limits.

a

It is not the rule

of reason which tragedy finds so dangerous, however, as

though the rule of passion might offer

alternative.

a

superior

The danger lies in the principle of

sovereignty itself which represents

a

loss of balance and

restraint
Judgment and Conviction
The first four books of the Republic follow

a

trajectory from low to high, body to mind, from the sensual
pleasures of the Pireaus to the intellectual pleasures of
logical demonstration of justice.

a

Retracing that trajectory

reveals that Socrates has also been more seductive than

strictly rational. 42 He has waited until the end of Book
Four to formally articulate the principle of logical
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identity which had been surreptitiously and
repeatedly
inserted into the discussion at every possible
opening.
Books Five through Seven repeat the same trajectory
at
a

higher level.

The first four books represent the realm of

the body and its desires.

Books Five through Seven

represent the intellectual realm of reason and its love as
the dialogue soars to the overarching height of truth,

dialectic and the idea of the good.

The text ascends to

what would have been the realm of the gods and reveals the

thread of language which connects it to the world of

politics and the human soul below.

Later,

in Books Eight

through Ten, the text will descend once more to the realm of

worldly politics and the afterworld of death and
immortality.

By that time, however,

"knowing oneself,"

knowing one's place in the traditional sense of wisdom, will
have been overturned.
Book Five opens with Polemarchus interrupting the

discussion to raise the issue of sexual relations among the
guardians.

The voices of all of the earlier participants

except Cephalus, but including Thrasymachus

heard again signifying the new beginning.

,

are briefly

Socrates himself

warns that the subject of sexual relations forces the

discussion back to the beginning.

It is not immediately

clear why this should be so, but the answer seems to be that
the historical conjunction of "sex" and "happiness" forces
the discussion to tackle the equation of "pleasure" and "the

good" and the love which joins them.
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Book Four had opened on the question of happiness and

ended on the same question, still unanswered. 43

The

conventional answer that happiness consists of the physical
pleasures obtainable through money, sex and power had not
yet been refuted, as Socrates reminded us. 44

Socrates now proceeds to gain assent to

a

program of

rationally controlled breeding and sexual activity in the
ideal city in which even the meaning of "parent" and "child"

become mathematically determined.

The arrangement is

designed to minimize the disruptive influence of jealous and
possessive sexual eros upon the city.
The extreme of f ensiveness to us, the modern readers of

Plato's highly rationalized program of sex and breeding,
forces us to confront the author's intentions.

Is it a

Swif tian-style "modest proposal" intended to shock the

reader (or listener) to the potential horror and absurdity
Surely it is here, if anywhere,

of the Platonic project?

that such irony can be found.

Might Plato be warning us

sub-textually that rationality is an extreme medicine
45
required to restore an extremely sick polis to health?

so,

If

the Republic would appear to recapitulate the heroic

trajectory of Thucydides

'

Athens and Aeschylus' Agamemnon,

suggesting that the medicine is potentially as poisonous as
the disease,

and portending further that any future antidote

to the excesses of rationality would necessarily be as one-

sidedly dangerous as what had gone before, recalling the
endless cycle of revenge and retribution dramatized by
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Aeschylus in the first two plays of the Oresteia.
will it end,

the tragic chorus would ask?

Where

If Plato joins

Aeschylus in calling such oscillation into question, the

Republic nevertheless has no political or theoretical
correspondence to the Eumenides within itself.
is tragic.

The Oresteia

The Agamemnon alone is not.

It is more likely that if Plato's eugenics is intended

ironically, it is intended not to call the project of the

Republic into question but rather the equation of happiness
with sexual pleasure.

Immediately following the discussion

of sexual relations and the evils of civil strife within the

city,

the question of happiness reappears once more.

Socrates contends that on the basis of the previous

discussion they have determined that the guardians will be
happier than any Olympic victor. 46

Indeed they will be the

happiest class in the city because they have the pleasure of

preserving the whole city, maintaining its identity.

The

highest natures do not love the pleasures of sexual objects,
they love the pleasures derived from their relation to the

metaphysical object of the whole, the idea of the one.
Having decided that the ideal city as described is best
and most happy,

the discussion turns to whether or not it is

possible for such

a

city to ever occur. 47

Socrates insists

that it can never occur until philosophers become kings or

kings become philosophers.
must be made to coincide.

Political power and philosophy

Socrates explains his conclusion

by explaining the nature of images and ideals.
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He reminds his listeners that they were seeking a model

on which they might model themselves. 48 But models,

images,

are by their very nature ideal and not exactly reproducible
in physical form.

He further reminds his listeners that the

conversation thus far has constructed an image, an idea, in
words.

The ideal city is a construction of and in language,

not the physical world.

But,

Socrates insists, language

always contains more truth than action. 49

Language is the instrument which shapes the soul and
Socrates is teaching his students to talk to themselves

properly if they are to realize and maintain the ideal state
in their souls,

ever.

50

which is where it must be realized first, if

Socrates can only seduce them with his language.

If they are to be free and self-governing they must be truly

persuaded and learn to speak the same language to themselves
in his absence.

Socrates has subtly turned the conversation to the
status of language and the unspoken power of persuasion.

He

has been demonstrating the method of true knowledge and the

structure of reason itself.

He showed that it was possible

to know something securely by following a methodical,

rational inquiry.

He showed that the method of logical

reasoning is founded upon the axiom of identity, the
Now he self-consciously

principle of non-contradiction.

points out that the knowledge of justice which had been

secured so far was produced by

a

logical argument which

flowed from an image, an idea, composed of words.

.
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By calling attention to the structure of the

conversation itself, Socrates has suddenly managed to cast
the entire conversation of the first four books into an
image, a mere shadow of the position where the conversation

now stands.

In so doing he is able to cast the idea of

happiness and eros which governed the earlier conversation
into

a

mere shadow of the true happiness and the highest

love which will soon be illuminated.

In the process the

role of imagery in the power of persuasion will also be

illuminated
The ideal city is

a

city composed of speech.

If it is

to be well-ordered and well-governed it must be ruled by

those who are most expert at the composition of language.
It must be ruled by philosophers and not poets or sophists

like Thrasymachus

shapes the state.

.

Language shapes the soul.

The soul

Therefore he who best controls language

will best control the state.

But whose language is best?

To ask this question is to ask to whom we should submit, by
whose language should we be persuaded in the contest among
the poets, sophists and philosophers?

How is it possible to

decide among the language of the theater, the language of
the assembly, and the language of the soul-doctors?

The text suggests that the speech which shapes our

souls is also shaped by love.

We are likely to be persuaded

by language shaped by the same love which directs our soul.

Persuasive speech therefore must contain an element of

seduction to entice the listener into desiring what is
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offered.

The love which guides philosophy is different from

(and superior to)

51

the love which guides the poetic speech

of the theater and the ordinary speech of the assembly and

the market.

The rules of philosophical speech flow from an

image which inspires its devotion, the image of the good.

Philosophy loves the image of the good which is always

harmoniously one, identical to itself and forever
unchanging.

52

Its truth is reflected in an unambiguous,

logical language.
for the good.

Its wisdom consists of its steady desire

Its knowledge consists in its expertise in

using language to promote the good of the soul.
Poetic speech and ordinary speech, Plato believes, are

ruled by the image of war and the contest (agon). 53

Their

truth is reflected in the ambiguous language of the theater
or the disputatious speeches of the assembly and the market

place.

Poetic speech loves to stir up the dangerous and

subversive emotions, while political speech seeks victory
either for its own sake or the honors it brings.

The

character of ordinary speech is revealed in the selfish
babble of the market place as it pursues the power to
acquire endlessly more goods.
in Plato's view:

They all lead to the same end

war and stasis.

In the Republic Socrates must persuade his audience

that what they really love is not what they think they love.

They think they love the physical pleasures obtainable
through money, sex and power.

But,

he argues,

54

such

pleasures are unstable and their pursuit leads only to

.

216

misery and the opposite of happiness.
want, he must argue,

What they really

is an internal state of harmony and

peace, being at one with oneself.

This desire can never be

fulfilled by the endless pursuit of physical pleasures and
objects.

That route leads only to war and stasis,

internally and externally, because it knows no end, no final
limit

Most people do not know what is truly good for them,

Socrates must argue, because they do not know the idea of
the good which everyone admittedly desires.

ideal state must be ruled by philosophers.

That is why the

Only

philosophers have knowledge of the good, the wisdom to
pursue it, and the skill to teach it.

While Socrates is extolling the virtues of the rule of

philosophy he is suddenly and forcefully interrupted by
Adeimantus who objects that Socrates really tricks his
listeners into seeming to contradict themselves because of
their lack of skill in the "game" of "question and

answer." 55

The participants, he complains, are left feeling

trapped with nowhere to move and nothing to say in this
"game where the pieces are words."

But the game has

"nothing to do with the truth," he declares, because the

world of action, the visible world, the real world all

contradict Socrates' world of words.

Socrates' argument has

shown conclusively, it seems, that only philosophers are fit
to rule.

Yet, Adeimantus observes,

if we actually look at
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the people who are called philosophers we find that they are

either "scoundrels" or useless.

Adeimantus confronts Socrates with

powerful

a

contradiction between the compelling conclusion of his
argument that philosophers should rule and the contrary

evidence of the senses.

The objection raises fundamental

questions as to the power of persuasion and the meaning of
"truth."

Adeimantus is essentially conceding the

intellectual validity of the argument on Socrates' own
terms.

But why, he asks, should anyone be persuaded by

logical argument, especially when the evidence of one's own
eyes shows that the logical truth is falsified by the facts
of the visible world?

Adeimantus is defending the knowledge

of the senses and the visible world (which after all seem to

produce real pleasures) against the seemingly insubstantial
truths of the intellectual world.

Socrates answers that he can only respond to
Adeimantus' objections with

portrait in words.

a

metaphor,

a

poetic image,

a

He supplies the image of a ship with a

mob of ignorant sailors who refuse to believe that sailing
and navigating require any special skills.
is reminiscent of Thucydides

'

The image, which

portrait of the Corcyraean

Revolution, portrays democracy as the equivalent of stasis.
It portrays the mob of sailors as believing that only

coercion and "sharp persuasion" are the skills necessary to
ruling.

56

The image is an allegory of language ungoverned

by the compass of truth.

.
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There is nothing deceptive or devious about Socrates'

resort to imagery in defense of logical truth.

Indeed he

claims that it is required. And Plato clearly wishes to call

attention to this shift in the rhetorical strategy from
strict argumentation to metaphorical imagery.

Otherwise he

would not have Adeimantus pointedly taunt Socrates with the
apparent inconsistency in his method.
used similes," Adeimantus teases him. 57

"I thought you never

Plato is conceding,

even insisting, that the force of all persuasion including
the persuasion of logic proceeds from imagery and vision.
It is finally the correctness of the image,

its truth, which

determines the truth of the argument and the power of
persuasion.

In a contest between two forms of truth,

the

logical and the empirical, for example, the correctness of
the vision informing the truth will determine the victor.

Socrates uses his image of the shipboard mob to

undermine his listeners' allegiance to the embodied world
and the limited vision of the goods associated with it. He

intends to show that appeals to the "real" world as

verification of truth are forced to presume

a

a

final

certain

necessity to the way things are.

Theory must submit to

reality, the empiricists claim.

But Socrates takes the

radical step of proposing that theory might be
reality.

a

test of

Theory, and thus language, may be more true than

reality
Plato seeks to found political theory on logical
be the
necessity, implying that things need not necessarily

.
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way they seem.

If the world does not conform to the theory,

then the world may be false.

In this upside-down world it

can be simultaneously true that
fit to rule by nature,

useless or evil.

and

b)

a)

philosophers are the most

most philosophers are either

But the apparent contradiction convicts

the world not the theory.

Several other images swiftly follow the image of the

shipboard mob in the text,

58

all designed to loosen ties to

the visible world and the loyalties, pleasures and loves it

commands.

The images are intended to open up the

intellectual eye of the soul to its love for the highest
idea of the good, while dimming the eyes of the body

directed toward the physical world and its erotic pleasures.
The idea of the good is the idea which informs

knowledge and truth.
possible. 5 ^

The good makes knowledge and truth

Socrates says he is unable to state the

outlines of the good without recourse to imagery.

But he

can say what kinds of knowledge make use of the good.

They

are the kinds of knowledge which the guardians must be good
at such as mathematics and geometry which are based on the

skill of judging the difference between one thing and

another
If the good is not the principle of identity itself,

and
then it is the source of the power to make distinctions

judgments which rely on the law of identity to make them
possible.

good
It is worth recalling that the image of the

.

.
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supplied by Socrates in the text is the image of the sun
which is the source of power as well as light. 60
The power of judgment is called upon to resolve

contradictions
...if one is never seen without its contrary,

so that it

always appears to be its contrary as well as itself,
then it demands judgment because it baffles the soul and
forces it to investigate. The soul stirs up its mind
and asks what one itself is.
Thus the study of unity

would be one of the studies that lead the soul and turn
it to the contemplation of what is. 61
It is precisely this power of judgment which is subverted by

tragedy, Socrates claims, and it is the justification for
its expulsion.

Tragedy appeals to

a

confused, irrational

part of the soul by failing to distinguish between opposites
such as justice and injustice or good and evil.

Instead it

portrays opposites as inseparable in violation of the law of
identity
As he levels his charges against the imitative poetry
of tragedy,

Socrates cites the law of identity once more.

"Didn't we declare it impossible for the same thing to hold

contrary opinions about the same things at the same time?"
he asks.

62

The formal accusation follows:

tragedy portrays

persons "plunged into strife" within themselves "holding

contrary opinions about the same things at the same time,"
and contending and fighting within themselves in their

actions. 63

Finally the verdict,
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The imitative poet instills an evil regime in each
individual soul, gratifying an irrational thing in it
that distinguishes neither larger nor smaller but thinks
the same thing now large and now small; he is

maker

a

phantom-

who stands far from the truth. 64

...

and the sentence:

Thus in justice we may now bar him from the city, if it
is to have good laws, because by arousing, feeding and

strengthening that part he destroys the soul's rational
part ... and puts the rabble in charge. 65
The charge is not merely that tragedy appeals to the

emotions.

It is more serious than that.

Tragedy encourages

division and loss of identity in the soul in violation of
the foundational law of the city and the foundational law of

logic.

Tragedy confounds the logic and the psychology of
Significantly, Plato's

identity.

most descriptively

passionate charge against tragedy is leveled at the shameful
portrait of good men in grief.

66

It is significant because

it is in grief at the loss of a loved one that we feel most

deeply torn in agony inside, as Socrates so profoundly
reminds us.

But a truly good man, he says, will resist

inner sorrow, pain, grief and suffering, and certainly never

display anything but

a calm,

deliberate persona in public.

Reason dictates the expulsion of poetry, Socrates
insists.

But in a rather disingenuous touch on Plato's part

poetry
he also has Socrates concede that "should imitative

directed to pleasure be able to give reasons for her
existence in

a

well-regulated city, we would gladly take her
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back from exile

1,67

itself rationally.

But of course tragedy cannot justify

To do so would negate its own identity

and destroy its balance.

rationality.

Tragedy is the very antithesis of

The ancient feud cited by Socrates between

philosophy and tragedy is real and irreconcilable. 68
are contradictory and,

They

true to the form of rationality, the

philosopher- judge must resolve the contradiction by

eliminating one side with conviction.
Plato also permits Socrates to generously allow others,
not poets,
form.

to plead on tragedy's behalf but only in prose

Until they persuade us, however,

"we'll chant this

argument [of the Republic] to ourselves whenever we hear her
as a charm to ward off her spell...." 69

Plato's emphasis

upon the form of language to be permitted at trials and

appeals is telling.

First of all, the trial is

a

mirror

image of the trial and conviction of Socrates (in the
Apology)

for refusing to speak in a manner pleasing to the

Athenians.

Secondly, the suggestion that we should drown

out the voice of the opposition with our own speech to

ourselves recalls two injunctions.

The first is the

Platonic injunction that the voice in which we talk to

ourselves is the way in which we govern ourselves to

maintain our freedom and our identity, which are one.

The

second, opposing injunction comes from the image of

Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia, where Agamemnon
silenced the voice of his daughter, drowning her speech in
strength,

in order to maintain his identity as a warrior.

.
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Lastly, the insistent control of language is reminiscent of
the "Melian Dialogue" in which the Athenians restricted the

Melians' plea for justice to a form which guaranteed their

extinction
Three images remain long after the trial and

condemnation of tragedy in the Republic:
and Socrates.

Melos, Agamemnon,

The same three images and the truths they

represent about power and wisdom continue to haunt, and
contest, the language of politics today.

/

.

:

.
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CHAPTER

5

CONCLUSION

Democratic Possibilities
This dissertation originated with a concern for the

nature of modern political power and its relation to truth
and language.

As with Arendt,

this concern was rooted in

the memory and the horror of the Nazi period in Germany.

In

Hitler's Germany the power of the state was concentrated in
a

drive to unify and dominate the western political world

under the Third Reich.

The power of the state was further

mobilized to exterminate an entire people identified as
people and not

a state.

a

What is the connection between

these drives of power and what are the implications for the

politics of the modern state in general and the modern

democratic state in particular?
Furthermore,

been exhausted.

I

These questions have never
fear that we have not yet

learned to frame them rightly.
It is too easy to launch an interrogation of history

from

a

medical or moral perspective which would identify

Nazi Germany as

a

diseased, perverted, or otherwise

pathological state.

We might,

for example,

look to the

peculiar conditions of German history in order to fix the
onset of the disease and thereby prevent it or cure it in
ourselves.

But this line of questioning presumes that a

diseased politics is

a

state of contamination or infestatio
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by a foreign invader.

The cure consists of prophylactically

preventing the infection or excising it once it has entered
the body.
a

The operative assumption is that we can identify

pure state of health free of disease and then seek to

attain or maintain it.

Excluded from this approach is the

thought that the very condition which we cherish as good

also generates the disease which we fight.
We might seek a more juridical account of the genesis
of Nazi Germany by characterizing it as a criminal state

ruled by thugs and murderers.

Such an account would at

least have the merit of conceding that bad children often

come from good families, but then only through perversion or

subversion never as fruition.
It must not be forgotten that the Nazi era sprouted

from democratic soil.

What if democracy and fascist

authoritarianism are produced from the same vine, and that
nurturing the one necessarily involves nourishing the other?
The question may seem absurd but it should not therefore be

forbidden.

Its apparent absurdity stems from the Platonic

premise that good and evil are opposites and that like
produces like:

good produces good; evil produces evil.

It

remained for Machiavelli to suggest that evil might produce
good.

Not until Nietzsche did the older, tragic thought

recur that good is also the father of evil.
The characterization of Nazi Germany as a transgressor

state quickly leads to the problem of limits.

There would

seem to be no form of politics immune from perversion or
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subversion.

"Politics" necessarily implies the formation

and use of power, and so the concept of limits applied to

politics seems to imply, as Arendt's work nicely
illustrates, the necessity of non-political limits upon

political power.

Those limits have been sought in morality

and philosophy which,

in the West,

find roots in Plato.

Following this path leads eventually but certainly to an
inquiry upon the nature of "truth" (philosophy) and the
"good"

(morality)

and their relation to political power.

The dimension of language is deeply implicated in this

inquiry because of its intimate relations with philosophic
truth and morality ("in the beginning was the word") but

also because language is the very medium of political life
and political power in democracy, more so, perhaps, than in

any other political arrangement.

This dissertation has tried to take seriously the

Nietzschean thought that cherished ideals may contain within
them the seeds of evil.

This endeavor entails

a

willingness

to consider the possibility that in some crude way the Nazi

regime in Germany represented neither

a

contamination nor

perversion of the modern democratic state but rather

harbinger of its future.

a

a

The point is not to condemn

democracy nor to celebrate Nietzsche.

The point is to open

an examination of democracy's foundations which is precluded

by the intellectual quarantine of an entire period of German

history as perversely or cancerously different.

It may not

be sufficient to intone "democracy" as a talisman against
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fascism.

It may be that something like German fascism,

albeit more refined, can and will happen here unless we are

prepared to confront all of the promises, the dangers as
well as the hopes, of our democratic ideals.

Surely it is

neither perverse nor diabolical to confront the possibility
that tyranny may flow from democracy.

consider it

a

Plato seemed to

certainty.

"Democracy" has many meanings.

This dissertation has

looked at three contending theoretical views of democracy

represented in works of three Greek thinkers
Aeschylus, and Plato

democracy.

— present

— Thucydides,

at the height of Athenian

These three views of democracy yield three

interwoven but contentious views of language, truth, and
power embedded in competing interpretations of nature.

Juxtaposition of these theoretical strands of thought
reveals many knotted but common political threads among

Themes of justice, law, wisdom, freedom, war, peace,

them.

death and immortality, for example, are but

few among the

a

many which might be singled out for further scrutiny.

Complete clarity is not to be expected, however.

Pulling on

one thread may loosen some but tighten others connected to
it.

I

see this as

a

gain and not

a

loss, however.

The project embarked upon here has not sought to

"analyze" the tapestry of our politics by unthreading its
past into its separate and distinct colors.

That sort of

autopsy offers its own rewards but it would,

I

exactly what

I

fear, destroy

have been seeking in the process of

*
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interpretation pursued here.

Politics is best understood in

the texture and the weave of its whole fabric.

We do not

better understand politics by unravelling the tapestry into
its separate yarns and threads,

sorting them, perhaps,

according to their different weights, thicknesses and
colors.

What

I

have sought to do instead is to unfold the

tapestry in which we ourselves are folded, and to pull on

a

few tantalizing strings to see how they might be tied to

others

.

In conclusion,

I

want to tug briefly but more firmly

upon the thread of "identity" left dangling from the
tapestry.

In the three texts examined here,

there can be

found three versions of identity associated with three

theoretical visions of democracy.

In Thucydides

'

History

the identity of Athens in the "person" of the assembly is

the focus of concern.

In Aeschylus'

Oresteia the torn

identity of Orestes occupies the stage.

And in Plato's

Republic the identity of the good soul is the subject of the
dialogue.

The material in these texts permits

a

retrospective look at the nexus of language, truth and power
from the perspective of these identities.

From there we can

we can speculate briefly on the same themes with respect to

modern democracy and its identity.
Thucydides' History concerns itself with the growth and

decline of Athenian power which is equated with greatness.

Within the heroic view of nature represented in that text,
to
power is composed of unity while weakness is attributed

.
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division.

Political power is shown to be

(poiesis)

of forces acting in concert,

a

composition

not disparately.

There is nothing strange about this view.

We have often

heard it said that "strength lies in unity" or "united we
stand, divided we fall."
in the Republic.

However,

It is also a view shared by Plato

in contrast to the Republic, at

least on the surface, the History suggests that political

power requires an enemy, an opponent, in order to sustain
and perhaps to construct its own identity.

To Thucydides

political power was inseparable from war.
In principle,

unity equals strength.

In actuality,

Athenian power derived from the decisions made by the often
fractious assembly.

But as long as the assembly could

remain united behind

a

power.

single policy, it was unequalled in

To the extent that the Athenian assembly was united,

to the extent that it spoke with one voice, we can say that
it acquired a single identity.

own,

Thucydides' task, and our

is to comprehend the accomplishment of that identity,

an accomplishment best understood through the speeches of

Pericles

Thucydides was no democrat.

He considered the assembly

too whimsical to govern effectively.

But as long as the

voice of the assembly was identical to the voice of
Pericles, democracy was the most powerful form of government

exciting the greatest possible loyalty and sacrifice.

The

voice
unity of the assembly and its identification with the
however.
of Pericles was not naturally harmonious,

It was a
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construction of power, specifically the power of persuasion
exercised by Pericles.
The persuasive power of Pericles had one notable

feature from which it drew its superior force.

Pericles was

uniquely able to mute and render impotent any opposition to
his policies.

He accomplished this feat primarily through

the "imagination of desire."

As we saw in Chapter One,

Pericles continually enlisted support for his policies by

appealing to the one desire which could unite the men of
Athens:

the desire for eternal glory.

has always been the dream of heroes.

An immortal death

And Pericles held out

to men the hope of participation in the undying fame of

Athens due to its greatness in war.
Sparta,

the enemy, did not seriously threaten the

identity of Athens.
the enemy,

Indeed it was partly through Sparta,

that Athens consolidated its identity.

There was

another force, however, which did threaten to decompose the

identity of Athens:

the force of disintegration and decay

which eventually overtakes all things.

Identity and therefore power are coterminous in
Thucydides' History.

But identity appears always to be a

precarious and dying achievement.
it holds its opposite force at bay.

It exists only so long as

This opposing force is

portrayed symbolically in the History in the form of the
plague (which ironically may have been caused by Pericles'

victorious policy of concentrating the Athenian population
within the walls of Athens)

,

and also by the Corcyraean
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revolution which represents the decay of language and
foretells the breakdown of persuasion which had sustained
the identity of the Athenian assembly.

The figure of Pericles represents the force of identity
in the text.

He does not change.

He remains constant.

"I

am the same man and do not alter," he tells the assembly at

one point, "it is you who change." 3

Can we find another

figure within the text to personify the opposite force which

undermines identity thereby threatening heroic fame and
glory?

This figure has no voice but it is a silent presence

representing the other side of identity in the funeral
oration of Pericles.

Addressing the women in his audience

at the very end of his speech,

the "greatest

[glory]

Pericles admonishes them that

will be hers who is least talked of

among the men whether for good or for bad."^

The female

force, and women's voices, represent the silenced "other" in

Thucydides

'

History.

In heroic Greek literature the female force often

embodied unsteadiness and unfaithfulness.

Women were

considered dangerously unreliable not because they were weak
but because they tended to change sides,

wander.

they tended to

The classic representative of this dangerously

ambiguous force in the heroic tradition is Helen, as

Aeschylus reminds us in the Agamemnon.

Within the funeral

oration of Pericles, Thucydides has insinuated the contest
between truth and falsity that is at the heart of his
History, a contest between male and female forces.
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Pericles, the hero and the male, embodies truth.

He is

singleminded and addresses the true desire of the assembly.
Women embody untruth, they bear

a

false identity, and they

must be barred from the field of language lest they corrupt
it.

Thucydides bears an ambiguous relation to Homer.

He

positions himself against Homer and the poets, but at the
same time he strives to be

better "Homer" than Homer was.

a

Rather than condemning Homer, it seems that Thucydides seeks
to rival him.

Plato is to Thucydides as Thucydides is to Homer.

The

Republic seems to condemn Homer along with the tragic poets,
but the similarities between Thucydides' and Plato's texts

suggest that Plato also seeks to rival Homer for the poetic

heights of truth.

then the Republic is heroic

If so,

literature and philosophy is heroic at its origins.
The similarities between Plato and Thucydides are

perhaps best revealed in
Socrates and Pericles.

a

comparison of their own heroes,

Each seeks to shape the identity and

therefore the government of Athens through the force of
persuasion.

Pericles of course addresses his persuasive

powers toward the assembly while Socrates, in the Republic,

directs his persuasion toward the structure of the
individual soul which he identifies as the source of the

Athenian form of government.-

1

From Pericles to Socrates,
but the ideal remains the same.

"identity" has moved inward
To speak with, and accede

.

237

to,

single authoritative voice yields superior strength

a

and goodness (arete).

Plural, opposing voices signal a

decline into weakness and political stasis.
Socrates also recognizes, along with Pericles, that

persuasive force relies on an appeal to desire.

Even the

persuasive power of reason and logic, Socrates demonstrates,
must ultimately rest upon powerfully seductive images for
its force.

Socrates' task in the Republic is to shift the

image of desire away from the eternal glory earned in war

toward the inner peace found in the eternally elusive quest
for truth in the soul.

The traditional Greek desire for

immortality in the face of death is consoled in the Republic
by the final Myth of Er which closes the text while

extending the prospect of reincarnation into another life
spent in the eternally rewarding quest for the truth of

identity
The Periclean path to identity requires an enemy to
fight.

It also requires the exclusion of another dangerous

opponent, one who is also a friend, from the field of

language which is also the field of power.

The double, and

therefore false, identity of women represents

a

threat to

the unwavering heroic male identity, and so they are

silenced by Pericles, neither to be heard from nor talked
about in public.
Are there parallels to be found in the Republic?

On

the surface there are no enemies in The Republic, only

errant friends.

This apparent harmony is consistent with
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the Platonic pursuit of identity as a universal ideal

reflecting the universal truth of nature.
however,

It can be argued,

that there is an enemy in the Republic occupying

the space of Melos in the History.

position is filled by tragic poetry.

In the Republic that
In the History Melos

was destroyed in part for its refusal to submit to the

language of justice and the law of nature articulated by the
Athenians.

In the Republic tragedy,

too,

is invited to save

itself by pleading its case in the rational language

established by Socrates.

Tragedy could not of course speak

in a different voice without annihilating its own identity,

and so the voice of tragedy was banished from the ideal
city,

silenced by philosophy.
Is it significant that poetry is consistently

identified as

a

feminine voice ("she") in the Republic?

The

crime for which tragic poetry is convicted and banished from
the city is the crime of ambiguity, a traditionally feminine

characteristic.

Surely it is significant that it is

a

woman, a harping wife, who corrupts the ideal regime of the

philosopher king, initiating its decline and fall into
tyranny.

If so,

then there is strong evidence for

believing that the ascendence of philosophy and the

conviction of reason is inseparable from the condemnation of
the "other."

The charge is not merely that the ancient

Greeks were sexist, but that philosophy and the rule of
reason may in its very structure be one-sided and blind to

.
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the crimes and sacrifices it commits on the altar of

identity.
The Republic seeks to replace the ideal of

death in

a

a

heroic

great war with the idea of a permanent peace

beginning within and extending outward.

But because it does

not successfully escape the heroic model it opposes, the

Republic, and by implication the unopposed rule of reason,

may actually set the stage for even more gloriously

devastating wars than either Homer or Thucydides ever
dreamed of
Aeschylus' Oresteia systematically undermines the

destructive assumptions and pretensions of the heroic,
imperialistic democracy portrayed by Thucydides.

It does so

by affirming the fundamental ambiguity of language and

identity.

It reveals in the Agamemnon the crimes and the

sacrifices which flow from the heroic ideal of singleminded
resolution.

It substitutes in the Eumenides a vision of

democracy in which all voices are heard and none are
silenced.

It is no accident that in Greek tragedy women's

voices are powerful and the female characters are often the
most richly complex.

The result is not a harmonious chorus

but a noisy and fearsome clamor.

The Oresteia affirms the

necessity of political judgments and convictions which are
not simultaneously condemnations of the other.

identifies politics as

a

It

contest of claims to be

precariously balanced, and

a set of

dangerously straddled, rather than

dilemmas to be
a set of

conflicts to be
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"resolved."

We learn from Greek tragedy that rationally

resolving conflict often means little more than unequal
sacrifice and crimes committed by the strong against the
weak in the name of "justice".
If Greek tragedy remains the best critic of the heroic

ideal, it can also stand as a warning that Plato did not

succeed in replacing the heroic foundations and aspirations
of ancient democracy but merely succeeded in concealing
n

them.'

The warning is relevant today only if it can be

shown that the modern democratic state rests upon Platonic

foundations.

The full challenge of that task cannot be

undertaken here but the most promising approach to its

exploration begins with Nietzsche.
The authoritarian implications of the Republic have not

been overlooked by other scholars. 8

Possession of the final

truth is antithetical to democracy.

Still others, however,

point out that even Socrates never claimed to have seen the
light of the "good" or to be in possession of the truth.
Its positive identification appears to be eternally elusive.

Truth claims appear always open to further interpretation

Therefore "there can be no permanent elite

and disputation.

who have the right to rule because they know [the truth]."
On this conventional, liberal reading democracy consists of
a

collective pursuit of truth in which no single vantage

point can claim

a

monopoly. The eternally elusive character

of truth is thought to be a political safeguard against

tyranny while pulling us toward community.
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This position tends to overlook the fact that "truth"
and "good" are finally coterminous in the Republic, and that
the quest for truth is first of all a quest for internal

purity and goodness.

While the elusiveness of truth is seen

on one hand to be a safeguard, few beside Nietzsche have

explored the consequences of never being able to be "good"
enough or pure enough.
into the pursuit of

The pursuit of goodness translates

internally harmonious identity.

a pure,

The question then becomes, What are the consequences of

never being able to achieve that identity?

The short answer

is that the impossibility of meeting that standard generates

feelings of inadequacy, helplessness, and self-hatred
(Nietzschean

"

ressentiment"

)

which translate into

pool of damned up docility and rage.

a

public

This reservoir of

docility and rage then generates the supply of political
power available for deployment by Nietzsche's "sick priests"
and politicians.^

Turning this Nietzschean lens toward the past and the
rise of German fascism reveals heroic strains.

One might

conclude that targeting the Jews for elimination performed
the strategic function of concentrating the fear and hatred
of the other,

which already diffusely existed, in order to

generate the political will and power for war.

Turning the

Nietzschean lens toward the present, we might inquire about
our own foundations and our own trajectory.

What sort of

democracy do we have and what will emerge from it?

It is a

contest of course, but one in which we had better be able to
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identify the contestants, for we are, heart and soul, listed
among them.
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Notes
1

Of course I have not merely "found" the tapestry
displayed here.
I am in part its weaver and interpreter as
well as a figure in its tale.
But it seems to me that
political theory is always in this position and that the
dream of detachment is itself one of the threads in the
Platonic yarn. What I have tried to do is to make such
threads more visible as threads which pull against others.
We cannot extricate ourselves from the tapestry in which we
occupy such a prominent position.

Poiesis implies composition in the sense of something
made or fashioned, and is not restricted to writing or
The craftsman is as much a poet as the dramatist.
singing.
There is, therefore, an inescapable dimension of power to
poetry, and the texts examined here are, at a most profound
level, poems of power.
3

Thucydides, 2.61.

4

Thucydides, 2.45.

These addresses are not mutually exclusive, however, and
their comparison has the potential to illuminate the
mutually constitutive relationship between national and
individual identity which obtains today.
6
Plato, Republic, 549c-d.
7
This is not a claim about Plato's intentions.
5

8

See,

Little

,

e.g., I. F. Stone,
Brown, 1988)

The Trial of Socrates (Boston:

.

The Tragedy of Political Theory, 263.
10
See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, tr.
Francis Golffing (New York: Doubleday, 1956).
9

J.

Peter Euben,
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Efforts to ground legitimate limits of political power upon a foundation of truth
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power," Nietzsche's attack on truth has conventionally been interpreted as an affirmation
argue to the contrary that Nietzsche's work may be an attempt to
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